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PV3-00167a Site Security Target NXP Glasgow EK Lite

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Approvers

Sequence	Role	Name
Acceptance	Security Manager	Dirk Luetzelberger
Approval	Security Manager	Martin Schaffer

Subscriber

Role	Name	Notification	PDF-file
n.a.	None, document not public		

NXP Glasgow EK, Phoenix
House, 3 Bramah Avenue,
Scottish Enterprise
Technology Park, East
Kilbride,
Quality Systems

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1. Document Introduction

1.1 Reference

Title: PV3-00167a Site Security Target NXP Glasgow EK Lite

Version: 1.0

Date: 9/22/2017

Company: NXP Glasgow EK, Phoenix House, 3 Bramah Avenue, Scottish Enterprise
Technology Park, East Kilbride, G75 0RD

Name of site: NXP Glasgow EK

EAL: SARs taken from EAL6

1.2 Version History

Version	Date	Comment
V1.0	22 Sept 2017	first release

2. SST Introduction

- 1 The chapters 1 to 6 of this document is based upon the Eurosmart Site Security Target Template [1] with adaptations such that it fits the site (i.e. development site, testing of software, no production, no direct delivery to customers of the user of the site).

This Site Security Target is intended to be used by NXP Semiconductors Business Security and Connectivity (BU S&C).

* Note that the site of this Site Security Target also belong to NXP BU S&C.

2.1 SST Reference

- 2 Title PV3-00167a Site Security Target NXP Glasgow EK Lite
- 3 Version 1.0

2.2 Site Reference

- 4 The site belongs to NXP Semiconductors U.K. and is located at:

NXP Glasgow EK.
3 Bramah Avenue,
Phoenix House,
Scottish Enterprise Technology Park,
East Kilbride,
G75 0RD

2.3 Site Description

- 5 The site as described in section 2.2 is a 2 story building which NXP full occupy. The building is a dedicate NXP security controlled area.
- 6 This development area is HS¹ (High Security) and exclusively occupied by NXP with restricted need to know access controlled by NXP for authorize personnel only.
- 7 The non-NXP controlled areas of this building are out with the scope of this site security target (SST). All these areas of this building are considered to be in the NS¹ security area and are describe later in this document.

¹ The terms NS, RS and HS are well defined security levels. Their definition can be found in the NXP internal document "PV3-00166 - Site Security Manual, Glasgow EK" [8]

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- 8 Within the development area, only members of the development team are entitled to access sensitive information i.e. source code, confidential documentation, etc.
- 9 The activities are: Security IC Embedded Software Development (Phase 1), IC Embedded Software and Testing (Phase 1), IC Design (Phase 2), IC Dedicated Software and Testing (Phase 1) as defined in 'Security IC Platform Protection Profile' (PP-0035) and 'Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages' (PP-0084)
- 10 To perform these activities the site uses the NXP BU ID provided and managed remote IT-infrastructure. Locally available IT equipment like workstations or VPN routers are also provided and managed by NXP BU ID directly. The site works according to NXP BU ID processes.
- 11 The activities (and areas where they are performed) are:

Activity	Area
Development and testing* of software for secure integrated circuits.	1 st floor, NXP Secure Area
Also development of IC Hardware Design secure integrated circuits	1 st floor, NXP Secure Area

- 12 The typical Life Cycle model for Smart Cards usually comprises the following phases:
 - Development,
 - Production,
 - Delivery,
 - Preparation,
 - Operation,
- 13 Whereas the site under evaluation supports only the life cycle phase
 - Development
- 14 Development comprises of the generation of source code modules and the test of this code only.

3. Conformance Claim

15 This SST is conformant with Common Criteria Version 3.1:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, [2]
- Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1, 4, September 2012, [3]

16 For the evaluation, the following methodology will be used:

- Common Methodology for Information Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology; Version 3.1, 4, September 2012, [4]
- Minimum Site Security Requirement V1.1 June 2013 [10]

17 This SST is CC Part 3 conformant.

18 There are no extended components required for this SST for the NXP Glasgow EK Site.

19 The evaluation of the site comprises the following assurance components²:

- ALC_CMC.5,
- ALC_CMS.5,
- ALC_DVS.2,
- ALC_LCD.1,
- ALC_TAT.3.

20 The assurance level chosen for the SST is compliant to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [5] and is therefore suitable for the evaluation of software and Hardware design for Security ICs.

21 The chosen assurance components are derived from the assurance level EAL6 of the assurance class "Life-cycle Support". For the assessment of the security measures attackers with a high attack potential are assumed. Therefore this site supports potentially augmented product evaluations up to EAL6.

4. Security Problem Definition

22 The Security Problem Definition comprises security problems derived from threats against the assets handled by the site.

23 Where necessary the items in this section have been re-worked to fit the site

4.1 Assets

24 The following section describes the assets handled at the site.

Development data: The site has access to (and optionally copies thereof) electronic development data (specifications, guidance documentation, source code, etc.) in relation to developed TOEs. Both the integrity and the confidentiality of these electronic documents must be protected.

Development tools: To perform its development activities the site uses tools (e.g. compiler) to transform source code (and potentially the libraries that come with these tools) into binaries. The integrity of these tools (running on local or remote development computers) must be protected.

Physical security objects: The site has physical security objects (printed documents, etc.) in relation to developed TOEs. Both the integrity and the confidentiality of these must be protected.

4.2 Threats

T.Smart-Theft: An attacker tries to access sensitive areas of the site for manipulation or theft of assets (1) In this case development data with the intention to violate confidentiality and possibly integrity (2) Physical security objects in the form of printed documentation (3) Development Tools in the form of IT infrastructure hardware. The attacker has sufficient time to investigate the site outside the controlled boundary. For the attack the use of standard equipment for burglary is considered.

T.Rugged-Theft: An attacker with specialized equipment for burglary, who may be paid to perform the attack, tries to access sensitive areas and manipulate or steal assets (1) In this case development data with the intention to violate confidentiality and possibly integrity (2) Physical security objects in the form of printed documentation (3) Development Tools in the form of IT infrastructure hardware.

- T.Computer-Net: A possibly paid hacker with substantial expertise using standard equipment attempts to remotely access sensitive network segments to get access to (1) development data with the intention to violate confidentiality and possibly integrity or (2) development computers with the intention to modify the development process.
- T.Unauthorised-Staff: Employees or subcontractors not authorized to get access to assets by violating (1) In this case development data with the intention to violate confidentiality and possibly integrity (2) Physical security objects in the form of printed documentation (3) Development Tools in the form of IT infrastructure hardware.
- T.Staff-Collusion: An attacker tries to get access to assets by getting support from one employee through extortion or bribery. (1) In this case development data with the intention to violate confidentiality and possibly integrity (2) Physical security objects in the form of printed documentation (3) Development Tools in the form of IT infrastructure hardware.

4.3 Organizational Security Policies

- P.Config_IT-env: The site uses software on development workstations and servers in addition to configuration management systems for file versioning and problem tracking. For file versioning unique repositories shall be used to support proper management of multiple products and the site internal procedures. The team members are instructed to use only project related IT equipment provided by NXP with the provided tools.
- P.LifeCycle-Doc: The site uses life cycle documentation that describes:
- (1) Description of configuration management systems and their usage;
 - (2) A configuration items list;
 - (3) Site security;
 - (4) The development process;
 - (5) The development tools.
- P.Config_Activities: The activities of the site shall be performed in accordance with the life cycle documentation (P.Config_IT-env) using the IT-environment (P.LifeCycle-Doc).

4.4 Assumptions

- A.Inherit-secure-IT: The local IT equipment (e.g. workstations) is connected to a secure remote IT-Infrastructure through a secure (encrypted) network connection. The local workstations, the remote secure IT-infrastructure and the secure connection to it will satisfy all relevant ALC requirements and are provided and managed by NXP. The workstations are configured such that any assets are contained within encrypted containers.
- A.Setup-Projects: To enable that the site participates in the development of products NXP provides services to setup the necessary development computers (tools, user accounts, etc.) and configuration management systems (user accounts, repositories etc.).
- A.Product-Setup: The site participates in the development of products. To define the participation of the site in the development while maintaining quality, for each product NXP will manage the activities to be performed by the site, the specifications of the input for the site and the acceptance of the results by NXP.

5. Security Objectives

25 The Security Objectives are related to physical, technical, and organizational security measures, the configuration management as well as the internal shipment and/or the external delivery.

O.Config_IT-env: The site uses software on development workstations and servers in addition to configuration management systems for file versioning and problem tracking. For file versioning unique repositories are used to support proper management of multiple products and the site internal procedures.

O.LifeCycle-Doc: The site uses life cycle documentation that describes:

- (1) Description of configuration management systems and their usage;
- (2) A configuration items list;
- (3) Site security;
- (4) The development process;
- (5) The development tools.
- (6) CM_Plan

O.Config_Activities: The activities of the site are performed in accordance with the life cycle documentation (O.Config_IT-env) using the IT-environment (O.LifeCycle-Doc).

O.Physical-Access: The combination of physical partitioning between the different access control levels together with technical and organisational security measures allows a sufficient separation of employees to enforce the “need to know” principle. The access control shall support the limitation for the access to these areas including the identification and rejection of unauthorised people. The access control measures ensure that only registered employees can access restricted areas. Assets are handled in restricted areas only.

O.Security-Control: Assigned personnel of the site operate the systems for access control. Out of hour surveillance and respond to alarms is contracted to a 3rd party security company. Technical security measures like motion sensors and similar kind of sensors support the enforcement of the access control. NXP personnel are also responsible for registering and ensuring escort of visitors, contractors and suppliers.

O.Alarm-Response: The technical and organisational security measures ensure that an alarm is generated before an unauthorised person gets

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access to any asset. After the alarm is triggered the unauthorised person still has to overcome further security measures. The reaction time of the employees and/or guards is short enough to prevent a successful attack.

- O.Internal-Monitor: The site performs security management meetings at least every six months. The security management meetings are used to review security incidences, to verify that maintenance measures are applied and to reconsider the assessment of risks and security measures. Furthermore, an internal audit is performed every year to control the application of the security measures.
- O.Maintain-Security: Technical security measures are maintained regularly to ensure correct operation. The logging of sensitive systems is checked regularly. This comprises the access control system to ensure that only authorised employees have access to sensitive areas as well as computer/network systems to ensure that they are configured as required to ensure the protection of the networks and computer systems.
- O.Network-separation: The (plain-text) development network of the site exists within the secured areas of the site only. It is connected only to:
- (1) The encryption equipment employs encrypted VPNs to the secure network provided by the NXP;
 - (2) The development workstations provided by the NXP;
 - (3) Additional equipment (e.g. a printer) approved by the NXP.
- O.Logical-Operation: Development computers enforce that every user authenticates using a password and has a unique user ID.
- O.Control-Scrap: The site has measures in place to either securely destroy assets (e.g. paper shredder) or return them to the NXP for destruction.
- O.Staff-Engagement: All employees who have access to assets are checked regarding security concerns and have to sign a non-disclosure agreement. Furthermore, all employees are trained and qualified for their job. All contractors and visitors must be escorted by a trained employee at all times.

5.1 Security Objectives Rationale

- 26 The SST includes a Security Objective Rationale with two parts. The first part includes the tracing which shows how the threats and OSPs are covered by the Security Objectives. The second part includes a justification that shows that all threats and OSPs are effectively addressed by the Security Objectives (see column “Rationale” of table 1 and Table 2)
- 27 Note that the assumptions of the SST cannot be used to cover any threat or OSP of the site. They are seen as pre-conditions fulfilled either by the site providing the sensitive configuration items or by the site receiving the sensitive configuration items. Therefore, they do not contribute to the security of the site under evaluation.

Threat and OSP	Security Objective(s)	Rationale
T.Smart-Theft	O.Physical-Access O.Control-Scrap O.Security-Control O.Alarm-Response O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security	O.Physical-Access ensures that the Secure Room is physically partitioned off, so that a burglar cannot just walk in. O.Control-Scrap ensures that scrap material cannot be accessed by an authorized party O.Security-Control ensures that an attacker will be detected when trying to reach the assets through the Secure Room O.Alarm-Response supports O.Physical_Access and O.Security_Control by ensuring that a response will be given to the alarm systems and that this response is quick enough to prevent access to the assets. O.Internal-Monitor and O.Maintain-Security ensure that the above is managed and maintained. Together, these objectives will therefore counter T.Smart_Theft.

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T.Rugged-Theft	O.Physical-Access O.Security-Control O.Alarm-Response O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security	O.Physical-Access ensures that the Secure Room is physically partitioned off, so that a burglar cannot just walk in. O.Security-Control ensures that an attacker will be detected when trying to reach the assets through the Secure Room O.Alarm-Response supports O.Physical_Access and O.Security_Control by ensuring that a response will be given to the alarm systems and that this response is quick enough to prevent access to the assets. O.Internal-Monitor and O.Maintain-Security ensure that the above is managed and maintained. Together, these objectives will therefore counter T.Rugged_Theft
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<p>T.Computer-Net</p>	<p>O.Network-separation O.Physical-Access O.Staff-Engagement O.Logical-Operation O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.LifeCycle-doc O.Config_IT-env</p>	<p>O.Network-separation ensures that the development network is not connected to anything that an attacker could use to set up a remote connection</p> <p>O.Physical-Access ensures that all communication between the Secure Room and the Business Unit is done through encryption equipment (provided by the Business Unit). The attacker can therefore neither:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Listen in on or manipulate the network connection between the Secure Room and the Business Unit • Penetrate the Secure Room management stations through this connection <p>The attacker also cannot use other networks that lead into the Secure Room as O. Exclusive-Access also ensures that all such connections are not connected to the encryption equipment.</p> <p>O.Staff-Engagement ensures that all staff is aware of its responsibilities (signing NDAs, and being trained).</p> <p>In addition, O.Logical-Operation ensures that all computer systems used to manage the Business Unit network are kept up to date (software updates, security patches, virus and spyware protection)</p> <p>O.LifeCycle-doc ensures life cycle documentation that describes configuration management systems, Site security, development process and tools providing a CM_Plan is sufficient to meet P.LifeCycle-doc.</p> <p>O.Internal-Monitor and O.Maintain-Security ensure that the above is managed and maintained.</p> <p>O.Config_IT-env assigns unique numbers to the internal procedures and guidance.</p> <p>Together, these objectives will therefore counter T.Computer-Net.</p>
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<p>T.Unauthorised-Staff</p>	<p>O.Network-separation O.Physical-Access O.Security-Control O.Alarm-Response O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.LifeCycle-doc O.Config_IT-env O.Control-Scrap O.Staff-Engagement</p>	<p>O.Network-separation ensures that the development network is not connected to anything that an attacker could use to set up a remote connection O.Security_Control ensures that all unauthorised people who have a legitimate need to visit the Secure Room are always accompanied. O.Physical-Access, O.Security-Control and O.Alarm-Response ensures that the unauthorised people cannot circumvent this (see the rationale for T.Smart-Theft for more details on this) O.Internal-Monitor and O.Maintain-Security ensure that the above is managed and maintained. O.LifeCycle-doc ensures life cycle documentation that describes configuration management systems, Site security, development process and tools providing a CM_Plan is sufficient to meet P.LifeCycle-doc. O.Config_IT-env assigns unique numbers to the internal procedures and guidance. O.Control-Scrap ensures that scrap material cannot be accessed by an authorized party O.Staff-Engagement ensures that all staff is aware of its responsibilities (signing NDAs, and being trained). Together, these objectives will therefore counter T.Unauthorised-Staff.</p>
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<p>T.Staff-Collusion</p>	<p>O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.Staff-Engagement O.Control-Scrap O.LifeCycle-doc</p>	<p>O.Staff-Engagement ensures that all staff is aware of its responsibilities (signing NDAs, and being trained). O.Internal-Monitor and O.Maintain-Security ensure that the above is managed and maintained. O.Control-Scrap ensures that scrap material cannot be accessed by an authorized party O.LifeCycle-doc ensures life cycle documentation that describes configuration management systems, Site security, development process and tools providing a CM_Plan is sufficient to meet P.LifeCycle-doc.</p> <p>Together, these objectives will therefore counter T.Staff-Collusion.</p>
<p>P.Config_IT-env</p>	<p>O.Config_IT-env O.Config_Activities</p>	<p>The Security Objective directly enforces the OSP. O.Config_IT-env assigns unique numbers to the internal procedures and guidance. O.Config_Activities activities of the site are performed in accordance with the life cycle documentation. As the site processes no other configuration items, this is sufficient to meet P.Config_IT-env.</p>
<p>P.Config_Activities</p>	<p>O.Network-separation O.Config_Activities</p>	<p>O.Network-separation ensures that the development network is not connected to anything that an attacker could use to set up a remote connection O.Config_Activities activities of the site are performed in accordance with the life cycle documentation. The Security Objective directly enforces the OSP. The services and processes provided by the site are described in the internal procedures and guidance. As these are kept under CM (see the rationale above), this is sufficient to meet P.Config_Activities.</p>

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P.LifeCycle-doc	O.LifeCycle-doc	The Security Objective directly enforces the OSP. This ensures life cycle documentation that describes configuration management systems, Site security, development process and tools providing a CM_Plan is sufficient to meet P.LifeCycle-doc.
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Table 1 Threats and OSP - Security Objectives Rationale

6. Extended Assurance Components Definition

28 No extended components are defined in this Site Security Target.

7. Security Assurance Requirements

- 29 NXP Glasgow EK using this Site Security Target requires a TOE evaluation up to evaluation assurance level EAL6, potentially claiming conformance with the Eurosmart Protection Profile [5].
- 30 The Security Assurance Requirements are chosen from the class ALC (Life-cycle support) as defined in [3]:
- CM capabilities (ALC_CMC.5)
 - CM scope (ALC_CMS.5)
 - Development Security (ALC_DVS.2)
 - Life-cycle definition (ALC_LCD.1)
 - Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT.3)
 -
- 31 Because hierarchically higher components are used in this SST the Security Assurance Requirements listed above fulfil the requirements of:
- [10] 'Minimum Site Security Requirements'
 - [5] Eurosmart Protection Profile.
- 32 In addition, SAR as defined in [10] 'Minimum Site Security Requirements' is augmented by assurance components from 'Life-cycle definition' (ALC_LCD.1) and 'Tools and techniques' (ALC_TAT.3).

7.1 Application Notes and Refinements

- 33 The description of the site certification process [6] includes specific application notes. The main item is that a product that is considered as intended TOE is not available during the evaluation. Since the term "TOE" is not applicable in the Site Security Target, the associated processes for the handling of products, or "intended TOEs" are in the scope of this Site Security Target and are described in this document. These processes are subject of the evaluation of the site.

7.1.1 CM Capabilities (ALC_CMC.5)

- 34 Refer to subsection 'Application Notes for Site Certification' in [6] 5.1 'Application Notes for ALC_CMC'.

7.1.2 CM Scope (ALC_CMS.5)

- 35 Refer to subsection 'Application Notes for Site Certification' in [6] 5.2 'Application Notes for ALC_CMS'.

7.1.3 Development Security (ALC_DVS.2)

36 Refer to subsection 'Application Notes for Site Certification' in [6] 5.4 'Application Notes for ALC_DVS'.

7.1.4 Life-cycle Definition (ALC_LCD.1)

37 Refer to subsection 'Application Notes for Site Certification' in [6] 5.6 'Application Notes for ALC_LCD'.

38 Refer to '*Application Note 26*' in 6.2.1.2 'Refinements regarding Development Security (ALC_DVS)' in the Eurosmart PP [5].

39 Refer to subsection '*Refinement*' in 6.2.1.2 'Refinements regarding Development Security (ALC_DVS)' in the Eurosmart PP [5].

40 Refer to subsection "C Excerpts from the Criteria in Security assurance components (chapter 7)" in [12] Security IC Platform Protection Profile (BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014), Version 1.0, Eurosmart, 2014.

7.1.5 Tools and Techniques (ALC_TAT.3)

41 Refer to subsection 'Application Notes for Site Certification' in [6] 5.7 'Application Notes for ALC_TAT'.

7.2 Security Requirements Rationale

7.2.1 Security Requirements Rationale - Dependencies

42 The dependencies for the assurance requirements are as follows:

- ALC_CMC.5: ALC_CMS.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1
- ALC_CMS.5: None
- ALC_DVS.2: None
- ALC_LCD.1: None
- ALC_TAT.3: ADV_IMP.1
-

43 Some of the dependencies are not (completely) fulfilled:

- ALC_LCD.1 is only partially fulfilled as the site does not represent the entire development environment. This is in-line with and further explained in [6] 5.1 'Application Notes for ALC_CMC'.
- ADV_IMP.1 is not fulfilled as there is no specific TOE. This is in-line with and further explained in [6] 5.7 'Application Notes for ALC_TAT'.

7.2.2 Security Requirements Rationale – Mapping

SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_CMC.5.1C: The CM documentation shall show that a process is in place to ensure an appropriate and consistent labeling.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Config_Activities	Appropriate and consistent labelling is ensured through the application (O.Config_Activities) of the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) and the use of the configuration management systems (O.Config_IT-env).
ALC_CMC.5.2C: The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The method used to uniquely identify the configuration items is described in the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc).
ALC_CMC.5.3C: The CM documentation shall justify that the acceptance procedures provide for an adequate and appropriate review of changes to all configuration items.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The adequate and appropriate acceptance procedures for configuration items are described in the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc).
ALC_CMC.5.4C: The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Config_Activities	Unique identification of all CIs is realized by performing the CM activities (O.Config_Activities) in accordance with the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) using the Configuration management systems (O.Config_IT-env)
ALC_CMC.5.5C: The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only authorized changes are made to the configuration items.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Config_Activities	The configuration management systems (O.Config_IT-Env) used (O.Config_Activities) according to the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) enforces automated measures such that only authorized changes are made to the configuration items
ALC_CMC.5.6C: The CM system shall support the production of the product by automated	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Config_Activities	The software on the development computers (O.Config_IT-env) supports automated production of products when used

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SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
means.		(O.Config_Activities) in accordance with the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc)
ALC_CMC.5.7C: The CM system shall ensure that the person responsible for accepting a configuration item into CM is not the person who developed it.	O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Config_Activities	As described in the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) the activities performed (O.Config_Activities) are such that the person responsible for accepting a configuration item into CM is not the person who developed it.
ALC_CMC.5.8C: The CM system shall clearly identify the configuration items that comprise the TSF.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc	The CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) identifies the configuration items that comprise the TSF possibly supported by the configuration management system (O.Config_IT-env)
ALC_CMC.5.9C: The CM system shall support the audit of all changes to the TOE by automated means, including the originator, date, and time in the audit trail.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc	As described in the CM_Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) the configuration management systems (O.Config_IT-env) are configured such that an audit trail (showing originator, date and time) is automatically generated.
ALC_CMC.5.10C: The CM system shall provide an automated means to identify all other configuration items that are affected by the change of a given configuration item.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc	As described in the CM_Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) the configurations management system and software installed on the development workstations and servers (O.Config_IT-env) provide automated means to identify all other configuration items that are affected by the change of a given configuration item.
ALC_CMC.5.11C: The CM system shall be able to identify the version of the implementation representation from which the TOE is generated.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc	As described in the CM_Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) the configurations management system (O.Config_IT-env) identifies the version of the implementation representation from which the TOE is generated

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SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
		through baselines.
ALC_CMC.5.12C: The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) includes a CM-Plan.
ALC_CMC.5.13C: The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development of the TOE.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) describes how the CM system is used for the development of the product.
ALC_CMC.5.14C: The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the TOE	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The acceptance procedures for modified or newly created configuration items are described in the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc).
ALC_CMC.5.15C: The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	All configuration items are listed in the CI-list (O.LifeCycle-Doc)
ALC_CMC.5.16C: The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items have been and are being maintained under the CM system.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc	The CI-list (O.LifeCycle-Doc) is generated from the configuration management systems (O.Config_IT-env)

Table 2 Rationale for ALC_CMC.5

SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_CMS.5.1C: The	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle documentation

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SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
configuration list includes the following: the TOE itself; the evaluation evidence required by the SARs in the ST; the parts that comprise the TOE; the implementation representation; security flaws; and development tools and related information. The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.		(O.LifeCycle-Doc) includes a CM-Plan and a CI-List with the items required by ALC_CMS.5.1C
ALC_CMS.5.2C: The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The CI-List (O.LifeCycle-Doc) uniquely identifies the configurations items as described in the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc).
ALC_CMS.5.3C: For each configuration item, the configuration list shall indicate the developer/subcontractor of the item.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The CI-List (O.LifeCycle-Doc) indicates the developer/subcontractor for each configuration items as described in the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc).

Table 3 Rationale for ALC_CMS.5

SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_DVS.2.1C: The development security documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural,	O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Physical-Access O.Security-Control O.Alarm-	The development security documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) describes the physical (O.Physical-Access, O.Security-Control,

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SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development environment.	Response O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.Network-separation O.Logical-Operation O.Control-Scrap O.Staff-Engagement	O.Alarm-Response), procedural (O.Internal-Monitor, O.Maintain-Security, O.Control-Scrap), personnel (O.Staff-Engagement), and other (O.Network-separation, O.Logical-Operation) security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development environment.
ALC_DVS.2.2C: The development security documentation shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The development security documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) justifies the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.

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SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_DVS.2.3C: The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Physical-Access O.Security-Control O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.Network-separation O.Logical-Operation O.Control-Scrap O.Staff-Engagement 	ALC_DVS.2.3C: The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and

Table 4 Rationale for ALC_DVS.2

SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_LCD.1.1C: The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop and maintain the TOE.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The model used to develop the TOE is described in the life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc)
ALC_LCD.1.2C: The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the TOE.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle model as described in the life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) provides for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the TOE.

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Table 5 Rationale for ALC_LCD.1

SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_TAT.3.1C: Each development tool used for implementation shall be well-defined.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) shows that the development tools used for implementation are well-defined.
ALC_TAT.3.2.C: The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define the meaning of all statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the implementation.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) together with the documentation of the development tools unambiguously defines the meaning of all statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the implementation.
ALC_TAT.3.3C: The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) together with the documentation of the development tools unambiguously defines the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.

Table 6 Rationale for ALC_TAT.3

8. Site Summary Specification

8.1 Preconditions required by the Site

- 44 The site activities are performed using an IT infrastructure consisting of development workstations, servers and configuration management systems. All of these are provided, configured and maintained by the NXP.
- 45 The IT infrastructure consists of local and remote equipment connected using an encrypted connection. NXP provides, configures and maintains the local workstations and router (used for the encrypted connection) and all remote equipment such that they are secure. The workstations are configured such that any assets are contained within encrypted containers.
- 46 In case of necessary updates to the life cycle documentation NXP will coordinate, communicate and deliver.
- 47 To enable that the site participates in the development of products NXP provides services to setup the necessary development computers (tools, user accounts, etc.) and configuration management systems (user accounts, repositories etc.).
- 48 To enable the site to realize shipment such that assurance of integrity is assured throughout transport of physical security objects NXP will manage the shipment method.
- 49 In case the site is unable to securely destroy certain physical assets the assets will be securely stored and shipped to NXP for destruction.
- 50 To define the participation of the site in the development while maintaining quality, for each product NXP will manage the activities to be performed, the specifications of the input for the site and the acceptance of the results.
- 51 The site follows the development processes of NXP. Applicable policies and processes are documented and available.

8.2 Services of the Site

52 The site participates in the design and development of software¹ for secure integrated circuits.

8.3 Security Assurance Rationale

8.3.1 CM capabilities (ALC_CMC.5)

53 Configuration Management is described in [7], [8] and [12].

54 For full detail and evidences please view Section 7.2.2

8.3.2 CM scope (ALC_CMS.5)

55 Configuration Management is described in [7], [8] and [12].

56 For full detail and evidences please view Section 7.2.2

8.3.3 Development Security (ALC_DVS.2)

57 Development Security is described in [8].

58 For full detail and evidences please view Section 7.2.2

8.3.4 Life-cycle definition (ALC_LCD.1)

59 Life-cycle definition is described in [7] and [8].

60 For full detail and evidences please view Section 7.2.2

8.3.5 Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT.3)

Tools and techniques is described in [8].

61 For full detail and evidences please view Section 7.2.2

8.4 Objectives Rationale

62 The following rationale provides a justification that shows that all threats and OSP are effectively addressed by the Security Objectives.

8.4.1 O.Physical-Access

63 The NXP Office area is surrounded by a solid wall construction and controlled by Access Control, PIR's, Break Glass Detectors and CCTV. The access to the building is only possible via reception desk and controlled doors. The building is protected by guards 24/7. NXP manages its own dedicated alarm system and the additional external control are graduated according to the running operation at the site. The physical, technical and organizational security measures ensure a separation of the site into three security levels. The access control ensures that only registered persons can access sensitive areas. This is supported by O.Security-Control that includes the maintenance of the access control and the control of visitors. The physical security measures are supported by O.Alarm-Response providing an alarm system.

64 Thereby the threats T.Smart-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Rugged-Theft can be prevented. The physical security measures together with the security measure provided by O.Security-Control enforce the recording of all actions. Thereby also T.Unauthorized-Staff is addressed.

8.4.2 O.Security-Control

65 During off hours the guards patrol the building with the alarm system being used to monitor the site. The CCTV system supports these measures because it is always enabled. Further on the security control is supported by O.Physical-Access requiring different level of access control for the access to security product during operation as well as during off-hours.

66 This addresses the threats T.Smart-Theft and T.Rugged-Theft. Supported by O.Maintain- Security and O.Physical-Access also an internal attacker triggers the security measures implemented by O.Security-Control. Therefore also the Threat T.Unauthorized-Staff is addressed.

8.4.3 O.Alarm-Response

67 During working hours the guards monitor the alarm system. The alarm system is connected to security desk which is manned 24 hours. During off-hours additional guard patrols supports the alarm system. O.Physical-Access requires certain time to overcome the different level of access control. The

response time of the guard and the physical resistance match to provide an effective alarm response.

68 This addresses the threats T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft and T.Unauthorised-Staff

8.4.4 O.Internal-Monitor

69 Regular security management meetings are implemented to monitor security incidences as well as changes or updates of security relevant systems and processes. This comprises of all security events, security relevant systems, CCTV and access control. Major changes of security systems and security procedures are reviewed in general management systems review meetings (4x per year). Upon introduction of a new process a formal review and release for mass production is made before being generally introduced.

70 This addresses T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff and T.Staff-Collusion

8.4.5 O.Maintain-Security

71 The security relevant systems enforcing or supporting O.Physical-Access, O.Security-Control and O.Logical-Access are checked and maintained regularly by the suppliers. In addition the configuration is updated as required either by employees (for the access control system) of the supplier. Logging files are checked at least monthly for technical problems and specific maintenance requests.

72 This addresses T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff and T.Staff-Collusion

8.4.6 O.Logical-Operation

73 All logical protection measures are maintained and updated as required, at least once a month. Critical items such as virus scanners are updated daily. The backup is sufficiently protected and is only accessible for the administration.

74 This addresses the threats T.Computer-Net

8.4.7 O.Staff-Engagement

75 All employees are interviewed before hiring. They must sign a NDA and a code of conduct for the use of NXP equipment before they start working in the company. The formal training and qualification includes security relevant subjects and the principles of handling and storage of security products. Security training is performed annually with access being revoked if not complete. The security objectives O.Physical-Access, O.Logical- Access and O.Config-Items support the engagement of the staff.

76 This addresses the threats T.Computer-Net, T.Staff-Collusion and T.Unauthorised-Staff

8.4.8 O.Control-Scrap

77 Scarp may only exist in two forms on this site printed secure objects or redundant hardware/movable media. Hardware scrap is returned to NXP head office for controlled secure destruction. Transport and actual destruction of security products is done under supervision of a qualified employee in collaboration with the destructor. Sensitive information and information storage media are collected internally in a safe location and destroyed in a supervised and documented process. All documentation destroyed on site is by means of a Level 5 security shredder.

78 Supported by O.Physical-Access and O.Staff-engagement this addresses the threats T.Unauthorised-Staff, T.Smart-Theft and T.Staff-Collusion

8.4.9 O.Config_Activities

79 All product configuration information is stored in the database on the NXP secure network. The information stored is covering process specifications, acceptance test instructions and specifications, and test programs. Products are identified by unique customer part IDs with are linked to the unique ID numbers of the associated configuration items.

80 This is addressing the threat P.Config_IT-env, and the OSP P.Config-Activities

8.4.10 O.Config_IT-env

81 All logical protection measures are maintained and updated as required, at least once a month. Critical items such as virus scanners are updated daily. The backup is sufficiently protected and is only accessible for the administration.

82 This addresses the threats T.Computer-Net and T.Unauthorised-Staff

8.4.11 O.Network_Separation

83 The internal network is separated from the internet with a firewall. The internal network is further separated into subnetworks by internal firewalls. These firewalls allow only authorized information exchange between the internal subnetworks. Each user is logging into the system with his personalised user name and password. The objective is supported by O.Internal-Monitor based on the checks of the logging regarding security relevant events.

84 The individual accounts are addressing T.Computer-Net. All network configuration is stored in the database of the NXP secure network. Supported by O.Config-IT-env this addresses the threats T.Unauthorised-Staff and the OSP P.Config-Activity.

8.4.12 O.LifeCycle_doc

85 The security of the site is maintained according to the sites security documentation covering all physical and logical measures to ensure the security of the site.

86 These security measures are necessary to prevent the threats T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff, T.Staff-Collusion and the OSP P.LifeCycle-Doc.

9. References

9.1 Literature

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- [3] Common Criteria, "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part3: Security Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 4," September 2012.
- [4] Common Criteria, "Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology; Version 3.1, Revision 4," September 2012.
- [5] "Security IC Platform Protection Profile Version 1.0," Eurosmart, 15.06.2007.
- [6] Common Criteria, "Supporting Document, Site Certification, Version 1.0, Revision 1, CCDB-2007-11-001," October 2007.
- [7] "BU ID ALC-CM Common Criteria Documentation, PV4-00805".
- [8] PV3-00166 - Site Security Manual, Glasgow EK, V1.3
- [10] Minimum Site Security Requirement V1.1 June
- [11] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmented Packages (BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014), Version 1.0, Eurosmart, 2014.
- [12] Glasgow EK Configuration List, Version 1.0

9.2 List of Abbreviations

CC	Common Criteria
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
IC	Integrated Circuit
IP	Intellectual Property
IT	Information Technology
OSP	Organizational Security Policy
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SST	Site Security Target
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation