

Version

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| 23/10/2019 | 1.1 | L. GAUDIN | Minor changes |
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| 12/10/2020 | 1.5a | L. GAUDIN | Update linked with official feedback |
| 09/11/2020 | 1.6 | L. GAUDIN | Confidential remove Add element "App Security" in 5.2 Remove T.Application leak in 7.2 Add T.Application alteration tracability in 7.2 |
| 10/11/2020 | 1.7 | | Document restructuring following ANSSI remarks |

References

| Date | Version |
|----------|--|
| [GUIDES] | <i>Photometrix Verifier Core – SDK for Android</i> , November 2020 |

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1 Product Identification

| | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Editor | Surys |
| Editor Web site | Surys.com |
| Commercial name of the product | Photometrix Verifier Core |
| SDK version | 1.2.3 |
| Smartphone compatibility list | Samsung galaxy S6 and above |
| Type of product | Android SDK |

2 Glossary and terms

| | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Authentication | Process to ensure the conformity of the Photometrix™ code . |
| Document holder | Person who gives this Photometrix™ file to make authentication. |
| Photometrix™ Certificate | Public Key used in the authentication process |
| PhotoMetrix™ Code | 2D printed representation of a Photometrix™ file that contains Authentication data and other customer specific data. |
| PhotoMetrix™ Application | Control application using the SDK Photometrix™ installed on an Android or iPhone |
| Photometrix™ server | Server that contains Photometrix™ Certificates used in the authentication process. |

3 Product description

3.1 General description of the product

Photometrix™ is an innovative 2D bar code that enables automated photo authentication without the need to connect to a centralized database. This security is based on the integration, in an encrypted 2D bar code, of the digital signature of the photograph.

This code can be printed on any media to then allow reading by a portable device (smartphone for example) or fixed (security gate). This code can also be present in dematerialized form in a Smartphone application. Thus the carrier presents his identity in digital form to the control system (smartphone of the controller or terminal of the security gantry)




Thus, whatever the type of authentication request, the user can produce a paper document, an authentication card type document or a smartphone screen to authenticate.

Photometrix™ can be printed on any paper, PVC card or Polycarbonate card with 300DPI printing.

The generation of **Photometrix™** is immediate via a dedicated and centralized hardware and software module. This solution can therefore be used with decentralized personalization hardware for an immediate need (installation sites or temporary installations to be secured) or a centralized platform depending on the type of customization technology used or the security conditions for preparing these identification documents.


For example please see below an authentication scenario with a smartphone.

In order to control the authenticity of the ID document, the operator only needs a smartphone with a 2K camera. For Document holder control, two options, which can be implemented at the same time, can be used:



Photometrix Control

Facial recognition: The Photometrix™ code is scanned. Once the ID picture has been authenticated, it becomes a trusted element on which the facial recognition process will be based. This function is optional and is not included into the scope of the current document.



Face control

Fingerprint control using a fingerprint module connected to the smartphone.

Optional or can replace the facial recognition, fingerprint can be used to check Document holder.

Same basic procedure, document holder presents its fingerprint and control is immediate in an offline mode. This function is optional and is not included into the scope of the current document.




Biometric Control

Figure 1 - Fingerprint control

SURYS proposes two technical approaches to provide final user tools to control **Photometrix™** Codes

- Control application developed by SURYS based on customer specifications
- SDK with SURYS support in order to let the customer capability to include **Photometrix™** control into its own application.

The purpose of this security target is to evaluate the SDK using a generic control application.



Creation process

| Step | Description |
|------|--|
| 1 | The citizen is enrolled. Photo and Fingerprint are captured through dedicated hardware. Additional data are typed by the operator on the computer. |
| 2 | Data are sent through a secure HTTPS channel via a web service to the Photometrix Server |
| 3 | Using a private key stored in a secured HSM, the server generates the Photometrix™ data |
| 4 | The Photometrix file in PNG, JPG or PDF format is sent back. |
| 5 | The Photometrix data is managed by customer software to manage full card personalization. |
| 6 | Administrative data are available from the Photometrix server to follow up Request Numbers, Key Management etc... |

3.2.2 Photometrix verification process

Once the document is issued, it is necessary that it can be controlled easily and quickly. In a context that may be unstable and where rapid decision-making is necessary, the Smartphone Automated Authentication feature of the **Photometrix™** is a real benefit.

The code is constructed in such a way that it is automatically authenticated using a traditional smartphone and a secure application developed specifically for the end use.

Authentication is localized without the need to be connected to a central database or network of any kind.




Photometrix Use

The **Photometrix™** application will decrypt the 2D code and compare certain elements of the photograph printed on the card, to the digital signature of the photo recorded during the issuance of the card to ensure that the photograph has not been manipulated. If the check is successful, some variable data will be extracted from the code so that the controller can also confirm that they have not been modified.

A facial check may also be used to verify that the person presenting the document with the **Photometrix™** component is the person named on this document. This technology can be implemented on smartphone or any other hardware and software solution.

4 Evaluation Perimeter

4.1 ToE perimeter



The ToE perimeter is defined as follow:

- A generic control application using the SDK **Photometrix™** installed on Android.

Photometrix™ server, corresponding communications, and Android Application store (including communication with them) are outside the ToE perimeter.

It should be noted that each **Photometrix™ application** download from app store is specific to one customer (e.g keys included in the application are specifically generated for one customer).

4.2 Limit of the evaluation

It should be noted that the evaluation is limited to the verification of the Photometrix file signature in order to prove its authenticity. The evaluation doesn't include Image processing that are implemented in the **Photometrix™** solution.

4.3 Operating environment

The environment that is needed to operate the ToE is composed of

- A generic mobile **PhotoMetrix™ application**
- A smartphone with Android 9.0
- A **PhotoMetrix™ server** (Nginx 1.10.3)
- The Android application store

5 Security Problem Definition

5.1 Users

The users that may interact with the ToE are the following:

User : person who will use Photometrix Verifier Core in order to develop his own application which will verify the **PhotoMetrix™** file.

5.2 Assumptions

User not evil

User are trained for performing the tasks they are responsible for. They follow instructions of the ToE and they are not hostile. They are supposed to follow instructions given in [GUIDES].

The user is supposed to connect every day to update **PhotoMetrix™ Certificates** including the revocation list.

Secure application

The application developed using the Photometrix Verifier Core is responsible not to harm or lower TOE's security. In particular, the application:

- shall not bypass Photometrix Verifier Core security and is supposed to be developed in a secure and responsible way;
- Shall guarantee master certificate's integrity and authenticity;
- Shall guarantee configuration file's integrity;
- Shall use the security functions provided by the SDK whenever these functionalities are necessary

The application is supposed to be installed on a phone up-to-date and free of malicious software.

Enrollment

The **PhotoMetrix™** creation process (see 3.2.1) is considered secured and is not included in the perimeter of the ToE.

Backend

The **PhotoMetrix™** backend (i.e the **PhotoMetrix™ server**) is considered secured and is not included in the perimeter of the ToE.

5.3 Critical assets

5.3.1 Sensitive data from the environment

A.PhotoMetrix™ certificate

A public key used to verify **PhotoMetrix™ file** associated with an interval validity date (after this date no **PhotoMetrix™ file** can be issued for this **PhotoMetrix™ Certificate**. Each public key is linked to a value page of **PhotoMetrix™ file** (i.e 100 000). Security needs for this asset are : integrity and authenticity.

5.3.2 Assets of the ToE

A.Photometrix_file

A **Photometrix™ file** contains a template and customer's data.

A template contains salient characteristics of the picture used in the verification process of the photo.

Customer's data are data formatted by the customer based on a configuration file. It includes the expiration date of the **PhotoMetrix™ file** and a serial number.

This file is signed by an asymmetric process (A.PhotoMetrix™ certificate). The signature result is included in the **PhotoMetrix™ file**. Security needs for this asset are: integrity and authenticity¹.

5.4 Threat model

5.4.1 Attackers

Attacks on the ToE are performed by a malicious person that want to usurp an identity when controlled by the user of the ToE. It could be the modification of the **PhotoMetrix™ file** or the introduction of malicious data during the verification process performed by the ToE.

5.4.2 Threats

T.PhotoMetrix™ file alteration

The attacker manages to modify, temporary or permanently, the **PhotoMetrix™ file**.

T.PhotoMetrix™ certificates alteration

¹ The Photometrix File contains Customers data and Template that need integrity. The whole file need also authenticity

The attacker attempt to alter or modify the **PhotoMetrix™ certificates** in order to modify **PhotoMetrix™ file signature**.

6 Security functions

SF.Verification function of public PhotoMetrix™ key

PhotoMetrix™ certificates are verified in integrity by the ToE. The ToE ensures that keys are neither present in the revocation list nor expired. Keys are also verified in authenticity using the Master Key stored in the application.

SF.Verification function of Photometrix file

The ToE checks the authenticity of the **PhotoMetrix™ file** by verifying the signature of **PhotoMetrix™ files**, signed by the **PhotoMetrix™ certificate** corresponding to the serial number of the **PhotoMetrix™ file**. **PhotoMetrix™ files** are signed using ECDSA Algorithm with ECDSA-SHA256 Keys. (Generation of the signature is outside the scope of evaluation)

7 Rationale

7.1 Assets/threats traceability

| | | T.PhotoMetrix™ file alteration | T.PhotoMetrix™ certificates alteration |
|---------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| Environmental asset | A.PhotoMetrix™ certificate | | X |
| TOE asset | A.Photometrix™ file | X | |

7.2 Threats/Security function traceability

| | SF.Verification function of public PhotoMetrix™ key | SF.Verification function of Photometrix file |
|---|--|---|
| T.PhotoMetrix™ file alteration | | X |
| T.PhotoMetrix™ certificates alteration | X | |

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From science to confidence