STMICROELECTRONICS

COMMON CRITERIA FOR IT SECURITY EVALUATION

TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE ST33TPHF2ESPI MODE TPM 1.2 TPM FIRMWARE 0x47.0x0C

SECURITY TARGET





DOCUMENT REVISION

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 ST Reference

This security target is referenced with the following information

- Filename: ST33TPHF2ESPI_M12_ST
- Revision: 01.02p,
- Internal documentation system reference: SSS_ST33TPHF2ESPI_M12_STP_16_001
- Date: January 30, 2017

This security target is strictly conformant to the TPM Protection Profile [TPM1.2 PP rev116].

1.2 Purpose

This document presents the Security Target (ST) of the ST33TPHF2ESPI product.

The reference and definition of the TOE are provided in Chapter 2.

A list of abbreviation definition is provided in Appendix A

1.3 <u>Context</u>

The original text from the protection profile [TPM1.2 PP rev116] is indicated with a light grey font.



2 **TOE DESCRIPTION**

2.1 <u>TOE reference</u>

Table 1: Target of evaluation: ST33TPHF2ESPI reference

Product	Hardware	Hardware Version (Ext.Int)	Firmware Version Major.Minor ¹ (Major.Minor in decimal ²)
ST33TPHF2ESPII	ST33HTPH	A.C	0x47.0x0C (decimal 71.12)

The chip packaging is not included in the TOE.

2.2 <u>TOE Overview</u>

2.2.1 <u>TOE Definition</u>

The ST33TPHF2ESPI is a hybrid TPM product targeting PC, server platforms and embedded systems.

This product supports two modes exclusively:

TPM 1.2 mode: the set of TPM 1.2 commands is supported and only TPM 1.2 assets can be accessed

• TPM 2.0 mode: the set of TPM 2.0 commands is supported and only TPM 2.0 assets can be accessed.

The mode can be selected by the platform vendor and locked irreversibly during platform provisioning. The mode can also be left modifiable by the platform firmware after platform provisioning.

The TOE is the product ST33TPHF2ESPI in mode TPM 1.2. The same product ST33TPHF2ESPI in mode TPM 2.0 is covered by another security target conformant with the TPM 2.0 protection profile.

The TOE is the TCG PC Client Specific Trusted Platform Module (PCCS TPM). This TPM is hardware, firmware and/or software that implements the functions defined in the TCG Trusted Platform Module Main Specification, version 1.2, [5] [6] [7] and the PC client specific interface specification [8]. The TCG Trusted Platform Module Specification describes the design principles [5], the TPM structures [6] and the TPM commands [7]. The PC Client Interface Specification [8] describes the platform-specific set of requirements of the TPM for the PC Client, the details of what interfaces and protocols are used to communicate with the TPM and specific items like the minimum number of PCRs required and NV Storage available.

The primitives provided by the TOE include cryptographic algorithms for key generation, digital signatures, random number generation, sealing data to system state, protected storage, binding information to the TPM, support of direct anonymous attestation and physical protection. Attestation by the TOE is an operation that provides proof of data known to the TPM. This is done by digitally signing specific internal TPM data using an Attestation Identity Key (AIK). The acceptance and validity of both the integrity measurements and the AIK itself are determined by the Verifier. The AIK is obtained using either the Privacy Certification Authority or the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol. The DAA is a protocol for vouching for an AIK using zero-knowledge-proof technology.



¹ The firmware major and minor versions may be retrieved from the TOE with the command TPM_GetCapability [7] with capability TPM_CAP_VERSION_VAL and formatted in the response field with the value 0x01 0x02 0x47 0x0C according to TPM_VERSION [6].

² Some tools may report the version in decimal value. In that case, the version retrieved is 71.12.

2.2.2 <u>TOE Major Security features</u>

The PCCS TPM provides all services required for a TPM in the TCG Trusted Platform Module Main Specification, version 1.2, [5] [6] [7] and additional services that are optional in the main TPM specification but mandatory in the PC client specific interface specification [8]. The PCCS TPM provides physical protection for internal user data and TSF data.

In TCG systems roots of trust are components that must be trusted because misbehavior might not be detected. There are commonly three Roots of Trust in a trusted platform; a root of trust for measurement (RTM), root of trust for storage (RTS) and root of trust for reporting (RTR). The RTM is a computing engine capable of making inherently reliable integrity measurements. Typically the normal platform computing engine is controlled by the core root of trust for measurement (CRTM). The CRTM is the instructions executed by the platform when it acts as the RTM. The RTM is also the root of the chain of transitive trust. The RTS is a computing engine capable of maintaining an accurate summary of values of integrity digests and the sequence of digests. The RTR is a computing engine capable of reliably reporting information held by the RTS. The TCG Specification Architecture Overview [11] provides a more detailed description.

Support for the Root of Trust for Measurement

The TPM supports the integrity measurement of the trusted platform by calculation and reporting of measurement digests of measured values. The measurement values are representations of embedded data or program code scanned and provided to the TPM by the measurement agent, such as the Root-of-Trust-for-Measurement. The TPM supports cryptographic hashing of measured values and calculates the measurement digest by extending the value of a Platform Configuration Register (PCR) with a calculated or provided hash value by means of the SHA-1. The PCRs are shielded locations of the TPM which can be reset by TPM reset or a trusted process, written only through measurement digest extensions and read.

Root of Trust for Reporting

The root of trust for reporting (RTR) exposes the measurement digests stored in the PCRs and attests to the authenticity of these measurement digests based on trusted platform identities or the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol. The trusted platform identities for RTR are defined by Attestation Identity Credentials for Attestation Identity Keys (AIK) generated by the TPM. The TPM creates digital signatures over the PCR values using an Attestation Identity Key.

Each TPM is identified and validated using its Endorsement Key. A TPM has only one endorsement key pair. The Endorsement Key is transitively bound to the Platform via the TPM as follows:

- An Endorsement Key is bound to one and only one TPM (i.e., there is a one to one correspondence between an Endorsement Key and a TPM.)
- A TPM is bound to one and only one Platform, (i.e., there is a one to one correspondence between a TPM and a Platform.)
- Therefore, an Endorsement Key is bound to a Platform, (i.e., there is a one to one correspondence between an Endorsement Key and a Platform.

The Endorsement Key is used in the process of issuance the Attestation Identity Credentials and to establish a platform owner.

Root of Trust for Storage



The TPM may be used to provide secure storage for an unlimited number of private keys or other data by means of encryption. The resulting encrypted file, which contains header information in addition to the data or key, is called a BLOB (Binary Large Object) and is output by the TPM and can be loaded in the TPM when needed. The functionality of the TPM can also be used so that private keys generated on the TPM can be stored outside the TPM (encrypted) in a way that allows the TPM to use them later without ever exposing such keys in the clear outside the TPM. The TPM uses RSA key technology to encrypt data and keys and may implement cryptographic algorithms of equivalent strength.

The functionality used to provide secure storage is:

- TPM_Seal and TPM_Unseal, which perform RSA encrypt and decrypt, respectively, on data that is externally generated. The sealing operation encrypts not only the data, but also the values of the selected PCRs and the locality that must exist during for unseal and tpmProof, which is a unique secret identifier for the TPM sealing the data. To unseal the data, three conditions must exist:
 - (i) the appropriate key must be available for unseal,
 - (ii) the TPM PCRs must contain the values defined at the time of the seal operation, and
 - (iii) the value of tpmProof must be the same as that encrypted during the seal operation.

By requiring the PCR values to be duplicated at unseal and the tpmProof value to be checked, the seal operation allows software to explicitly state the future "trusted" configuration that the platform must be in for the decrypted key to be used and for decryption to only occur on the specified TPM.

• TPM_Unbind, which RSA decrypts a blob created outside the TPM that has been encrypted using a public key where the associated private key is stored in the TPM.

The key types used for the Root for Trust of Storage include:

- The Storage Root Key (SRK), which is the root key of a hierarchy of keys associated with a TPM; it is generated within a TPM and is a non-migratable key. Each owned TPM contains a SRK, generated by the TPM at the request of the Owner. Under that SRK may be organized different trees dealing with migratable data or non-migratable data.
- Storage keys, which are used to RSA encrypt and RSA decrypt other keys and sealed data with their security attributes in the Protected Storage hierarchy, only.
- Binding Keys, which are used for TPM_Unbind operations only. A binding operation (performed outside the TPM) associates identification and authentication data with a particular data set and the entire data blob is encrypted outside the TPM using a binding key, which is an RSA key. The TPM_Unbind operation uses a private key stored in the TPM to decrypt the blob so that the data (often a key pair) stored in the blob may be used.

Other security services and features

The TPM provides cryptographic services hashing of arbitrary data by means of the hash function SHA-1 and creation of digital signatures with signing keys which must be a leaf of the Storage Root Key hierarchy. The private key of a singing key pair is used for signing operations only.

The TPM provides non-volatile storage as a shielded location for data of external entities.



The TPM owner controls access to the non-volatile storage. The access control may include the need for authentication of the user, delegations, PCR values and other controls. Keys managed by the TPM may be non-migratable, migratable or certifiable migratable. A nonmigratable key is a key that cannot be transported outside beyond a specific TPM. A migratable key is a key that may be transported outside the specific TPM. In addition some keys must be bound to a specific TPM but should be able to be backed-up or migrated under certain circumstances. The certified migration allows a Migration Selection Authority therefore to control a migration process without handling the migrated key itself or respectively uses a Migration Authority to control the migration process without the knowledge of the data or the migrated key. Those keys which are intended for certified migration are called certifiable migratable keys

The TPM provides a "tick counter" as a count of the number of ticks that have occurred since the start of a timing session. The time between the ticks is identified via a "tick rate" but it is the responsibility of the caller to associate the ticks to an actual UTC time.

The TPM provides also a monotonic counter as an ever-increasing incremental value for external use.

Generation and import of the Endorsement key pair and certificate

The Endorsement Key (EK) pair and associated EK certificate (EK credential) are stored in the TPM during the manufacturing process at the TOE lifecycle phase "Manufacturing".

The Endorsement key pair is generated by a HSM (Hardware Security Module) and then stored encrypted with a 2-DES transport key on a key server.

The Endorsement Key certificate is generated also by a HSM that stores the STMicroelectronics intermediate CA (Certification Authority) keys. The certificates are stored on a certificate server. CA keys are stored outside the HSM in backup encrypted with a 3-DES key. This backup key is generated under dual control by 3 different security officers;

The importation of the EK and EK certificate in the TOE is done by the personalization infrastructure that requests EK and EK certificate to the key and certificate servers. The personalization infrastructure decrypts the EK private key and writes it encrypted on the chip with the EK certificate.

The key server, certificate server, HSM and the personalization infrastructure are all located within the secure production area of the TOE.



2.3 <u>TOE Description</u>


2.3.1 <u>TOE hardware description</u>

The TOE includes the ST33HTPH hardware platform based on the ST33 product family.

The ST33HTPH is a serial access microcontroller designed for Trusted Platform Module applications that incorporates the most recent generation of ARM processors for embedded secure systems. Its SecurCore® SC300[™] 32-bit RISC core is built on the Cortex[™] M3 core with additional security features to help to protect against advanced forms of attacks.

The SC300TM core brings great performance and excellent code density thanks to the Thumb®-2 instruction set.

Figure 1: ST33HTPH block diagram



The ST33HTPH supports a SPI interface up to 34 Mhz compliant with [8] for integration with controllers for PC Client and Server platforms and system drivers.

The ST33HTPH hardware includes the following security features:

- Active shield
- Memory protection unit (MPU)
- Monitoring of environmental parameters through security sensors
- Code/Data Signature for Protection against fault attacks
- ISO 3309 CRC calculation block
- AIS-31 Class PTG2 compliant true random generator (TRNG)



- the EDES peripheral provides a secure DES (Data Encryption Standard) algorithm implementation,
- the AES peripheral provides a secure AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm implementation, and
- the NESCRYPT crypto-processor efficiently supports the public key algorithm.
- Three timers for TPM Clock and TPM Time management
- The ST ROM is located in non-volatile memory protected by a firewall. This ST firmware includes:
 - A test program used to validate the TOE production (OST)
 - A set of boot and flash management services



2.3.2 <u>TOE Firmware description</u>

The TOE firmware "F2E" is divided in four compiled blocks

- TPM firmware: dynamic block supporting the TPM 2.0 commands.
- Application Flash Loader (AFL): dynamic block responsible to manage the loading of a new firmware
- Code Memory Loader (CML): static block responsible to verify the integrity of the dynamic blocks and to launch one of the dynamic blocks depending on the TPM state machine
- NesLib: static cryptographic library providing high-level crypto services to the dynamic blocks
 - NesLib 4.2.9 for ST33 is integrated into the TOE

The TPM firmware, the CML and the AFL use all the services of the ST Firmware.

Set mode mgt TPM1.2 core TPM1.2 commands handling Î 1 Î Sessions and authorization 1 Cryptography HaL **PivOS** I/O driver Out of TOE TPM2.0 Τ commands I TPM2.0 core L Public

Figure 2: F2E mode TPM 1.2 Firmware block diagram

The TPM firmware is divided into several modules

- PivOS: module supporting a set of low-level services built with these submodules:
 - Flash, FU, AtomBlock, SelTests and Crypto
- Hardware abstraction layer (Hal) supporting a set of services provided by the hardware platform built with these submodules
 - I/O driver, Timers, Security and TRNG
- Block Manager (BM): module supporting heap services for data storage
- Secure nano kernel (Snk) supports low-level services for symmetric cryptography macrocells and for atomic transactions
 - Snk 2.20 for ST33 is integrated into the TOE
 - TPM1.2 Core: module supporting
 - Command processing: TPM LoopInit, Execution loop, TPM Process command)
 - Backgroung processing for RSA key generation and flash management
 (BKG activity)
 - Command authorization: Sessions and authorizations and Command handling
 - Data management: Misc, Crypto asym, DAM, Audit, PCR, MC (Monotonic Counters), SelfTests, Key Manager, Data, Delegation, NV, Flags
- TPM 1.2 Commands: module supporting TPM commands implementation
 - Startup&State, FU, Admin Testing, AuthData, Admin Opt-in, Sessions, Admin Owner, Delegation, Capability, NV, Admin function, Context, Storage, Monotonic Counter (MC), Cryptography, DAA, EK handling, Transport, Identity, Timing, PCR, Eviction.
- The modules "TPM2.0 commands" and "TPM2.0 Core" are included in the product and may be activated with the command TPM_SetMode. These modules are noninterfering with the TOE since TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 modes are exclusive and data accessed in these two modes are completely segregated.

2.3.3 <u>TOE guidance documentation</u>

The following documents must be used by the TOE user in order to configure and operate the TOE.

Table 2: User Documentation

User Documentation	Version	Date	Ref
TPM Main, Part 1, Design principles, Version 1.2 Level 2, revision 116, 1 March 2011,	Revision 116	March 1, 2011	[5]
TPM Main, Part 2, TPM Structures, Version 1.2 Level 2, revision 116, 1 March 2011	Revision 116	March 1, 2011	[6]
TPM Main, Part 3, Commands, Version 1.2 Level 2, revision 116, 1 March 2011	Revision 116	March 1, 2011	[7]
TCG PC Client Specific TPM Interface Specification (TIS) Version 1.3 – 21 March 2013	Revision 1.3	March 21 2013	[8]
TCG Credential profiles for TPM 1.2 version 1.0 revision 0.981, TCG, 18 January 2006	Revision 0.981	January 18, 2006	[9]
ST33TPHF2ESPI datasheet V9, Firmware 0x47.0x0C	V9	January 23, 2017	[29]



User Documentation	Version	Date	Ref
TPM EK Certificate – Chip and EK authenticity verification (2.0)	2.0	March 11, 2016	[25]
ST33TPHF2E - Security recommendations (1.3)	1.3	December 18, 2015	[26]

2.3.4 Forms of delivery

The TOE is delivered in form of complete chips which include the hardware, the firmware, the Endorsement Primary Keys and certificates, and the guidance documentation. The TOE is finished and the extended test features are removed. The TOE is delivered in different packages (e.g. TSSOP and VQFN). The ordering codes are listed in the document *ST33TPHF2ESPI:- Datasheet* V4 [27] and V5 [28].

The firmware behaviour is described in the document [29].

2.4 <u>TOE lifecycle</u>

The life cycle of the TOE as part of this evaluation includes

- phase 1 "Development" and
- phase 2 "Manufacturing"

as defined in the PP [11] section 1.3.3.

The phase 1 that includes TPM development involves the sites of

- ST ROUSSET (FRANCE)
- ST ANGMO KIO (SINGAPORE)

for the hardware development activities and

- ST ROUSSET (FRANCE)
- ST RENNES (FRANCE)
- ST ZAVENTEM (BELGIUM)

for the embedded software development activities.

The phase 2 that includes the TPM manufacturing, the TPM conformance testing, the TPM-Mfg EK key pair download and the TPM-Mfg EK credential issuance involves the sites of

- ST ROUSSET (FRANCE)
- ST CROLLES (FRANCE)
- ST TOA PAYOH.(SINGAPORE)



3 CONFORMANCE CLAIM

3.1 CC Conformance Claim

This security target is **conformant** to the Common Criteria version 3.1 R4.

This security target claims to be Common Criteria version 3.1 R4

- Part 1 conformant,
- Part 2 **extended** and
- Part 3 conformant.

The extended Security Function Requirement is the one defined in the protection profile.

3.2 PP Claim

This security target is in **strict conformance** to the Protection Profile PC Client Specific TPM, Family 1.2 Level 2 Revision 116 (Version 1.3) released by the Trusted Computing Group dated 14 July 2014.

The protection profile is registered and **certified through an assurance continuity maintenance report** by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-0030-2008-MA-02, Version 1.3,dated 14 July 2014.

3.3 Package claim

This security target does not claim conformance to a package of the PP [11]

This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL4 augmented with

- ALC_FLR.1
- AVA_VAN.4

defined in CC Part 3 [CCMB-2012-09-003].

3.4 <u>Conformance Rationale</u>

This security target claims strict conformance to only one PP [TPM1.2 PP rev116].

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a complete solution implementing the TCG Trusted Platform Module main specifications Version 1.2 level 2 revision 116 ([TPM Part1 116], [TPM Part2 116] and [TPM Part3 116]) and the TCG PC Client Specific TPM Interface Specification, Version 1.3 Final, Release 026 0 ([PC Client TIS 1.3]) as defined in the PP section 1.3.1. So the TOE is **consistent** with the **TOE type** in the PP.

The **security problem** definition of this security target is **consistent** with the statement of the security problem definition in the PP, as the security target claims strict conformance to the PP and no other threats, organizational security policies and assumptions are added.

The **security objectives** of this security target are **consistent** with the statement of the security objectives in the PP as the security target claims strict conformance to the PP and no other security objectives are added.

The **security requirements** of this security target are **consistent** with the statement of the security requirements in the PP as the security target claims strict conformance to the PP. One security functional requirement is added in this security target to cover the authenticity verification of the field upgrade binary file. All assignments and selections of the security functional requirements are done in the PP section 6.1 and in this security target section 7.1.

3.5 <u>Application note</u>

This security target claims compliance with the application note [23] released by the ANSSI (French CC Certification scheme) and defining security requirements for post-delivery code loading.



4 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

The content of the PP [TPM1.2 PP rev116] applies to this chapter completely.

4.1 <u>Threats</u>

The threats are defined in the PP section 4.1, no other threats are added.

The primary assets that have to be protected by the TOE against the listed threats are:

- User data
- TSF Data.

In order to protect the access to the primary assets, the following components are also considered are assets:

- Hardware of TOE
- Embedded firmware.

4.2 Organizational Security Policies

The organizational security policies are defined in the PP section 4.2.

The following security policy is added to this TOE:

Table 3: Organizational security policies for the TOE

#	OSP	Description
1	OSP.FieldUpgrade	The Platform software is allowed to perform Field Upgrade within the certified TPM or installing a new certified TPM before and after delivery to the end user. The end user shall be aware of the certification and the version of the TPM.

4.3 <u>TOE Operational environment assumptions</u>

The TOE environment is highly variable. In general the TOE is assumed to be in an uncontrolled environment with no guarantee of the TOE's physical security.

The TOE assumptions to the IT environment are defined in the PP section 4.3, no other assumptions are added.



5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES

This section shows the security objectives which are relevant for the TOE. For this section the PP can be applied completely.

5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

The security objectives of the TOE are defined and described in the PP, section 5.1.The following security objectives are added to this TOE comply with [23].

#	Objective	Description
1	O.FieldUpgradeModeControl	The TOE restricts the Field Upgrade and mode selection to the authorised roles and accepts for Field Upgrade only authentic update data provided by the TOE vendor.
2	O.Secure_Load_ACode	The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be loaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to be assembled with the Initial TOE.
3	O.Secure_AC_Activation	Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Final TOE shall be completed before activation. If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption, or incident which prevents the forming of the final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain in its initial state of fail secure.
4	O.TOE_Identification	The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non-volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data. After Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of the initial TOE and Additional Code. The user shall be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Additional Code(s) which are embedded in the Final TOE.

Table 4:	Security	objectives	for the TOE
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5.2 <u>Security Objectives for the operational environment</u>

The security objectives for the operational environment are described in the PP, section 5.2. The following security objective for the operational environment is added for this TOE:

Table 5: Security objectives for the operational environment

#	Objective Name	Objective Description
1	OE.FieldUpgradeInfo	The developer via AGD documentation will instruct the admin doing the upgrade how to do the upgrade and that the admin should inform the end user regarding the Field Upgrade process, its result, whether the installed firmware is certified or not, and the version of the certified TPM.




5.3 Security Objectives rationale

The following table provides an overview of the mapping between the security objective for the TOE and the functional security requirements. The table shows and the rationale demonstrates that each security objective for the TOE is traced back to threats countered by that security objective and OSPs enforced by that security objective; each security objective for the operational environment is traced back to threats countered by that security objective, to OSPs enforced by that security objective, and to assumptions upheld by that security objective. All security objectives counter all threats, enforce all organisational security policies and uphold all assumptions.

The security objectives for the TOE and for the operational environment listed in the PP are covered by the table and rationale described in the PP, section 5.3.

The following table and rationale covers the security objectives for the TOE and for the operational environment listed in this security target.

Table 6: Security objectives rationale



T.Imperson: An unauthorised individual may impersonate an authorised user of the TOE and thereby gain access to TOE data in shielded locations and protected capabilities. T.Imperson is countered by O.FieldUpgradeModeControl. This objective prevents impersonation by authentication based on managed roles with their security attributes and access control considering security attributes of the users securely provided by the TOE environment:

• O.FieldUpgradeModeControl: This objective requires that only platform firmware or TPM owner are allowed to perform Field Upgrade or Mode selection.

T.Bypass: An unauthorized individual or user may tamper with TSF, security attributes or other data in order to bypass TOE security functions and gain unauthorized access to TOE assets. T.Bypass is countered by O.Secure Load ACode:

• O.Secure_Load_ACode: This objective requires that only authorized and authentic Additional code can be loaded in the TOE.

T.Insecure_State: The TOE may start-up in an insecure state or enter an insecure state, allowing an attacker to obtain sensitive data or compromise the system.

T.Insecure_State is countered by O.Secure_AC_Activation. This objectives ensure the preservation of secure state in case of failure:

 O.Secure_AC_Activation: this Objective requires that if the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption, or incident which prevents the forming of the final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain in its initial state of fail secure.

T.Modify: An attacker may modify data in shielded locations or their security attributes in order to gain access to the TOE and its assets. The integrity of the information may be compromised due to the unauthorised modification or destruction of the information by an attacker. T.Modify is countered by O.TOE_Identification:



• O.TOE_Identification: . this Objective requires that after Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of the initial TOE and Additional Code

OSP.FieldUpgrade: The Platform software or the TPM owner is allowed to perform Field Upgrade within the certified TPM or installing a new certified TPM before and after delivery to the end user. The end user shall be aware of the certification and the version of the TPM.

The OSP.FieldUpgrade is implemented by O.FieldUpgradeModeControl O.Secure_Load_ACode, O.Secure_AC_Activation, O.TOE_Identification and OE.FieldUpgradeInfo:

- O.FieldUpgradeModeControl: Ensures that
 - the field upgrade or mode selection can only be performed by the platform software or TPM owner and
 - o only authentic update data provided by the vendor are accepted.
- O.Secure_Load_ACode: Ensures that
 - the Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code and
 - the Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be loaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to be assembled with the Initial TOE.
- O.Secure_AC_Activation: Ensures that
 - Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way.
 - All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Final TOE shall be completed before activation.
 - If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption, or incident which prevents the forming of the final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain in its initial state of fail secure
- O.TOE_Identification: Ensures that
 - The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code.
 - The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non-volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data.
 - After Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of the initial TOE and Additional Code. The user shall be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Additional Code(s) which are embedded in the Final TOE.
- OE.FieldUpgradeInfo: The operational environment is required to ensure that the end user shall be aware of the field upgrade process and its result, whether the installed firmware is certified or not and the version of the certified TPM.



6 EXTENDED COMPONENT DEFINITION

The extended component "FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers" (FCS_RNG.1) is already described in the PP. No other extended components are added.

FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers

Family behaviour

This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.

Component levelling:

FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers	1	

FCS_RNG.1	Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric.
Management:	FCS_RNG.1
	There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:	FCS_RNG.1
	There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RNG.1	Random number generation
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1	The TSF shall provide a [selection: <i>physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid</i>] random number generator that implements: [assignment: <i>list of security capabilities</i>].
FCS_RNG.1.2	The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].



7 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

7.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE

7.1.1 Security Functional Requirements listed by the TPM1.2 Protection Profile

The security functional requirements (SFRs) for the TOE are defined in the PP section 6.1. All assignments and selections of the Security Functional Requirements are done in the PP with the exception of the following SFRs that required to be completed in the security target.

The operations completed in this security target are marked in *italic* font.

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No dependencies

- FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
 - 1. Management of the TPM modes of operation,
 - 2. Management of Delegation Tables and Family Tables,
 - 3. Management of security attributes of keys,
 - 4. Management of security attributes of PCR,
 - 5. Management of security attributes of NV storage areas,
 - 6. Management of security attributes of monotonic counters,
 - 7. Reset the Action Flag of TPM dictionary attack mitigation mechanism,
 - 8. Management of TPM Field Upgrade

FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security attributes of keys, PCR, NV storage areas and monotonic counters.

FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

- FPT_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret authentication data of the user using OperatorAuth, TPM Owner, delegation entities, owner of entities, user of entities when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product.
- FPT_TDC.1.2The TSF shall use roles defined in [TPM Part2 116] and [TPM Part3116] when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.



Public

FCS_RNG.1	Random number generation		
	Hierarchical to:	No other components	
	Dependencies:	No dependencies	
FCS_RNG.1.1		e a <i>deterministic</i> random number generator that ass DRG.3 according to [21].	
(DRG.3.1)	if initialized with a random seed using a PTRNG of class PTG.2 as random source, the internal state of the RNG shall have at least 100 bit of min-entropy		
(DRG.3.2)	The RNG provides for	ward secrecy	
(DRG.3.3)	The RNG provides backward secrecy even if the current internal state is known		
FCS_RNG.1.2	The TSF shall provide	random numbers that meet	
(DRG.3.4)	The RNG initialized with a random seed before the first use of the RNG after each product power up and reseeded after 2^{32} requests generates output for more than 2^{34} stings of bit length 128 that are mutually different with probability of w>1- 2^{-16}		
(DRG.3.5)		cannot practically distinguish the random numbers so of an ideal RNG. The random numbers must stical test suite.	

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation /AES

Hierarchical to:No other componentsDependencies:[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: *AES key generator* and specified cryptographic key sizes *128 bits* that meet the following: *none*

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method: *key overwriting with "0"* or *generation of new key encryption key* that meets the following: *none*

FCS_COP.1 /RSA_Sig	Cryptographic operation		
	Hierarchical to:	No other components	
	Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic	



key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1The TSF shall perform signature generation and signature verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA signature
scheme [5] section 31.2.1, 31.2.2, 31.2.3 and cryptographic key sizes
RSA 512, 1024, 2048 that meet the following: PKCS#1 V2.0 ([PKCS#1])

FCS_COP.1 /RSA_Enc	Cryptographic operation		
	Hierarchical to:	No other components	

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm RSA encryption scheme [5] sections
31.1.1 and 31.1.2 and cryptographic key sizes RSA 512, 1024, 2048
that meet the following: PKCS#1 V2.0 [PKCS#1].

FCS_COP.1	Cryptographic op	eration
/SymEnc2	L Benerali se Lter	N.a. a

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform symmetric encryption and decryption in /SymEnc2 accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES mode CTR as described in [5] section 31.1.3 and mode CFB with cryptographic key size of 128 bits that meet the following: FIPS PUB 197, 2001 November 26 and <u>NIST Pub 800-38a</u>

FIA_UID.1	Timing of identification		
	Hierarchical to:	No other components	
	Dependencies:	No dependencies	
FIA_UID.1.1	The TSF shall allow:1. to execute commands indicated in PP [TPM1.2 PP rev116] table 12 column RQU as not requesting authentication,		
	č ,	 accessing objects where entity owner has given the user "World" access based on the value of TPM_AUTH_DATA_USAGE, 	
		TPM Interface commands TPM_HASH_START, A and TPM_HASH_END	
	on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.		



Public			
FIA_UID.1.2	2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.		
FIA_UAU.1	Timing of authentic	ation	
	Hierarchical to:	No other components	
	Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	
FIA_UAU.1.1	The TSF shall allow		
	1. to execute comr requesting authe	nands indicated in table 12 column RQU as not ntication,	
		s where entity owner has given the user "World" the value of TPM_AUTH_DATA_USAGE,	
		TPM Interface commands TPM_HASH_START, TA and TPM_HASH_END	
	on behalf of the user	to be performed before the user is authenticated.	
FIA_UAU.1.2		e each user to be successfully authenticated before SF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.	
FIA_UAU.5	Multiple authentication mechanisms		
	Hierarchical to:	No other components	
	Dependencies:	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.5.1	The TSF shall provide	e	
	 OIAP authorization session, OSAP authorization session, DSAP authorization session, Transport session, Commands which require authorization and are executed outside a authorization session to support user authentication. 		
FIA_UAU.5.2	The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following rule: the TOE maintains a counter of unsuccessful authentication. This counter is incremented each time a wrong authentication value is provided for OIAP, OSAP, DSAP authorization sessions. When the counters reaches a specific value (defined by capability Threshold), the activation Flag is set to True which makes that the response will be delayed. For each new unsuccessful authentication the response time is doubled until a maximum value. When this maximum value is reached the response time is always the maximum value		
FIA_AFL.1	Authentication failu	re handling	
	Hierarchical to:	No other components	
	Dependencies:	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication	
FIA_AFL.1.1	The TSF shall detect when a number <i>defined by capability Threshold</i> of unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to authentication attempts for the same user.		



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FIA_AFL.1.2	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been <i>met</i> , the TSF shall		
	1. Set the Action Flag to TRUE,		
	2. Add a delay in command response time for authorized commands, non authorized commands time is kept unchanged. This forbids another authorized command to be processed. Each new failed authentication doubles the response time up to a maximum value.		
FDP_ACF.1/	Security attribute based access control		
Deleg	Hierarchical to: No other components		
	Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset of access control		
	FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation		
FDP_ACF.1.1/ Deleg	The TSF shall enforce the Delegation SFP to objects based on the following: Delegated Entities and commands with the delegated permission defined in the delegation table row, locality, pcrInfo and key handle of the key in the Delegation owner blob.		
FDP_ACF.1.2/ Deleg	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:		
	 The TSF shall disallow the execution of a command in a DSAP session if the permission of this command is not set in the delegation table row in the Delegation owner blob used for the DSAP session, The TSF shall disallow the execution of a command in a DSAP session if the PCR_SELECTION of the DSAP session is not NULL and the pcrInfo of the DSAP session does not match the current PCR value of the PCR_SELECTION and locality. 		
FDP_ACF.1.3/ Deleg	The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: if the TPM command is listed in the table at [6], section 20.2.1 "Owner Permission Settings" including TPM_KeyControlOwner ³ at bit 31 or the key is listed in the table at [6] section 20.2.3 "Key Permission Settings", then the TPM owner or the key user can delegate that capability to a trusted process.		
FDP_ACF.1.4/ Deleg	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rules:		
	 if the TPM command is listed in the table at [6], section 20.2.2 "Owner commands not delegated" 		
	 if the key is listed in the table at [6], section 20.2.4 "Key commands not delegated", then the command can not be delegated. 		
	 The delegation is denied if family linked to delegation row, delegation owner blob or delegation key blob flag TPM_FAMFLAG_ENABLED is set to false 		
	 The delegation family configuration is no more editable when TPM is unowned if family flag TPM_DELEGATE_ADMIN_LOCK is set to TRUE 		



³ TPM_KeyControlOwner at bit 31 in section 20.2.1 "Owner Permission Settings" was added in revision 116.

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FDP_ACF.1/ KeyMan	-	ased access control	
neyillali	Hierarchical to:	No other components	
	Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset of access control	
		FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	
FDP_ACF.1.1/ KeyMan	 the following: subjects: comma AuthData,locality objects: (a) EK with the S TOE, (b) SRK with the anddisableFo (c) User keys wi keyUsage, ko (d) Wrapped Key 	the Key Management SFP to objects based on ands with security attributes ownerAuth, srkAuth, a, physical presence; SFR-related security attribute ownership of the e SRF related security attributes disableOwnerClear proceClear of the TOE, th the security attributesauth <datausage, eyFlags, and ownerEvict, y Blob with the security attributes keyUsage, gorithmParms and pcrInfo.</datausage, 	
FDP_ACF.1.2/ KeyMan	 among controlled suft The user "World" already. The user "World" TOE is unowned The TPM owner The TPM owner The User "World" TRUE. The TPM owner disableOwnerCle The user "World" SRK if the disable The user authent allowed to genera The TPM owner a TPM_EK_BLO PCR values and The TPM owner quoted data, or a The entity owner an AIK The Entity owner an AIK The entity owner the following con (a) the secu subject, (b) the secu subject, (c) the secu keyFlags comman (d) the secu 	is allowed to read the public part of an EK. ' is allowed to create an SRK if the ownership flag is is allowed to delete an SRK if the ear flag is FALSE. ' under physical presence is allowed to delete an eForceClear flag is FALSE. ticated as TPM owner and the owner of the SRK is ate an AIK. is allowed to activate the AIK if the imported blob is B structure and the actual state meets the identified the locality. is allowed to use the AIK for signing audit data, a tick stamped blob. of a key with the security attribute keyUsage, RAGE=TRUE, is allowed to generate an User Key lser key wrapped with the key the owns key except is not the TPM owner and the key to generated is ' of the key to be used for import of Wrapped Key p import a User key in a Wrapped Key Blob if the keyUsage, TPM_KEY_STORAGE=TRUE. is not allowed to use a User key if at least one of	



	Public					
	identified PCR and locality 13. The TPM owner is allowed to delete a User key if the security attribute OwnerEvict, OwnerEvict=FALSE.					
FDP_ACF.1.3/ KeyMan	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:					
	1. The execution of the commands TPM_CreateWrapKey, TPM_LoadKey, TPM_LoadKey2, TPM_Unseal, TPM_GetPubKey, TPM_CertifyKey, TPM_CertifyKey2, TPM_MakeIdentity, TPM_DSAP, TPM_ChangeAuthAsymStart, TPM_CMK_CreateKey, TPM_CMK_SetRestrictions, TPM_CMK_CreateBlob and TPM_CMK_ConvertMigration depends on the values of the security attribute TPM_KEY_FLAG (keyFlags).					
	2. The execution of the commands TPM_CMK_SetRestrictions, TPM_ChangeAuthAsymStart, TPM_Take_Ownership, TPM_Seal, TPM_Unseal,, TPM_Unbind, TPM_Sign, TPM_CertifyKey, TPM_LoadKey, TPM_LoadKey2, TPM_CreateWrapKey, TPM_MakeIdentity, TPM_GetPubKey, TPM_MigrateKey, TPM_DSAP, TPM_Quote, TPM_ActivateIdentity, TPM_ConvertMogrationBlob, TPM_CertiySelfTest, TPM_CMK_CreateKey, TPM_CMK_ConvertMigrationBlob, TPM_Tick StampBlob and TMK_EstablishTransport depends on the values of the security attribute TPM_KEY_USAGE (KeyUsage).					
	3. The execution of the commands TPM_Seal, TPM_Unseal, TPM_LoadKey, TPM_LoadKey2, TPM_MakeIdentity, TPM_GetPubKey, TPM_CertifyKey, TPM_CertifyKey2, TPM_CMK_CreateKey, TPM_NV_WriteValue, TPM_NV_WriteValueAuth, and TPM_NV_ReadValueAuth depends on the values of the security attribute pcrInfo.					
	 The execution of the commands TPM_TakeOwnership, TPM_AuthorizeMigrationKey, TPM_CMK_CreateTicket and TPM_CMK_CreateBlob depends on the values of the security attribute algorithmParams. 					
	 The execution of the commands TPM_Startup, TPM_KeyControlOwner, TPM_FlushSpecific and TPM_EvictKey depends on the values of the security attribute OwnerEvict. 					
FDP_ACF.1.4/ KeyMan	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule: <i>none</i>					

FMT_MSA.3/ KeyMan	Static attribute initialization			
	Hierarchical to:	No other components		
	Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes		
		FMT_SMR.1 Security roles		
FMT_MSA.3.1/ KeyMan	The TSF shall enforce the Key Management SFP to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.			
FMT_MSA.3.2/ KeyMan		no role to specify alternative initial values to values when an object or information is created.		

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control



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/MigK	Hierarchical to: No other components				
	Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset of access control				
	FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation				
FDP_ACF.1.1 /MigK	The TSF shall enforce the Key Migration SFP to objects based on the following:				
	 Subjects: TPM owner, Entity owner of the key with security attributes restrictDelegate and migrationSheme, 				
	2. Objects:				
	a. User key with security attribute migratable,				
	b. Wrapped Key Blob with the security attribute payload type,				
	c. Migration Key Blob with the security attribute payload type,				
	 Certified Migration Key Blob with the security attributes payload type and migrationKeyAuth. 				
FDP_ACF.1.2 /MigK	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:				
	 The Entity owner of a migratable User key is allowed to create a Wrapped Key Blob for this migratable key by means of the command TPM_CMK_CreateKey, if it is authorized for use of the CMK Migration Approval Ticket and in case of delegated commands the restrictions for the migration of keys are fulfilled. 				
	 The Entity owner of a migratable User key authorized for use of the Migration key authorization ticket is allowed to create a Migration Key Blob for this migratable key by means of the command TPM_CreateMigrationBlob. 				
	 The Entity owner of a certifiable migratable User key authorized for use of the Migration key authorization ticket and the Restriction Ticket is allowed to create a Certified Migration Key Blob for this migratable key by means of the command TPM_CMK_CreateBlob. 				
	 The Entity owner of private part of the migration User key is allowed to migrate a Migration Key Blob and a Certified Migration Key Blob to a conversion key by means of the command TPM_MigrateKey, 				
	 The Entity owner of the private part of migration User key is allowed to convert a Migration Key Blob by means of the command TPM_ConvertMigrationBlob and a Certified Migration Key Blob by means of the command TPM_CMK_ConvertMigration if in case of delegated commands the restrictions for the migration of keys are fulfilled. 				
FDP_ACF.1.3 /MigK	The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:				
	 The execution of the commands TPM_CreateMigrationBlob, TPM_ConvertMigrationBlob, TPM_CMK_CreateKey, TPM_CMK_CreateBlob and TPM_CMK_ConvertMigration depends on the value of the security attribute payload type. 				
	 The execution of the commands TPM_CreateMigrationBlob, and TPM_CMK_CreateBlob depends on the value of the security attribute migrationKeyAuth. 				
	 The execution of the command TPM_CMK_CreateKey depends on the value of the security attribute migrationAuthorityApproval. 				
FDP_ACF.1.4 /MigK	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the: <i>none</i> .				



FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based access control					
/M&R	Hierard	chical to:	No other components			
	Depen	dencies:	FDP_ACC.1 S	Subset of acces	s control	
			FMT_MSA.3	Static attribute i	nitialisation	1
FDP_ACF.1.1 /M&R		SF shell enford on the followin		ement and Repo	orting SFP	to objects
	1. Su	bjects:				
		a. SHA-1 se	ession,			
		b. user with	the security at	tribute locality,		
		c. entity ow usageAu	-	nature key with	the securit	y attribute
	2. Ob	jects:				
		a. PCR wit pcrExten	•	attribute pcrR	eset, pcrR	esetLocal,
		b. Signature	e key with the s	ecurity attribute	e keyUsage	•
FDP_ACF.1.2 /M&R				g rules to deter rolled objects is		operation
			sion is allowed and TPM_SHA	to reset the AlStart.	digest of t	he SHA-1
	IA-1 session a	as SHA-1 hash	to calculate th າ value of the by command T	digest of t	he SHA-1	
	dig the	est of the SH SHA-1 sessi	A-1 session as on and the pre	I (i) to finish th SHA-1 hash v esented data a SHA1Complete.	value of the and (ii) to a	e digest of
	dig the val	est of the SH SHA-1 sessi	A-1 session as on and the pre the indica	I (i) to finish th SHA-1 hash v esented data a tted PCR	value of the ind (ii) to e	e digest of
		he pcrReset is a PCR to 0xF		ommand TPM_	Startup is a	allowed to
		he pcrReset is a PCR to 0x0		ommand TPM_	Startup is a	allowed to
	pci TR PC	ResetLocal of UE, than the o R to 0x0000	the selected P command TPM or 0xFFFF,	lity matching t PCR and the pc _PCR_Reset is where the cond tion of the TOE	rReset of the allowed to crete value	his PCR is reset this
	pci TP the of val	Extend-Local M_SHA1Com digest of the the SHA-1 ses	of the soleteExtend is a SHA-1 session and the p	lity matching t selected PCI allowed (i) to fir as SHA-1 has presented data vith the final c	R the hish the cale h value of and (ii) to e	command culation of the digest extend the
		-				

9. If the user presents the locality matching the security attribute pcrExtend-Local of the selected PCR the command TPM_Extend is



	allowed to extend the value of the selected PCR with the presented data.
	10. The user "World" is allowed to read the PCR object with the command TPM_PCRRead.
	11. The entity owner is allowed to quote the PCR indicated by the parameter targetPCR with the User key, which security attribute keyUsage equals to TPM_KEY_SIGNING, TPM_KEY_IDENTITY, or TPM_KEY_LEGACY, by means of the command TPM_Quote or TPM_Quote2.
	12. The user "World" under locality 4 is allowed to execute the TPM Interface commands TPM_HASH_START, TPM_HASH_DATA ans TPM_HASH_END.
	13. Additional rules for operations, based on security attributes of the subjects and objects: <i>none.</i>
FDP_ACF.1.3 /M&R	The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
	1. The execution of the command TPM_PCR_Reset depends on the values of the security attributes pcrReset and pcrResetLocal.
	2. The execution of the commands TPM_SHA1CompleteExtend and TPMExtend depends on the value of the security attribute pcrExtendLocal.
	3. The execution of the commands TPM_Quote and TPM_Quote2 depends on the value of the security attribute KeyUsage.
FDP_ACF.1.4 /M&R	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rules: none.

FMT_MSA.3 /M&R	Static attribute initialization					
	Hierarchical to:	No other components				
	Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes				
		FMT_SMR.1 Security roles				
FMT_MSA.3.1 /M&R	The TSF shall enforce the Measurement and Reporting SFP to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.					
FMT_MSA.3.2 /M&R		no role to specify alternative initial values to alues when an object or information is created.				
FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based access control					
/NVS	Hierarchical to:	No other components				
	Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset of access control				
		FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation				
FDP_ACF.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the NVS SFP to objects based on the following:					
/NVS	-	orld", entity owner and TPM owner with the physical presence and current PCR values,				
	noOwnerNVWrite	ge with the security attributes nvLocked, , pcrInfoRead, pcrInfoWrite, localityAtRelease, and _NV_PER_READ_STCLEAR,				



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		TPM_N TPM_N TPM_N	IV_PER_WRITE_STCLEAR TPM_NV_PER_AUTHWRITE, IV_PER_OWNERWRITE TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE, IV_PER_AUTHREAD, TPM_NV_PER_PPREAD, IV_PER_OWNERREAD, MAX_NV_WRITE_NOOWNER.
FDP_ACF.1.2 /NVS			hall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation trolled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
	1.	storage nvLock	er "World" under physical presence is allowed to create NV by means of the command TPM_NV_DefineSpace if ed is 0 and noOwnerNVWrite does not exceed MAX_NV_WRITE_NOOWNER.
	2.		M owner is allowed to create a NV storage area by means of nmand TPM_NV_DefineSpace.
	3.	of the	er "World" is allowed to write the NV storage area if nvLocked TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS is FALSE and max NV writes an owner is not exceeded.
	4.		PM owner is allowed to write an NV storage area by means of nmand TPM_NV_WriteValue if
		a.	TPM_NV_PER_OWNERWRITE is TRUE,
		b.	the user match the requirement for physical presence defined in TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE,
		C.	the locality of the user mach the localityAtRelease defined for the TPM_NV_DATA_AREA and
		d.	if $\ensuremath{pcrInfWrite}$ defines a PCR selection the actual values of the selected
		e.	PCR shall match the digestAtRelease in pcrInfoWrite.
	5.		tity owner is allowed to write an NV storage area by means of nmand TPM_NV_WriteValueAuth if
		a.	TPM_NV_PER_AUTHWRITE is TRUE,
		b.	the user match the requirement for physical presence defined in TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE,
		C.	the locality of the user matches the localityAtRelease defined for the $\ensuremath{TPM_NV_DATA_AREA}$ and
		d.	if pcrInfWrite defines a PCR selection the actual values of the selected PCR shall match the digestAtRelease in pcrInfoWrite.
	6.		M owner is allowed to read an NV storage area by means of nmand TPM_NV_ReadValue if
		a.	TPM_NV_PER_OWNERREAD is TRUE,
		b.	the user match the requirement for physical presence defined in TPM_NV_PER_PPREAD,
		C.	the locality of the user matches the localityAtRelease defined in the pcrInfoRead and
		d.	if pcrInfoRead defines a PCR selection the actual values of the selected PCR shall match the digestAtRelease in pcrInfoRead.
	7.		tity owner is allowed to read an NV storage area by means of nmand TPM_NV_ReadValueAuth if
		a.	TPM_NV_PER_AUTHREAD is TRUE,
		b.	the user matches the requirement for physical presence



defined in TPM_NV_PER_PPREAD,

- c. the locality of the user matches the localityAtRelease defined in the pcrInfoRead and
- d. if pcrInfoRead defines a PCR selection the actual values of the selected PCR shall match the digestAtRelease in pcrInfoRead.



		Public
FDP_ACF.1.3 /NVS		TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based the following additional rules:
	1.	The value of security attribute nvLocked impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_WriteValue and TPM_NV_ReadValue.
	2.	The value of security attribute noOwnerNVWrite impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_WriteValue.
	3.	The value of security attribute pcrInfoRead impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_ReadValueAuth.
	4.	The value of security attribute pcrInfoWrite impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_WriteValue and TPM_NV_WriteValueAuth.
	5.	The value of security attribute localityAtRelease impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_ReadValue, TPM_NV_ReadValueAuth, TPM_NV_WriteValueAuth.
	6.	The value of security attribute TPM_NV_PER_AUTHREAD impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_ReadValue and TPM_NV_ReadValueAuth.
	7.	The value of security attribute TPM_NV_PER_AUTHWRITE impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_WriteValue and TPM_NV_WriteValueAuth.
	8.	The value of security attribute TPM_NV_PER_OWNERREAD impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_ReadValue and TPM_NV_ReadValueAuth.
	9.	The value of security attribute TPM_NV_PER_OWNERWRITE impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_WriteValue and TPM_NV_WriteValueAuth.
	10.	The value of security attribute TPM_NV_PER_PPREAD impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_ReadValue and TPM_NV_ReadValueAuth
	11.	The value of security attribute TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_WriteValue and TPM_NV_WriteValueAuth.
	12.	The value of security attribute TPM_NV_PER_READ_STCLEAR & bReadSTClear impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_ReadValue and TPM_NV_ReadValueAuth.
	13.	The value of security attribute TPM_NV_PER_WRITE_STCLEAR & bWriteSTClear impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_WriteValue and TPM_NV_WriteValueAuth.
	14.	The value of security attribute TPM_NV_PER_WRITEDEFINE & bWriteDefine impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_WriteValue and TPM_NV_WriteValueAuth.
	15.	The value of security attribute TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK impacts the processing of the following commands: TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_WriteValue and TPM_NV_WriteValueAuth.



	Public
FDP_ACF.1.4 /NVS	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rules:
	 If TPM_NV_PER_READ_STCLEAR is TRUE the NV storage area can not be read after read with a data size of 0 until successful write or TPM_Startup(ST_Clear).
	 If TPM_NV_PER_WRITE_STCLEAR is TRUE the NV storage area can not be written after write to the specified index with a data size of 0 until TPM_Startup(ST_Clear).
	 If TPM_NV_PER_WRITEDEFINE is TRUE the NV storage area can not be written after performing the TPM_NV_DefineSpace command and one successful write.
	 If TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK is TRUE the NV storage area can not be written after successful write to index 0 until TPM_Startup(ST_Clear).
	5. the access to command TPM_NV_DefineSpace is denied if
	a. TPM_NV_PER_OWNERWRITE and TPM_NV_PER_AUTHWRITE are both set to TRUE or
	b. TPM_NV_PER_OWNERREAD and TPM_NV_PER_AUTHREAD are both set to TRUE
FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based access control
/MC	Hierarchical to: No other components
	Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset of access control
	FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1 /MC	The TSF shall enforce the Monotonic Counter SFP to objects based on the following:
	 Subjects: TPM owner, Entity owner of the monotonic counter object, OSAP session, DSAP session,
	2. Objects: Monotonic counter with security attribute countID.
FDP_ACF.1.2 /MC	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
	 The TPM owner and Delegated entity are allowed to create a Monotonic counter, OSAP and DSAP sessions are required for creation of the Monotonic counter.
	 The Entity owner of the monotonic counter object is allowed to increment the Monotonic counter if the countID is set in TPM_STCLEAR_DATA for the current boot cycle.
	 The user "World" is allowed to read the Monotonic counter value if he addresses the Monotonic counter object correctly with valid countID.
	4. The Entity owner of the monotonic counter object is allowed to release the Monotonic counter.
	5. The TPM owner is allowed to release the Monotonic counter.
FDP_ACF.1.3 /MC	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
	1. the execution of the commands TPM_IncrementCounter, TPM_ReadCounter, TPM_ReleaseCounter and TPM_ReleaseCounterowner depends on the value of the security



	attribute countID			
FDP_ACF.1.4 /MC	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule:			
	 The TSF shall disallow the operation read or increment the monotonic counter if the countID is invalid. 			
FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based access control			
/EID	Hierarchical to: No other components			
	Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset of access control			
	FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation			
FDP_ACF.1.1 /EID	The TSF shall enforce the Export and Import of Data SFP to objects based on the following:			
	 Subjects: TPM owner with security attribute locality, Entity owner with security attribute locality, user "World", 			
	2. Objects:			
	a. Sealed data with security attribute pcrInfo and tpmProof,			
	 b. Context with the security attribute resourceType and tpmProof, 			
	c. Bound Blob with the security attributes payload type.			
FDP_ACF.1.2 /EID	 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: 1. The Entity owner of the key to be used for export of sealed data is allowed to export Sealed Data if this export key has the security attribute TPM_KEY_STORAGE and is not migratable. 2. The Entity owner of the key to be used for import of sealed data is allowed to import Sealed Data if a. this import key have the security attribute TPM_KEY_STORAGE and is not migratable. 2. The Entity owner of the key to be used for import of sealed data is allowed to import Sealed Data if a. this import key have the security attribute TPM_KEY_STORAGE and is not migratable, b. the security attributes perInfo of sealed data blob shall match to the values in the PCR indicated by perInfo, c. the security attributes tmpProof of sealed data blob shall match to the values tmpProof in the TPM_PERMANENT_DATA of the TOE. 3. The user "World" is allowed to save Context if the resourceType is TPM_RT_KEY, TPM_RT_AUTH, TPM_RT_TRANS or TPM_RT_DAA_TPM. 4. The user "World" is allowed to load Context if a. the resourceType is TPM_RT_MAT_AUTH, TPM_RT_AUTH, TPM_RT_TRANS or TPM_RT_TRANS or TPM_RT_ANS or TPM_RT_AUTH, TPM_RT_TRANS or TPM_RT_AUTH, TPM_RT_TRANS or TPM_RT_AUTH, TPM_RT_TRANS or TPM_RT_DAA_TPM and b. the tpmProof used as secret for the HMAC of the context match the tpmProof in TPM_PERMANENT_DATA. 5. The Entity owner of the private part of the bind key is allowed to unbind a Bound blob if the payload type is TPM_PT_BIND. 			
FDP_ACF.1.3 /EID	The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:			
	1. The execution of the command TPM_Unseal depends on the value of the security attributes TPMproof and payload type.			
FDP_ACF.1.4 /EID	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <i>none</i>			



Public

FMT_MSA.3	Static attribute initialization			
/M&R	Hierarchical to:	No other components		
	Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes		
		FMT_SMR.1 Security roles		
FMT_MSA.3.1 /M&R	The TSF shall enforce the Export and Import of Data SFP to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.			
FMT_MSA.3.2 /M&R	The TSF shall allow <i>no role</i> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.			
FMT_MSA.3	Static attribute initialization			
/DAA	Hierarchical to:	No other components		
	Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes		
		FMT_SMR.1 Security roles		
FMT_MSA.3.1 /DAA		e the DAA SFP to provide restrictive default values that are used to enforce the SFP.		
FMT_MSA.3.2 /DAA	The TSF shall allow the: <i>no role</i> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.			

FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No dependencies

FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: failure of any crypto operations including RSA encryption, RSA decryption, SHA-1, RNG, RSA signature generation, HMAC generation; failure of any commands or internal operations, *authorization (dictionary attack) and failure of operating conditions (power supply)*.

FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack

Hierarchical to:	No other components
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- Dependencies: No dependencies
- FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist *physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF* by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.



7.1.2 Security Functional Requirements related to TPM Field Upgrade & Mode Selection SFP

The TPM firmware may be modified securely with the Field upgrade functionality. The firmware is protected in integrity by a SHA-256 digest and in authenticity by a RSA-2048 signature. The signature key is owned by the TPM vendor and is stored securely in a Common Criteria certified Hardware Security Module. The TPM Owner or the Platform firmware are authorized to initiate a firmware loading session with the TPM command TPM_FieldUpgradeStart. Once this command is successfully executed, the TPM enters the Field Upgrade Mode (FUM). In this mode, the new firmware is loaded with the command TPM_FieldUpgradeData. Once the firmware is completely written in NV memory and its integrity is successfully verified, it is activated after the next reset of the TPM.

The following table defines additional objects, operations and security attributes for the TPM Field Upgrade & Mode selection SFP:

Table 7: objects, operations and security attributes for the TPM Field Upgrade & Mode selection SFP

#	Protected Objects	Operations	Security attributes
1	Firmware update data	TPM_FieldUpgradeStart():	Authorisation data for
	Data provided by the	Entering FUM and accepting the	TPM FieldUpgradeStart():
	vendor in order to	first data block of Firmware update	OwnerAuth, PhysicalPresence:.
	replace the firmware or	data	Security attributes of firmware update
	parts of the firmware.	TPM_FieldUpgradeData()	data:
		Writes the following Firmware	Signature over the first or the
		update data blocks.	complete digest of Firmware update
			data, generated by the TPM
			manufacturer
			Digest over each block or the
			complete Firmware update data
			Version: Firmware update is identified
			with a major and minor version
2	TPMLib mode	TPM_SetMode	Authorisation data for TPM_SetMode:
	Mode defining the set of		OwnerAuth, PhysicalPresence:.
	commands (TPM 1.2 or		Security attributes of TPMLib mode:
	TPM 2.0)		TPMLibModeLock: if SET, this flag
			fordids to change the library mode.

FDP_ACC.1	Subset Access Control				
/FUMS	Hierarchical to:	No other components			
	Dependencies:	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control			
FDP_ACC.1.1	The TSF shall enfor	ce the Field Upgrade SFP on			
/FUMS	1. Subjects: TF	PM Owner and Platform firmware			
	2. Objects: .Fir	Dbjects: .Firmware update data, TPMLib mode			
	 Operations: TPM_SetMode, TPM_FieldUpgradeStart and TPM_FieldUpgradeData 				
FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute b	ased access control			
/FUMS	Hierarchical to:	No other components			

FDP_ACC.1 Subset of access control

Dependencies:



FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP_ACF.1.1 /FUMS	The TSF shall enforce the <u>TPM Field Upgrade & Mode selection SFP</u> to objects based on the following:					
	Subjects:					
	 TPM owner with the security attribute OwnerAuth or Platform <u>Firmware with physical presence,</u> <u>Objects</u> <u>Firmware update data with security attributes signature of the TPM</u> <u>manufacturer, digest and version (major and minor)</u> TPMLib and TPMLibLock modes 					
	3. Trivilio and TrivilioLock modes					
FDP_ACF.1.2 /FUMS	 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: 1. <u>The <i>TPM Owner or Platform Firmware</i> is authorised to change the TPM state to FUM if the authenticity of the first digest or the signature could be successfully verified.</u> 2. <u>While in FUM state the <i>TPM Owner or Platform Firmware</i> is authorised to import or activate firmware data only after successful verification of its integrity and authenticity (see FDP_UIT.1/</u> 					
	 The FUM state shall only be left when TPM is reset after successful loading of the firmware update data 					
	 The TPM Owner or Platform Firmware is authorised to change the library mode (TPMLib mode) to TPM 2.0 					
	 The TPM Owner or Platform Firmware is authorised to lock permanently the TPM librabry mode (TPMLibLock mode is SET) 					
FDP_ACF.1.3 /FUMS	The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <i>none</i>					
FDP_ACF.1.4 /FUMS	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:					
	 the TPM refuses to enter FUM state if the firmware update data major version is not equal to the major version of the loaded firmware 					
	 the TPM refuses to enter FUM state if the firmware update data minor version is smaller or equal to the minor version of the loaded firmware 					
FMT_MSA.1	Management of security attributes					
/FUMS	Hierarchical to: No other components					
	Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control					
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles					
FMT_MSA.1.1 /FUMS	TSF shall enforce the <u>TPM Field Upgrade & Mode selection SFP</u> to restrict the ability to <u>modify</u> the security attributes: <i>none</i>					
FMT_MSA.3	Static attribute initialization					
/FUMS	Hierarchical to: No other components					
	Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes					
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles					
FMT_MSA.3.1 /FUMS	The TSF shall enforce the <u>TPM Field Upgrade & Mode selection SFP</u> to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.					



Public					
FMT_MSA.3.2 /FUMS	The TSF shall allow <i>nobody</i> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.				
FDP_UIT.1/	Data exchange integ	rity			
FU	Hierarchical to:	No other components			
	Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]			
FDP_UIT.1.1 /FUMS	The TSF shall enforce the <u>TPM Field Upgrade & Mode selection SFP</u> to <u>receive</u> firmware update data in a manner protected from <i>modification, deletion, insertion, replay</i> errors.				
FDP_UIT.1.2 /FUMS	.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of firmware update data whether <i>modification, deletion, insertion, replay</i> has occurred.				



7.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements (SAR) of the TOE are the assurance components of the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) as defined in the Common Criteria [CCMB-2012-09-001], [CCMB-2012-09-002], [CCMB-2012-09-003] and augmented with ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4. They are all drawn from the Common Criteria V3.1 R2 part 3.

The security assurance components are listed in Table 3. The security assurance requirements defined in Table 4 are defined in section 6.2 of the PP [TPM1.2 PP rev116].

#	Assurance class	Assurance Component	Assurance component description
1	ADV:	ADV_FSP.4	Complete functional specification
2	Development	ADV_ARC.1	Security architecture description
3		ADV_TDS.3	Basic modular design
4		ADV_IMP.3	Implementation representation of the TSF
5	AGD:	AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance
6	Guidance documents	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures
7	ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.4	Production support and acceptance procedures and automation
8		ALC_CMS.4	Problem tracking coverage
9		ALC_DEL.1	Delivery procedures
10		ALC_DVS	Identification of security measures
11		ALC_LCD.1	Develop defined life-cycle model
12		ALC_FLR.1	Basic flow remediation – augmented
13		ALC_TAT.1	Tools and technique
14	ASE:	ASE_INT.1	ST Introduction
15	Security Target	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims
16		ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition
17		ASE_OBJ.2	Security objectives
18		ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition
19		ASE_REQ.2	Security requirements
20		ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification
21	ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.2	Analysis of coverage
22		ATE_DPT.1	Testing: basic design
23		ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing
24		ATE_IND.2	Independent testing
25	AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.4	Methodical vulnerability analysis -augmented

Table 8: Assurance components



7.3 Security Requirements rationale

The security requirements rationale of the TOE are defined and described in the PP [11] section 6.3 and in the following table.

Table 9: Security requirements rationale

	O.FieldUpgradeModeControl	O.Secure_Load_ACode	O.Secure_AC_Activation	O.TOE_Identification	O.Context_Management
FMT_SMR.1	х				
FIA_UAU.5	х				
FDP_ACC.1/FUMS	х				
FDP_ACF.1/FUMS	х	х	х	х	
FMT_MSA.1/FUMS	x			х	
FMT_MSA.3/FUMS	х			х	
FDP_UIT.1/FUMS	х	х			
FCS_COP/SymEnc2		Х			Х
FCS_CKM.1/AES					Х

The Table 9 demonstrates that each security objective not present in the PP but added for this TOE is covered by at least one security requirement.

7.3.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements

O.Context_Management: The TOE must allow the user authenticated by operatorAuth and the user "World" under physical presence temporarily to deactivate the TPM and to hide the TPM attestation identity during a user session

- FCS_COP.1/SymEnc2 provides the cryptographic function for protection of confidentiality of the Context blob
- FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation requires generation of AES keys with required entropy



7.3.2 SFR Dependency Rationale

Table 10: SFR Dependency rationale

SFR	Dependency	Rationale		
FDP_ACC.1/FUMS	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1		
FDP_ACF.1/FUMS	FDP_ACC.1 Subset of access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/FUMS and FMT_MSA.3/FUMS		
FMT_MSA.1/FUMS	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/FUMS and FMT_SMR.1		
FMT_MSA.3/FUMS	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	Fulfilled by FMT_MSA.1/FUMS and FMT_SMR.1		
FDP_UIT.1/FUMS	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]	Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/FUMS and FDP_ITC.2		
FCS_COP/SymEnc2	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Fulfilled by FDP_ITC.2 and FCS_CKM.4		
FCS_CKM.1/AES	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Fulfilled by FCS_COP/SymEnc2 and FCS_CKM.4.		



8 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATIONS

The following sections describe how the Security Functional Requirements are fulfilled by the TOE.

The concept of security feature is introduced to provide a common coverage of SFRs that are logically linked.

8.1 <u>TOE Security features</u>

This section contains the definition and description of the security features (SF) of the TOE. The TOE provides six security features (SF) to meet the security functional requirements. The security features are:

- 1) SF_CRY: Cryptographic Support
- 2) SF_I&A: Authentication and Identification
- 3) SF_ACC: Access Control
- 4) SF_GEN: General
- 5) SF_PNB: Protection and Non-Bypassability
- 6) SF_TST: Test

8.1.1 <u>SF_CRY: Cryptographic support</u>

There are several functions within the TOE related to cryptographic support: generation of random numbers, generation of asymmetric key pairs, RSA digital signature (generation and verification), data encryption and decryption, key destruction, the generation of hash values and the generation and verification of MAC values.

The TOE supports the generation of cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified cryptographic key generation algorithm *RSA key generator* and specified cryptographic key sizes RSA 512, 1024 and 2048 bits that meet the following: P1363 [IEEE P1363-2000]. The source of randomness is the AIS 20 class DRG.3 deterministic random generator (RNG).

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_CKM.1.

The TOE supports the generation of symmetric cryptographic AES keys in accordance with the specified cryptographic key generation algorithm *AES key generator* and specified cryptographic key sizes 128 bits. The source of randomness is the internal AIS 31 class PTG2 true random generator (TRNG).

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_CKM.1/AES.

The TOE supports the destruction of cryptographic keys by erasure of volatile memory areas containing cryptographic keys or overwriting value of key encryption keys.

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_CKM.4.

The TOE performs the hash calculation in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 (cryptographic key sizes not available) that meets FIPS PUB 180-2 [FIPS 180-2].

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/SHA.

The TOE performs HMAC calculation and verification in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC (SHA-1) and cryptographic key sizes 160 bits that meet RFC2104 [RFC2104] and FIPS PUB 180-2 [FIPS 180-2].

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/HMAC.

The TOE performs signature generation and signature verification in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm RSA signature scheme [TPM Part1 116] section 31.2.1, 31.2.2 and 31.2.3, and cryptographic key sizes RSA 512, 1024 and 2048 bits that meet PKCS#1 V2.0. The TOE uses the internal RNG as the source for any randomness that the process may require.



The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/RSA_Sig.

The TOE performs encryption and decryption in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm RSA encryption scheme [TPM Part1 116] section 31.1.1, 31.1.2 and cryptographic key sizes RSA 512, 1024 and 2048 bits that meet PKCS#1v2.0 [PKCS#1].

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/RSA_Enc.

The TOE performs the encryption and decryption in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm AES in the CTR mode as described in [TPM Part1 116] section 31.1.3 and CFB mode with cryptographic key sizes of 128 bits that meet FIPS PUB 197 [FIPS 197] and FIPS PUB SP 800-38A [20] and the specified cryptographic algorithm MGF1 and cryptographic key sizes of 160 bits that meet PKCS#1v2.0 [PKCS#1].

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/SymEnc and FCS_COP.1/SymEnc2.

The TOE provides a true random number generator, consisting of an analogue circuit and a digital post-processing function, implementing the generation of internal random numbers. This true random generator is used to instantiate a deterministic random generator implementing HASH_DRBG with SHA 356 defined in [SP800-90A]. This RNG provides to TPM user random numbers that meet AIS20 Class DRG.3.

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_RNG.1

The SF_CRY "Cryptographic Support" covers the following security functional requirements:

- FCS_CKM.1,
- FCS_CKM.4,
- FCS_COP.1 and
- FCS_RNG.1.

8.1.2 SF_I&A: Authentication and Identification

The TPM provides four protocols for authentication and identification to authorize the use of entities without revealing the authorization data (AuthData) on the network or the connection to the TPM. The basic premise is to prove knowledge of a shared secret. This shared secret is the identification and authentication data, which is called authorization data in the TPM Main Specification. In both cases, the protocol exchanges nonce-data so that both sides of the transaction can compute a MAC value using shared secrets and nonce-data. Each side generates the MAC value and can compare to the value transmitted. Network listeners cannot directly infer the AuthData from the hashed objects sent over the network.

The first protocol is the "*Object-Independent Authorization Protocol*" (OIAP), which allows the exchange of nonces with a specific TPM. Once an OI-AP session is established, its nonces can be used to authorize the use any entity managed by the TPM. The session can live indefinitely until either party request the session termination. The TPM_OIAP function starts the OIAP session.

The second protocol is the "Object Specific Authorization Protocol" (OSAP)". The OSAP allows establishment of an authentication session for a single entity. The session creates non ces that can authorize multiple commands without additional session-establishment overhead, but is bound to a specific entity. The TPM_OSAP command starts the OSAP session. The TPM_OSAP specifies the entity to which the authorization is bound.

The third protocol is the "*Delegation Specific Authorization Protocol*" (DSAP)". The DSAP allows establishment of an authentication session for the delegation model (a delegation of individual TPM owner privileges to individual entities). The session creates nonces that can authorize multiple commands without additional session-establishment overhead, but is bound to a specific entity. The TPM_DSAP command starts the DSAP session.



The TPM provides the transport session protocol. The transport session protocol creates a shared secret and then uses the shared secret to authorize and protect commands sent to the TPM using this session. The protection of the sent command is done by encrypting the sent command using a XOR algorithm with a one-time pad.

The TOE allows access to commands and objects with the "World" access on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated/identified. Each user has to be successfully authenticated/identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. The TOE controls the access to all protected functions (e.g. commands) and shielded locations in accordance to the access-rights only through the authentication mechanism, i.e. by supplying the appropriate authentication/identification token (a 20 byte long HMAC value). A re-authentication of users is done by using the authentication protocol with a new *nonce* for each message and response. The access-rights of commands, data and keys are defined by security attributes (see PP [8], Table 1). The TOE authenticates any user's claimed identity and reacts on the detection of unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to the same user according to the rule "dictionary attack".

The covered security functional requirements are

- FIA_UID.1
- FIA_UAU.1
- FIA_UAU.4,
- FIA_UAU.5,
- FIA_UAU.6 and
- FIA_AFL.1.

The TOE supports the management of TSF data by restricting the ability to modify and create the authentication data to different roles (e.g. TPM owner, User under physical presence, Entity owner, authorized user) based on different rules and restricting the ability to reset the TPM dictionary attack mitigation mechanism and the creation of migration tickets to the TPM owner, by using access control mechanisms during the command processing.

The covered security functional requirements are: FMT_MTD.1/AuthData, FMT_MTD.1/Deleg, FMT_MTD.1/Lock and FMT_MTD.1/MigK.

The TOE associate user security attributes (e.g. authData, locality, physical presence, authorization handle and shared secret if the subject is a OSAP session and authorization associated with the delegation blob if the subject is a DSAP session) with subjects acting on the behalf of that user. The TOE enforces different rules, implemented in the appropriate command, on the initial association and governing changes of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users.

The covered security functional requirement is FIA_USB.1.

The SF_I&A "Authentication and Identification" covers the following security functional requirements:

- FIA_UID.1,
- FIA_UAU.1
- FIA_UAU.4,
- FIA_UAU.5,
- FIA_UAU.6,
- FIA_AFL.1,
- FMT_MTD.1 and
- FIA_USB.1.



8.1.3 <u>SF_ACC: Access control</u>

The TOE provides the security function policies TPM Mode Control SFP (MCT_SFP), Delegation SFP (Del_SFP), Key Management SFP (KeyM_SFP), Key Migration SFP (KMig_SFP), Measurement And Reporting SFP (M&R_SFP), Non-volatile Storage SFP (NVS_FSP), Monotonic Counter SFP (MC-SFP), Export and Import of Data (EID_SFP) and Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol SFP (DAA_SFP) to protect the sensitive subjects, objects and operations of the TOE. The security policies are described in section 8.2 and in the PP [8], section 6.1.

The covered security functional requirements are:

- FDP_ACC.1/Modes
- FDP_ACC.1/Deleg
- FDP_ACC.1/KeyMan
- FDP_ACC.1/MigK
- FDP_ACC.1/M&R
- FDP_ACC.1/NVS
- FDP_ACC.1/MC
- FDP_ACC.1/EID
- FDP_ACC.1/DAA.

The TOE enforces the different security function policies on subjects (e.g. commands, roles), objects (e.g. keys, user data) and operations (e.g. signature generation, encryption and decryption) based on different security attributes (e.g. TPM_AUTH_DATA_USAGE, TPM_KEY_USAGE, TPM_KEY_FLAGS). Any processing is only allowed if the respective security attribute has the correct value.

The covered security functional requirements are:

- FDP_ACF.1/Modes
- FDP_ACF.1/Deleg
- FDP_ACF.1/KeyMan
- FDP_ACF.1/MigK
- FDP_ACF.1/M&R
- FDP_ACF.1/NVS
- FDP_ACF.1/MC
- FDP_ACF.1/EID
- FDP_ACF.1/DAA.

For the TPM different operational modes are defined by different security attributes. The security attributes are stored in structures at shielded locations. The management of the security attributes (e.g. the ability to modify, set to default value, to delete, to enable, to disable, to create) are restricted to different roles und sometimes additionally based on different rules. These restrictions are defined in different structures and are stored at shielded locations or directly programmed in the specific commands. The TOE checks if there are no restrictions violated before processing the management of the security attribute. This functionality is used in principle for all security functional requirements of FMT_MSA.1.

The covered security functional requirements are:

- FMT_MSA.1/Modes
- FMT_MSA.1/PhysP



- FMT_MSA.1/DFT
- FMT_MSA.1/DT
- FMT_MSA.1/KeyMan
- FMT_MSA.1/KEvi
- FMT_MSA.1/MigK
- FMT_MSA.1/MC
- FMT_MSA.1/DAA

The TOE ensures that only secure values are accepted for security attributes. The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MSA.2. The TOE supports the static security attribute initialization. Different security enforcing policies are allowed to provide permissive and/or restrictive default values for security attributes. The TPM owner and the user "World" under physical presence are allowed to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. The permissions to change the security attributes are stored in different structures or/and controlled during the command processing. This functionality is used in principle for all security functional requirements of FMT_MSA.3.

The covered security functional requirements are:

- FMT_MSA.3/Deleg
- FMT_MSA.3/KeyMan
- FMT_MSA.3/DAA
- FMT_MSA.3/M&R
- FMT_MSA.3/NVS
- FMT_MSA.3/MC
- FMT_MSA.3/EID.

The TOE ensures that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from any object by overwriting or deallocation of the specific memory area.

The covered security functional requirement is FDP_RIP.1.

The export and import of user data, outside of the TOE and controlled under the SFP, is done under the control of the Key Management SFP, Key Migration SFP and Export and Import of Data SFP. The TOE enforces the export of the user data with the user data's associated security attributes and ensures that the security attributes are unambiguously associated with the exported user data. The TOE use the security attributes associated with the imported user data and ensures that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.

The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ETC.2 and FDP_ITC.2.

The SF_ACC "Access Control" covers the following security functional requirements:

- FDP_ACC.1,
- FDP_ACF.1,
- FDP_ETC.2,
- FDP_ITC.2,
- RDP_RIP.1,
- FMT_MSA.1,
- FMT_MSA.2 and



• FMT_MSA.3.

8.1.4 <u>SR_GEN: General</u>

The TOE provides the roles: TPM owner, Entity owner, Delegated entity, Entity user, User using operatorAuth and "World" and associates users with roles. The role is bound always on specific authentication token, e.g. for the TPM owner it is the TPM ownership token and for the entity owner it is the entity token. The roles are enforced within the TOE because there are specific commands and specific keys bond to different token.

The covered security functional requirement is FMT_SMR.1.

The TOE performs the following management functions: - Management of the TPM modes of operation, - Management of Delegation Tables and Family Tables, - Management of security attributes of keys, - Management of security attributes of PCR, - Management of security attributes of NV storage areas, - Management of security attributes of monotonic counters and - Reset the Action Flag of TPM dictionary attack mitigation mechanism.

The covered security functional requirement is FMT_SMF.1.

The TOE provides an authentication functionality to consistently interpret authentication reference data of the TPM owner, delegated entities, owner of entities, user of entities and User using operatorAuth, when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product and uses roles when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.

The covered security functional requirement is FPT_TDC.1.

The TOE provides the transmission and reception of user data in encrypted manner, to protect the user data from unauthorized disclosure.

The covered security functional requirements are FDP_UCT.1/Exp and FDP_UCT.1/Imp.

The TOE provides the transmission and reception of user data in encrypted and signed manner, to protect the user data from undiscovered modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors (only required for sessions). Interpreting the signature and the decrypted user data command input the TOE is able to determine, whether modification, deletion and insertion and replay has occurred.

The covered security functional requirements are FDP_UIT.1/Data and FDP_UIT.1/Session.

The TOE provides the generation of an audit record of the event Transport session including different information (e.g. type and outcome of event).

The covered security functional requirement is FAU_GEN.1.

The TOE provides reliable time stamps as number of ticks since start of the tick session.

The covered security functional requirement is FPT_STM.1.

The TOE provides the generation of evidence of origin for transmitted data at the request of the originator and is able to verify the evidence of origin of transmitted data to recipient, by calculation and verifying a digital signature of the data.

The covered security functional requirements are FCO_NRO.1/STS and FCO_NRO.1/M&R.

The SF_GEN "General" covers the following security functional requirements:

- FMT_SMR.1,
- FMT_SMF.1,
- FDP_TDC.1,
- FDP_UCT.1,
- FDP_UIT.1,
- FPT_STM.1,
- FCO_NRO.1 and
- FAU_GEN.1.



8.1.5 SF_PNB: Protection and non-bypassability

The field upgrade functionality guarantees the verification of the authenticity of the firmware file during the loading process in the memory of the TOE. The integrity of the TOE firmware and the non-bypassability of the verification are covered by the security functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1/FUMS, FDP_ACF.1/FUMS, FMT_MSA.1/FUMS, FMT_MSA.3/FUMS, FDP_UIT.1/FUMS.

The TOE preserves a secure state when a failure of any crypto operations including RSA encryption, RSA decryption, SHA-1, RNG, RSA signature generation, HMAC generation, failure of any commands or internal operations (including AES encryption/ decryption), authorization and failure of operating conditions (power supply) occurs. The Neslib library provides protection against fault attacks (FA) on those cryptographic functions thanks to code signature mechanism. The TOE maintains also a secure state after power failure thanks to an atomicity engine that guarantees non volatile memory integrity and coherence when power failure happens during writing operations.

The covered security functional requirement is FPT_FLS.1.

The TOE supports the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol.

The covered security functional requirement is FPR_UNL.1.

The TOE resists physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

The TOE supports the following functions for protection against and detection of physical manipulation and probing:

- Protection by an active shield that commands an automatic reaction on die integrity violation detection.
- Preventative mechanisms are implemented in order to mitigate the risk of information disclosure or unauthorized modification
 - Bus encryption
 - Memories scrambling and encryption
 - Mechanisms for operation execution concealment
- Intrinsic countermeasures for cryptographic algorithm against side channel attacks like timing attacks (TA), SPA and DPA.
- Detection of abnormal behavior of the following operational conditions:
 - High voltage supply
 - Glitches
- Detection of abnormal TOE behavior
 - MPU error
 - TRNG failure

8.1.6 <u>SF_TST: Test</u>

The TOE supports a suite of self-tests during startup and at the request of an authorized user to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF and to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.

The covered security functional requirement is FPT_TST.1.



8.1.7

Security Functional Requirements coverage by security features

Table 11: Summary table of SFR coverage by security features

SFR	SF_CRY	SF_I&A	SF_ACC	SF_GEN	SF_PNB	SF_TST
FMT_SMR.1				х		
FMT_SMF.1				Х		
FDP_ACC.1/Modes			х			
FDP_ACC.1/Deleg			х			
FDP_ACC.1/KeyMan			х			
FDP_ACC.1/MigK			х			
FDP_ACC.1/M&R			х			
FDP_ACC.1/NVS			х			
FDP_ACC.1/EID			х			
FDP_ACC.1/MC			х			
FDP_ACC.1/DAA			х			
FDP_ACF.1/Modes			х			
FDP_ACF.1/Deleg			X			
FDP_ACF.1/KeyMan			х			
FDP_ACF.1/MigK			х			
FDP_ACF.1/M&R			х			
FDP_ACF.1/NVS			х			
FDP_ACF.1/MC			х			
FDP_ACF.1/EID			х			
FDP_ACF.1/DAA			х			
FMT_MSA.1/Modes			х			
FMT_MSA.1/PhysP			х			
FMT_MSA.1/DFT			х			
FMT_MSA.1/DT			Х			
FMT_MSA.1/KeyMan			Х			
FMT_MSA.1/MigK			Х			
FMT_MSA.1/Kevi			Х			
FMT_MSA.1/MC			Х			
FMT_MSA.1/DAA			Х			
FMT_MSA.2			Х			
FMT_MSA.3/Deleg			Х			
FMT_MSA.3/KeyMan			Х			
FMT_MSA.3/M&R			Х			
FMT_MSA.3/NVS			Х			
FMT_MSA.3/MC		<u> </u>	Х			
FMT_MSA.3/EID			х			
FMT_MSA.3/DAA			Х			
FDP_ETC.2			Х			
FDP_ITC.2			х			



SFR	SF_CRY	SF_I&A	SF_ACC	SF_GEN	SF_PNB	SF_TST
FDP_RIP.1	SF_CRT	ος_ιαά		SF_GEN	SF_PND	55_131
FCS_CKM.1			Х			
FCS_CKM.1/AES	Х					
	Х					
FCS_CKM.4	Х					
FCS_RNG.1	Х					
FCS_COP.1/SHA	Х					
FCS_COP.1/HMAC	Х					
FCS_COP.1/RSA_Sig	Х					
FCS_COP.1/VAF						Х
FCS_COP.1/RSA_Enc	Х					
FCS_COP.1/SymEnc	Х					
FCS_COP.1/SymEnc2	Х					
FMT_MTD.1/AuthData		Х				
FMT_MTD.1/Deleg		Х				
FMT_MTD.1/Lock		Х				
FMT_MTD.1/MigK		Х				
FIA_UID.1		Х				
FIA_UAU.1		Х				
FIA_UAU.4		х				
FIA_UAU.5		Х				
FIA_UAU.6		Х				
FIA_AFL.1		х				
FIA_USB.1		х				
FPT_TDC.1				Х		
FCO_NRO.1/M&R				Х		
FCO_NRO.1/STS				Х		
FDP_UCT.1/Exp				Х		
FDP_UCT.1/Imp				Х		
FDP_UIT.1/Data				Х		
FDP_UIT.1/Sesson				X		
FAU_GEN.1				Х		
FPT_STM.1				X		
FPT_FLS.1					x	
FPR_UNL.1					X	
FPT_PHP.3					X	
FPT_TST.1						х
FDP_ACC.1/FUMS					x	
FDP_ACF.1/FUMS					X	
FMT_MSA.1/FUMS					X	
FMT_MSA.3/FUMS					X	
					X	
FDP_UIT.1/FUMS					Å	



Appendix A ABBREVIATIONS

A.1 Abbreviations

Table 12: Abbreviations

Term	Definition				
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard				
CC	Common Criteria				
DES	Data Encryption Standard				
DSAP	Delegate Specific Authorization Protocol				
EK	Endorsement Key				
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard				
FUM	Field Upgrade Mode				
GPIO	General Purpose I/O				
HMAC	Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication				
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology				
NV	Non-volatile (memory)				
OIAP	Object-Independent Authorization Protocol				
OSAP	Object Specific Authorization Protocol				
PCR	Platform Configuration Register				
RSA	Rivest Shamir Adelman				
RTM	Root of Trust for Measurement				
RTR	Root of Trust for Reporting				
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement				
SFR	Security Functional Requirement				
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm				
SPI	Serial Peripheral Interface				
SRK	Storage Root Key				
TCG Trusted Computed Group					
ТРМ	Trusted Platform Module				
TPME	TPM Manufacturer				
TSS	TPM Software Stack				



Appendix B REFERENCED DOCUMENTS

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