

ID One ePass V2.2 on NXP In BAP configuration with AA

Public Security Target



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1 Security Target introduction

1.1 Security Target identification

General identification:

Title:	ePass v2.2 on NXP Security Target BAP with AA
Editor:	Oberthur Technologies
CC version:	3.1 revision 3
EAL:	EAL4 + ALC_DVS.2 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3
PP(s):	BSI-CC-PP-055

TOE technical identification:

Name:	ePass v2.2 on NXP P5CD081 in BAP configuration with AA
SAAAAR Rom code:	075021
SAAAAR Optional code:	076151

Chips identification:

IC Reference:	P5CD081 V1A of NXP
IC EAL:	EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
IC Certificate:	BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009



1.2 Overview of the TOE

The current document aims at defining the functions and assurance security requirements which apply to the ePass v2.2 on NXP smartcard.

It is composed of both an Integrated Circuit (IC) and an embedded software providing secure data management following ePassport specifications(BAC, EAC) and driving licence specifications (BAP, EAP); this document is therefore a composite Security Target (ST).

In the following, the smartcard will be called "Target Of Evaluation" or TOE.

The TOE is a versatile device that can be easily configured in order to operate in different modes including BAC ePassport, EAC ePassport, BAP driving licence and EAP driving licence. It possesses a dual interface to perform contact and contactless communications to go beyond current ePassport usages.

This device can be proposed as inlay to integrate in secure document booklet but can also be provided in a regular credit card format especially in driving licence configurations.



2 **TOE Description**

This part of the Security Target describes the TOE as an aid to the understanding of its security requirements. It addresses the product type, the intended usage and the main features of the TOE.

2.1 TOE usages

State or organisation issues TOEs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an ePassport configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder or checking driving licence validity during a police control.

In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal TOE to the inspection system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used on the field.

The TOE in context of this security target contains:

• Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet

• A separate data summary (MRZ or keydoc data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ or keydoc area)

• And data elements stored on the TOE's chip for contact-less machine reading.

The authentication of the holder is based on:

• The possession of a valid TOE personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and

• The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored in the TOE.

When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or



DRIVING LICENCE


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Organization can performed extra authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as "driving licence penalty points", "visa information"...

The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine TOEs. The receiving State trusts a genuine TOE of an issuing State or Organization.



The TOE can be viewed as the combination:

- A physical TOE in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the TOE holder
 - (1) The biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
 - (2) The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) or keydoc area that identifies the device and
 - (3) The printed portrait.
- A logical TOE as data of the TOE holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO and extended in [R6], [R7], [R8] on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact or contact-less readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the TOE holder
 - (4) The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1),
 - (5) The digitized portraits,



- (6) The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both
- (7) The other data according to LDS (up to DG24) and
- (8) The Document security object.

The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the TOE to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the TOE and its data. The TOE as the physical device and the MRD's chip is uniquely identified by the document number.

The physical TOE is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the TOE's chip) and organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalisation procedures). These security measures include the binding of the TOE's chip to the physical support.



The logical TOE is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the TOE's chip.

2.2 TOE architecture

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a smartcard composed of the following components:

- An underlying P5CD081 chip of NXP,
- A native "BIOS FAT" allowing efficient access to chip functionalities,
- A dedicated highly secure cryptographic library,
- A personalisation application on top of the BIOS,
- An LDS application providing both the BAC/EAC and BAP/EAP features on top of the BIOS.




Figure 1 TOE architecture¹

¹ OT is the acronym of Oberthur Technologies.



2.2.1 Integrated Circuit (IC)

The TOE relies on the functional and security features of the P5CD081. This chip is designed to embed the secure code of Oberthur Technologies for the production of smart cards.

This chip provides the following major features:

- Die integrity,
- Monitoring of environmental parameters,
- Protection mechanisms against faults,
- A FameXE Enhanced Pulbic key coprocessor especially for RSA and ECC,
- A 3DES coprocessor,
- An AES coprocessor,
- AIS-31 class P2 compliant Random Number Generator,
- A CRC calculation block.

For more details, see [R14].

2.2.2 Basic Input/Output System (BIOS)

The native BIOS of Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip features from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi-layer design which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip.

The main features of the OS are the following:

- EEPROM management including secure data processing,
- Other memories management,
- Transaction management,
- APDU protocol management,
- Low level T=0 ; T=1 and T=CL management,
- Error processing,
- Advanced securities activation.

2.2.3 Cryptographic library

A dedicated cryptographic library is is designed and embedded on the TOE to provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms:

Feature	Embedded
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA 256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 bits	✓
RSA CRT from 1024, to2048 bits (by steps of 256 bits)	✓
RSA SFM from 1024 to 2048 bits (by steps of 256 bits)	~
ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521bits	✓
3DES with 112 bits key size	✓
AES with 128, 192, 256 key sizes	✓



2.2.4 Resident application

This application manages the TOE in pre-personalisation, personalisation and use phase in order to configure the card in the expected way.

It implements and control access to the following services:

- MSK management,
- File management including data reading and writing,
- Key generation,
- Key injection,
- PIN management,
- Locks management.

The resident application can be addressed:

- in clear mode for secure environment or non-sensitive commands,
- using a 3DES secure channel otherwise.

2.2.5 LDS application

The Logical Data Structure (LDS) application is a generic filesystem that can be configured to match especially ICAO specifications for ePassports BAC and EAC and ISO specifications for IDL BAP and EAP.

It also includes commands and protocol management specified in [R15] used to grant access to sensitive data stored in the filesystem.

Here are the main features provided by the LDS application and present in the evaluation scope:

Feature	Embedded	In the ST scope ²	References
BAC	~	✓	[R1],[R2], [R3], [R5]
EAC	~	*	R1],[R2], [R3], [R4], [R5]
Active Authentication (RSA CRT/SFM and ECC)	~	~	[R1],[R2], [R3], [R5]
Cryptosystem migration (Algorithm change during certificate verification transaction)	~	×	R1],[R2], [R3], [R4], [R5]
BAP	~	\checkmark	[R6], [R7], [R8]
EAP	>	×	[R6], [R7], [R8]

2.2.5.1 Basic Access Control (BAC)

The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The inspection system

- reads the printed data in the MRZ (for ePassport),
- authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.

² Features not included in the present Security Target are covered in the context of other CC certificates of the same product.



2.2.5.2 Basic Access Protection (BAP)

The Basic Access Protection (BAP) is especially used in the context of IDL as an alternative to BAC. Indeed it is actually a generalisation of BAC allowing usage of extra algorithms and key length. It exists in 4 modes:

- BAP1 3DES with key length of 128 bits (equivalent to BAC),
- BAP2 AES with key length of 128 bits,
- BAP3 AES with key length of 192 bits,
- BAP4 AES with key length of 256 bits.

Following Secure messaging is performed using the algorithm used in the selected BAP mode.

Note that the term MRZ is specific to ICAO standard; [R8] uses the term "Keydoc" which refers to an equivalent unique identifier printed on the physical TOE as a random number or barcode.

2.2.5.3 Active Authentication (AA)

The Active Authentication of the TOE is an optional feature that may be implemented. It ensures that the TOE has not been substituted, by means of a challenge-response protocol between the inspection system and the TOE. For this purpose the chip contains its own Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair. A hash representation of Data Group 15 (DG15, see 2.5.1) Public Key is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD, see 2.5.1) and therefore authenticated by the issuer's digital signature. The corresponding Private Key is stored in the TOE's secure memory.

The TOE supports the loading and generation of the Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair.

2.2.5.4 Extended Access Control (EAC)

The Extended Access Control (EAC) enhances the later security features and ensures a strong and mutual authentication of the TOE and the Inspection system. This step is required to access biometric data such as fingerprints and iris stored in DG3 and DG4. In particular, the authentication steps ensures a strong secure channel able to provide confidentiality of the biometric data that are read and authentication of the Inspection system retrieving the date to perform a Match on Terminal comparison. The Extended Access Control authentication steps the TOE implements may be performed either with elliptic curve cryptography, or with RSA cryptography.

2.2.5.5 Extended Access Protection (EAP)

The Extended Access Protection (EAP) extends EAC to allow a more flexible protocol. It can protect up to 16 DGs (from 1 to 16) and is no more restricted to DG3 and 4. There is also no prerequisite to perform A BAP before starting EAP. In addition, it is possible to send more than 2 certificates to the TOE in order to gain extra access rights.

Following secure messaging can be either in 3DES or AES taking into account that if a BAP was previously performed algorithm used must be stronger³.

2.3 Chip and software composition

The TOE contains an auto-programmable microcomputer (IC) with non-volatile EEPROM memory, permitting the storing of secret or confidential data, and with associated circuits that ensure its protection. The IC also integrates a ROM memory which embeds the code software of the smartcard.

³ AES 256 is stronger than AES 192 which is stronger than AES 128 which is stronger than 3DES.



In order to ensure a secure composition between IC and software, the chip is configured and used according to the security requirements specified in the datasheet and associated guides. This especially specifies the secure way to manage IC memory.

The optional code or "codop" is an executable code that is stored in the EEPROM of the chip. This code is called by the Resident Application when needed. These data are loaded during the prepersonalisation phase after the authentication of the manufacturer. Once an optional code is loaded, it is not possible to load any other optional code whether the TOE is in pre-personalisation phase or personalisation phase. The TOE ensures the optional code's integrity and that it can not be read from the outside.

In order to configure the available features of the product a One-Time Programmable (OTP) area is present (see 2.4). It can be written only once and cannot be erased afterward.

Memory adresses




Figure 2 Memory mapping of the TOE

2.4 TOE Configurations

The application locks are within a particular area of the EEPROM memory. It is called OTP (One Time Programmable). When the TOE is delivered, all the bits of this area are set to '0'. Theses bits may be set (to "1") in pre-personalisation phase or personalisation phase after the agent authentication (Manufacturer or Personnalizer). Once a bit is set to "1" in this area, it can not be reset anymore. This area is used to select the configuration of the TOE, in particular:

- If the BAC/BAP is enforced in used phase ('0' = not enforced/'1' = enforced)
- If the EAC is enforced in used phase ('0' = not enforced/'1' = enforced)
- If the EAP is enforced in used phase ('0' = not enforced/'1' = enforced)
- If the Get Data command is disabled ('0' = enabled/'1' = disabled)
- If the Active authentication is activated ('0' = not activated/'1' = activated)
- To indicate the TOE was pre-personalised ('1' = pre-personalised)
- To indicate the TOE was personalised ('1' = personalized)

These OTP bytes are protected in integrity as they are copied in EEPROM too.

Final configuration of the product is set by activating one or several of the five first locks. The product is in use phase when the two last locks are activated. Since BAC is a BAP configuration, the two ones have been merged into a unique lock. Nevertheless, usage of AES keys identifies BAP configuration.

Note that in order to be functional, a correct and consistent personalisation of the TOE must be performed.

2.5 TOE logical structure

Roughly, the embedded application, when powered, is seen as a master file, containing a Dedicated file (DF) for the LDS.



This dedicated file is selected by means of the Application Identifier (AID) of the LDS application for example in case of ePassport. Once the application dedicated files are selected, the file structure it contains may be accessed, provided the access conditions are fulfilled.

2.5.1 File structure of the TOE




Figure 3 : Structure of the file system

The TOE distinguish between two types of data

- System files,
- Data files that store data that are visible from the outside.

Basically, system files and data files are files handled by the Resident Application. The Resident Application handles their creation and management. Both types have the following characteristics:

- Size, size reserved within the EEPROM for the content of this file,
- EF ID, Elementary File Identifier of the file within the file structure,
- SFI, Short File Identifier used for an easy file selection. It is only used for data files,
- Access conditions, it specify under which conditions the file may be accessed (read never, read always...).



2.5.2 System files

System files are dedicated to store sensitive data that are used by the application. These data are protected in integrity by means of a checksum. Theses files may be created and updated in prepersonalisation or personalisation phase. Files containing keys are never readable. Once created, these files are used by the application to work properly. They have to be created before

Once created, these files are used by the application to work properly. They have to be created before any use of the application.

In particular, theses files are used to store:

- The active authentication public key needed to perform the active authentication,
- The active authentication private key needed to perform the active authentication,
- The keys needed to perform BAC, BAP, EAC and EAP,
- The list of the application present on the card.

2.5.3 Data files

Data files also called Elementary files (EF) or Data Groups (DG) are dedicated to store data that may be retrieved. They are protected in integrity by means of a checksum and can be created or updated either in pre-personalisation or in personalisation phase. They are also created in such a way they can only be read or write in use phase, provided authentications specified in access rights are performed.

All personalisation configurations are possible including BAC and EAC. Nevertheless, Data Files usually considered are the following:

- EF.COM which describes which DGs are present in the file structure,
- EF.SOD which contains a certificate computed over the whole DGs. It ensures their integrity & authenticity,
- DG1 up to DG24 which contains information about the holder (picture, name...) and key required to perform authentications.

2.6 Non evaluated features

Some features of the product are put out of the evaluation scope and are therefore not part of the TOE. Here is the complete list of those functionalities:

- Supplemental Access Control,
- Standard and biometric PIN management (therefore PIN associated commands are out of scope),



2.7 TOE life cycle

The Smart card life-cycle considered hereby, is the one described in [R13]. This protection profile is decomposed into 7 phases, described hereafter, whose only first three ones defined the TOE evaluation scope.

This life cycle is related to the different phases the designer/manufacturer/issuer has to go through to get a smart card ready to use. It starts from the design till the end of usage of the card.

Note that [R10] and [R11] define an anternative lifecycle almost equivalent (phases in [R13] are steps in [R10] and [R11]) except this only difference:

- Step 4 in [R10] and [R11], correspond to phase 4 of [R10] and [R11] and blocks 'Micromodule", "testing" and "Embedding" in phase 5 of [R10] and [R11],
- Step 5 in [R10] and [R11] correspond to the only next blocks "Personnalisation" and "Testing" in phase 5 of [R10] and [R11].

It is depicted in the figure below:



1

TOE scope






Figure 4 Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE



3 Conformance claims

3.1 Common Criteria conformance

This Security Target (ST) is CC Part 2 extended [R35] and CC Part 3 conformant [R36] and written according to the Common Criteria version 3.1 Part 1 [R34].

3.2 Package conformance

This ST is conformant to the EAL4 package as defined in [R36].

The EAL4 have been augmented^₄ with the following requirements to fulfill the Oberthur Technologies assurance level:

Requirement	Name	Туре
ALC_DVS.2	Sufficiency of security measures	Higher hierarchical component
ADV_FSP.5	Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information	Higher hierarchical component
ADV_INT.2	Well-structured internals	New component
ADV_TDS.4	Semiformal modular design	Higher hierarchical component
ALC_CMS.5	Development tools CM coverage	Higher hierarchical component
ALC_TAT.2	Compliance with implementation standards	Higher hierarchical component
ATE_DPT.3	Testing: modular design	Higher hierarchical component

<u>Remark</u>

For interoperability reasons it is assumed the receiving organisation cares for sufficient measures against eavesdropping within the operating environment of the inspection systems. Otherwise the TOE may protect the confidentiality of some less sensitive assets (e.g. the personal data of the TOE holder which are also printed on the physical TOE) for some specific attacks only against enhanced basic attack potential (AVA_VAN.3).

3.3 Protection Profile conformance

The Security Target is based on the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 3:

• Machine Readable Travel Documents with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control [R10].

⁴ This EAL and its augmentations correspond to an EAL5+ALC_DVS.2 where AVA_VAN level is downgraded to AVA_VAN.3 following constraint of [R10] about MRZ/keydoc entropy.





4 Security problem definition

4.1 Assets

Logical MRD data

The logical MRD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 (with different security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R2], [R6], [R7] and [R8]. These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. Depending on the personalisation, the EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 can contain personal data of the MRD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for the logical MRD.

The Active Authentication Public Key Info is used by the inspection system for Active Authentication of the chip. The Document security object is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRD.

All these data may be sorted out in two different categories.

- o If they are specific to the user, they are User data,
- o If they ensures the correct behaviour of the application, they are TSF Data.

User data

CPLC Data	Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as user data as they enable to track the holder
Personnal Data of the MRD holder (in EF.DGx)	Contains identification data of the holder
Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD	Contains a certicate ensuring the integrity of the file stored within the MRD and their authenticity. It ensures the data are issued by a genuine Organisation
Common data in EF.COM	Declare the data the MRD contains
Active Authentication Public Key in an EF.DGx	Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to an active authentication

TSF data



TOE_ID	Data enabling to identify the TOE
Personalisation Agent reference authentication Data	Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalisation agent
Basic Access Protection Key	Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the Basic Inspection Terminal and the MRD
Active Authentication private key	Private key the chip uses to perform an active authentication
Session keys for the secure channel	Session keys used to protect the communication in confidentiality and in integrity
Life Cycle Organisation	Life Cycle Organisation of the TOE

Authenticity of the MRD's chip

The authenticity of the MRD's chip personalized by the issuing Organisation for the MRD holder is used by the holder to prove his possession of a genuine MRD.

4.2 Threats

This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.

T.Chip_ID

Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRD by identifying remotely the MRD's chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless communication interface.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable Keydoc data printed on the MRD data page in advance

Asset: Anonymity of user

T.Skimming

Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication to read the logical MRD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable Keydoc data printed on the MRD data page in advance.

Asset: confidentiality of logical MRD data.

T.Eavesdropping

Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRD's chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the Keydoc data printed on the MRD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advance.



Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable Keydoc data printed on the MRD data page in advance. *Asset*: confidentiality of logical MRD data.

T.Forgery

Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRD or any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRD holder"s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed Keydoc and in the digital Keydoc to claim another identity of the holder. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRDs to create a new forged MRD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRD of a holder into another MRD's chip leaving their digital Keydoc unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRD to another contactless chip.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRDs.

Asset: authenticity of logical MRD data.

T.Abuse-Func

Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase "Operational Use" in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.

This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational Organisation after delivery to MRD holder.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD.

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.

T.Information_Leakage

Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).



Threat agent. having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD.

Asset: confidentiality of logical MRD and TSF data.

T.Phys-Tamper

Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRD's chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRD's chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRD's chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRD's chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRD's chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.

The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRD's chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRD's chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD.

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.

T.Malfunction

Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRD's chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRD's chip Embedded Software.

This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRD's chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRD's chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD.

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.

T.Counterfeit

An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRD. This violates the authenticity of the MRD's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRD's chip.



4.3 Organisational Security Policies

P.Manufact

The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.

P.Personalization

The issuing Organisation guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRD with respect to the MRD holder. The personalization of the MRD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing Organisation only.

P.Personal_Data

The biographical data and their summary printed in the Keydoc and stored on the MRD's chip, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data of finger(s), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) and data according to LDS stored on the MRD's chip are personal data of the MRD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRD holder by inspection systems to which the MRD is presented. The MRD's chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access Protection to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [R2].

Those data are stored in DGs as specified by in EF.COM.

P.Sensitive_Data_Protection

All the sensitive data are at least protected in integrity. The keys are protected in both integrity and confidentiality.

P.Key_Function

All the cryptographic routines are designed in such a way that they are protected against probing and do not cause any information leakage that may be used by an attacker.

4.4 Assumptions

The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used.

A.MRD_Manufact

It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).

A.MRD_Delivery

Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its objectives:



- o Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
- o Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process and storage.
- o Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill.

A.Pers_Agent

The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of(i) the logical MRD with respect to the MRD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key if stored on the MRD's chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRD's chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.

A.Insp_Sys

The Inspection System is used by the officer of the receiving Organisation (i) examining an MRD presented by the holder and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the holder as MRD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Organisation Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing Organisation, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Protection [R8]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRD under Basic Access Protection and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRD.

A.BAP-Keys

The Document Basic Access Protection Keys being generated and imported by the issuing Organisation have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc 9303" [R2] and "ISO 18013-3" [R8], the Document Basic Access Protection Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed Keydoc data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed Keydoc data with enhanced basic attack potential.



5 Security Objectives

5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.

OT.AC_Pers

The TOE must ensure that the logical MRD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG24, the Document security object according to specifications [R2,R8] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG2 to EF.DG24 are added.

OT.Data_Int

The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRD stored on the MRD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRD data.

OT.Data_Conf

The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG24. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System if specified in EF.SOD. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Protection based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection System.

OT.Identification

The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRD". The storage of the Pre- Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). In Phase 4 "Operational Use" the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.

OT.Prot_Abuse-Func

After delivery of the TOE to the MRD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.



Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.

OT.Prot_Inf_Leak

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRD's chip

- o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
- o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
- o by a physical manipulation of the TOE.

OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper

The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced-basic attack potential by means of

- measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- o measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-Organisation physics research and IC failure analysis)
- o manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
- o controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)

with a prior

o reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.

OT.Prot_Malfunction

The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.

OT.Chip_Authenticity

The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the authenticity of the MRD's chip. The TOE stores a RSA or ECC private key to prove its identity, and that is used in chip authentication. This mechanism is described in [R1] as "Active Authentication".

5.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment

5.2.1 Issuing Organisation

The issuing Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.



OE.MRD_Manufact

Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.

During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.

OE.MRD_ Delivery

Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following objectives:

- o non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
- o identification of the element under delivery,
- o meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment),
- o physical protection to prevent external damage,
- o secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE"s),
- o traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 - origin and shipment details,
 - reception, reception acknowledgement,
 - location material/information.

Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.

Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.

OE.Personalization

The issuing Organisation must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing Organisation (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.

OE.Pass_Auth_Sign

The issuing Organisation must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Organisation Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Organisation Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Organisation Signing CA Public Key to receiving Organisations and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing Organisation must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving Organisations and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 if stored in the LDS according to [R2,R7].



OE.BAP-Keys

The Document Basic Access Protection Keys being generated and imported by the issuing Organisation have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc 9303" [R2] and "ISO 18013-3" [R8], the Document Basic Access Protection Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed Keydoc data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed Keydoc data with enhanced basic attack potential.

5.2.2 Receiving Organisation

The receiving Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

OE.Exam_MRD

The inspection system of the receiving Organisation must examine the MRD presented by the holder to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Organisation Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing Organisation, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Protection [R8].

OE.Passive_Auth_Verif

The officer of the receiving Organisation uses the inspection system to verify the holder as MRD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRD before they are used. The receiving Organisations and Organizations must manage the Organisation Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.

OE.Prot_Logical_MRD

The inspection system of the receiving Organisation ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical MRD. The receiving Organisation examining the logical MRD being under Basic Access Protection will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Protection and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems).



6 Extended requirements

6.1 Extended families

6.1.1 Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage

6.1.1.1 Description

see [PP-0055].

6.1.1.2 Extended components

Extended component FAU_SAS.1

Description

see [PP-0055].

Definition

FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage

FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale

see [PP-0055].

6.1.1.3 Rationale

see [PP-0055].

6.1.2 Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers

6.1.2.1 Description

see [PP-0055].



6.1.2.2 Extended components

Extended component FCS_RND.1

Description

See [PP-0055].

Definition

FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers

FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale

See [PP-0055].

6.1.2.3 Rationale

see [PP-0055].

6.1.3 Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability

6.1.3.1 Description

See [PP-0055].

6.1.3.2 Extended components

Extended component FMT_LIM.1

Description

See [PP-0055].



Definition

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].

Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)

Rationale

See [PP-0055].

Extended component FMT_LIM.2

Description

See [PP-0055].

Definition

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].

Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)

Rationale

See [PP-0055].

6.1.3.3 Rationale

See [PP-0055].

6.1.4 Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation

6.1.4.1 Description

See [PP-0055].



6.1.4.2 Extended components

Extended component FPT_EMS.1

Description

See [PP-0055].

Definition

FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation

- **FPT_EMS.1.1** The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
- **FPT_EMS.1.2** The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale

See [PP-0055].

6.1.4.3 Rationale

See [PP-0055].



7 Security Functional Requirements

7.1 Security Functional Requirements

7.1.1 PP BAC

FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage

FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide **the Manufacturer** with the capability to store **the IC Identification Data** in the audit records.

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm **Document Basic Access Key Derivation** Algorithm and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bits that meet the following: [R2], normative appendix 5.

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method **zeroisation** that meets the following: **none**.

FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 ans SHA-512 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2.

FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAP) - encryption and decryption

in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **Triple-DES in CBC mode** and cryptographic key sizes **112 bits** that meet the following: **FIPS 46-3 [R27] and [R5] normative appendix 5, A5.3**.



FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication, encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES and AES and cryptographic key sizes 112(for Triple DES) and 128, 192, 256 (for AES) that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [R27] and FIPS 197 [R30].

FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging - message authentication code

in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **Retail MAC** and cryptographic key sizes **112 bits** that meet the following: **ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2)**.

FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers

FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet the requirement to provide an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte, following AIS 31 [R31].

FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

- FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to BAP authentication protocol.
- FIA_AFL.1.2 [Editorially Refined] When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an increasing time between receiving of the terminal challenge and sending of the TSF response during the BAP authentication attempts.

FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

- FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
 - o 1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 "Manufacturing",
 - o 2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRD",
 - o 3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 "Operational Use"

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.



FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

- FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
 - o 1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 "Manufacturing",
 - o 2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRD",
 - o 3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 "Operational Use"

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to

- o 1. Basic Access Protection Authentication Mechanism,
- o 2. Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES.

FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide

o 1. Basic Access Protection Authentication Mechanism

o 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES

to support user authentication.

FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the

- 1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one of the following mechanism(s):
 - the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key,
- O 2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Protection Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.

FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating

FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE during a BAP mechanism based communication after successful



authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Protection Authentication Mechanism.

FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Protection SFP on terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 and Active Authentication private key of the logical MRD.

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

- **FDP_ACF.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the **Basic Access Protection SFP** to objects based on the following:
 - o 1. Subjects:
 - a. Personalization Agent,
 - b. Basic Inspection System,
 - c. Terminal,
 - o 2. Objects:
 - a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRD,
 - b. data in EF.COM,
 - c. data in EF.SOD,
 - d. Active Authentication public key,
 - o 3. Security attributes
 - a. authentication status of terminals.
- **FDP_ACF.1.2** The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
 - 1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRD, including the Active Authenticate public Key,
 - 2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRD, including the Active Authenticate public Key if specified in EF.COM.
- **FDP_ACF.1.3** The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.
- **FDP_ACF.1.4** The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
 - 1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRD,
 - 2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRD,



• 3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read data in EF.DGs protected by EAC/EAP as specified in EF.COM.

FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality

FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the **Basic Access Protection SFP** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.

FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity

- **FDP_UIT.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the **Basic Access Protection SFP** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from **modification**, **deletion**, **insertion and replay** errors.
- **FDP_UIT.1.2** The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether **modification**, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

- **FMT_SMF.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
 - o 1. Initialization,
 - o 2. Pre-personalization,
 - o **3. Personalization**.

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles

- o 1. Manufacturer,
- o 2. Personalization Agent,
- o 3. Basic Inspection System.
- FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOF Delivery does not allow

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow



- o 1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
- o 2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
- o 3. software to be reconstructed and,
- 4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

- **FMT_LIM.2.1** The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
 - Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
 - o 1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
 - o 2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
 - o 3. software to be reconstructed and,
 - 4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.

FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the **the Initialization Data** and **Prepersonalization Data** to **the Manufacturer**.

FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the **Document Basic** Access Keys and Active Authentication private key to Personalization Agent.

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Document Basic Access Keys, Personalisation Agent keys and Active Authentication private key to none.



FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation

- **FPT_EMS.1.1** The TOE shall not emit **power variations, timing variations during command execution** in excess of **non useful information** enabling access to **Personalization Agent Keys** and **Active Authentication private key**.
- **FPT_EMS.1.2** The TSF shall ensure **any unauthorized users** are unable to use the following interface **smart card circuit contacts** to gain access to **Personalization Agent Keys** and **Active Authentication private key**.

FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state

- **FPT_FLS.1.1** The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
 - o 1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur,
 - o 2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.

FPT_TST.1 TSF testing

FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions

- o At reset
- o Before the first execution of the optional code,
- o After the Active Authentication is computed,
- Before any cryptographic operation,
- o When accessing a DG,
- o Prior to any use of TSF data,
- o Before execution of any command,
- o When performing a BAP authentication,

to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.

FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF data**.

FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF executable code**.



FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack

FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist **physical manipulation and physical probing** to the **TSF** by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

7.1.2 Active Authentication

FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication

- **FDP_DAU.1.1/AA** The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of **the TOE itself**.
- **FDP_DAU.1.2/AA** The TSF shall provide **any users** with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated information.

Refinement:

Evidence generation and ability of verfying it, constitute the Active Authentication protocol.

FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRD Cryptographic operation

- FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_MRD The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA CRT, RSA SFM or ECDSA with SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 and cryptographic key sizes
 - o 1024 to 2048 bits for RSA (by steps of 256bits),
 - o 192 to 521 bits for ECDSA,

that meet the following:

- o scheme 1 of [R20] for RSA,
- o [R17], [R18], [R19] for ECC.

FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes

- **FDP_ITC.1.1/AA** The TSF shall enforce the **Basic Access Protection SFP** when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
- **FDP_ITC.1.2/AA** The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.
- **FDP_ITC.1.3/AA** The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: **none**.



FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour

FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to **disable and enable** the functions **TSF Active Authentication** to **Personalization Agent**.

FCS_CKM.1/ASYM Cryptographic key generation

- **FCS_CKM.1.1/ASYM** The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm **RSA & ECC** and specified cryptographic key sizes
 - o 1024 to 2048 bits for RSA (by steps of 256 bits),
 - 0 192 to 521 bits over characteristic p curves for ECC

that meet the following: [R20], [R21], [R22], [R23].

7.1.3 Basic Access Protocol (BAP)

FCS_COP.1/BAP Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/BAP The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES and cryptographic key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits that meet the following: FIPS 197 [R30].

FCS_CKM.1/BAP Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/BAP The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm and specified cryptographic key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits for the AES that meet the following: [R8], Annex B.4.

FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/BAP-SM The TSF shall perform secure messaging - message authentication code

in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **AES in CBC mode** and cryptographic key sizes **128**, **192 and 256 bits** that meet the following: **FIPS 197 [R30]**.

7.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirement level is EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2 and ATE_DPT.3.



8 TOE Summary Specification

8.1 TOE Summary Specification

Access Control in reading

This function controls access to read functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle Organisation.

It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable:

- o BAP keys
- o Active Authentication private key
- o Personalisation agent keys

It controls access to the CPLC data as well:

- o It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase
- o It ensures it can not be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step

Regarding the file structure:

In the operational use:

o The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, EF.COM only after BAP authentication and through a valid secure channel.

In the personalisation phase

- o The personalisation agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).
- o The TOE is uniquely identified by a random number, generated at each reset. This unique identifier is called (PUPI)

It ensures as well that no other part of the EEPROM can be accessed at anytime

Access Control in writing

This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle Organisation.

This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written once in personalization phase to be set to "1".

It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized and that it is not possible to load an optional code or change the personnaliser authentication keys in personalization phase.

Regarding the file structure

In the operational use: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update any system files. However

o the application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs In the personalisation phase



 The personalisation agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys.

BAC mechanism

This security functionality ensures the BAC is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the Triple DES Document Basic Access keys the Personalization Agent loaded beforehand during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the session keys are destroyed at the beginning of each BAC session.

BAP mechanism

This security functionality ensures the BAP is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the Triple DES Document Basic Access keys the Personalization Agent loaded beforehand during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the session keys are destroyed at the beginning of each BAP session.

Secure Messaging

This security functionality ensures the confidentiality & integrity of the channel the TOE and the IFD are using to communicate. After a successful BAP authentication, a secure channel is established based on Triple DES or AES algorithms.

This security functionality ensures

- o No commands were inserted nor deleted within the data flow,
- o No commands were modified,
- o The data exchanged remain confidential,
- o The issuer of the incoming commands and the destinatory of the outgoing data is the one that was authenticated (through BAP).

If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed.

Personalisation Agent Authentication

This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm.

Active Authentication

This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in [R1] & [R2]. (if it is activated by the personnalizer). A self-test on the random generator is performed priori to any Active authentication. Moreover, this security functionality is protected against the DFA.

Self tests

The TOE performs self tests on the TSF data it stores to protect the TOE. In particular, it is in charge of the:

- o DFA detection for the Active authentication,
- o Self tests of the random generator before the BAP and Active Authentication,



- o Self tests of the DES before the BAP,
 - Monitoring of the integrity of keys, files and TSF data,
 - Monitoring the integrity of the optional code (at start up),
 - Protecting the cryptographic operation.

The integrity of the files are monitored each time they are accessed and the integrity of the optional code is checked each time the TOE is powered on. The integrity of keys and sensitive data is checked each time they are used/accessed.

Safe Organisation management

This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets bask to a secure Organisation when

- o an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS
- o a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM)

This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the Organisation "kill card" or becomes mute.

Physical protection

This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks.



9 Rationales

9.1 Security objectives and Security Problem Definition

9.1.1 Threats

- **T.Chip_ID** The threat T.Chip_ID "Identification of MRD's chip" addresses the trace of the MRD movement by identifying remotely the MRD's chip through the contactless communication interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective OT.Identification by Basic Access Protection using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAP-Keys.
- **T.Skimming** The threat T.Skimming "Skimming digital Keydoc data or the digital portrait" addresses the reading of the logical MRD trough the contactless interface or listening the communication between the MRD's chip and a terminal. This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf "Confidentiality of personal data" through Basic Access Protection using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAP-Keys.
- **T.Eavesdropping** The threat T.Eavesdropping "Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system" addresses the reading of the logical MRD trough the contactless interface or listening the communication between the MRD's chip and a terminal. This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf "Confidentiality of personal data" through Basic Access Protection using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAP-Keys.
- **T.Forgery** The threat T.Forgery "Forgery of data on MRD's chip" addresses the fraudulent alteration of the complete stored logical MRD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRD" requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRD according the security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering". The examination of the MRD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRD "Examination of the MRD passport book" shall ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRD data by means of digital signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign "Authentication of logical MRD by Signature" and verified by the inspection system according to OE.Passive_Auth_Verif "Verification by Passive Authentication".
- **T.Abuse-Func** The threat T.Abuse-Func "Abuse of Functionality" addresses attacks using the MRD's chip as production material for the MRD and misuse of the functions for personalization in the operational Organisation after delivery to MRD holder to disclose or to manipulate the logical MRD. This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func "Protection against Abuse of Functionality". Additionally this objective is supported by the security objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization "Personalization of logical



MRD" ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the personalization are disabled and the security functions for the operational Organisation after delivery to MRD holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.

- **T.Information_Leakage** The threat T.Information_Leakage "Information Leakage from MRD's chip" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information Leakage".
- **T.Phys-Tamper** The threat T.Phys-Tamper "Physical Tampering" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering".
- **T.Malfunction** The threat T.Malfunction "Malfunction due to Environmental Stress" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against Malfunctions".
- **T.Counterfeit** The threat T.Counterfeit "MRD's chip" addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine MRD chip. This attack is thwarted by active authentication proving the authenticity of the chip as required by OT.Chip_Authenticity "Protection against forgery" using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing Organisation. The Public active Authentication Key has to be written into its DG and signed by means of Documents Security Objects.

9.1.2 Organisational Security Policies

- **P.Manufact** The OSP P.Manufact "Manufacturing of the MRD's chip" requires a unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Prepersonalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
- **P.Personalization** The OSP P.Personalization "Personalization of the MRD by issuing Organisation only" addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRD by the Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization "Personalization of logical MRD", and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRD". Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification "Identification and Authentication of the TOE". The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
- P.Personal_Data The OSP P.Personal_Data "Personal data protection policy" requires the TOE (i) to support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRD by means of the Basic Access Protection and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing Organisation. This policy is implemented by the security objectives OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" describing the unconditional protection of the integrity of the stored data and during transmission. The security objective OT.Data_Conf "Confidentiality of personal data" describes the protection of the confidentiality.



- **P.Sensitive_Data_Protection** The OSP P.Sensitive_data_Protection requires data to be protected in integrity as fullfilled by OT.Data_Int. Concerning keys, they must be protected in confidentiality in any cases as ensured by OT.Prot_Inf_Leak.
- **P.Key_Function** The OSP P.Key_function requires cryptographic algorithms to be protected against tampering as it enforced for the whole TOE by OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper and also designed in order to avoid data leakage as ensured by OT.Prot_Inf_Leak.

9.1.3 Assumptions

- **A.MRD_Manufact** The assumption A.MRD_Manufact "MRD manufacturing on step 4 to 6" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRD_Manufact "Protection of the MRD Manufacturing" that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.
- **A.MRD_Delivery** The assumption A.MRD_Delivery "MRD delivery during step 4 to 6" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRD_ Delivery "Protection of the MRD delivery" that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRD.
- **A.Pers_Agent** The assumption A.Pers_Agent "Personalization of the MRD's chip" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization "Personalization of logical MRD" including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRD holder personal data.
- A.Insp_Sys The examination of the MRD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRD "Examination of the MRD passport book". The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRD "Protection of data from the logical MRD" will require the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Protection and to protect the logical MRD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
- A.BAP-Keys The assumption A.BAP-Keys "Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Protection Keys" is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.BAP-Keys "Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Protection Keys" ensuring the sufficient key quality to be provided by the issuing Organisation.

Threats	Security Objectives	Rationale
T.Chip ID	OT.Identification, OE.BAP-Keys	Section 6.1.1
T.Skimming	OT.Data Conf, OE.BAP-Keys	Section 6.1.1
T.Eavesdropping	OT.Data_Conf, OE.BAP-Keys	Section 6.1.1

9.1.4 SPD and Security Objectives



Threats	Security Objectives	Rationale
T.Forgery	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_MRD, OE.Passive_Auth_Verif	Section 6.1.1
T.Abuse-Func	OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Personalization	Section 6.1.1
T.Information_Leakage	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak	Section 6.1.1
T.Phys-Tamper	OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper	Section 6.1.1
T.Malfunction	OT.Prot_Malfunction	Section 6.1.1
T.Counterfeit	OT.Chip_Authenticity	Section 6.1.1

Tableau 1 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage

Security Objectives	Threats
OT.AC_Pers	T.Forgery
OT.Data Int	T.Forgery
OT.Data_Conf	T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping
OT.Identification	T.Chip_ID
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func	T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak	T.Information_Leakage
<u>OT.Prot_Phys-</u> <u>Tamper</u>	T.Forgery, T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction	T.Malfunction
OT.Chip_Authenticity	T.Counterfeit
OE.MRD_Manufact	
OE.MRD_Delivery	
OE.Personalization	T.Abuse-Func
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign	T.Forgery
OE.BAP-Keys	T.Chip_ID, T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping
OE.Exam_MRD	T.Forgery
OE.Passive_Auth_Ver if	T.Forgery
<u>OE.Prot_Logical_MR</u> D	

Tableau 2 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage



Organisational Security Policies	Security Objectives	Rationale
P.Manufact	OT.Identification	Section 6.1.2
P.Personalization	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification, OE.Personalization	Section 6.1.2
P.Personal_Data	OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf	Section 6.1.2
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection	OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak	Section 6.1.2
P.Key Function	OT.Prot Inf Leak, OT.Prot Phys-Tamper	Section 6.1.2

Tableau 3 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage

Security Objectives	Organisational Security Policies
OT.AC_Pers	P.Personalization
<u>OT.Data_Int</u>	P.Personal_Data, P.Sensitive_Data_Protection
OT.Data Conf	P.Personal Data
OT.Identification	P.Manufact, P.Personalization
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func	
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak	P.Sensitive Data Protection, P.Key Function
<u>OT.Prot_Phys-</u> <u>Tamper</u>	P.Key_Function
OT.Prot Malfunction	
OT.Chip_Authenticity	
OE.MRD_Manufact	
OE.MRD_Delivery	
OE.Personalization	P.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign	
OE.BAP-Keys	
OE.Exam_MRD	
<u>OE.Passive_Auth_Ver</u> <u>if</u>	
<u>OE.Prot_Logical_MR</u> D	

Tableau 4 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage



Assumptions	Security objectives for the Operational Environment	Rationale
A.MRD_Manufact	OE.MRD_Manufact	Section 6.1.3
A.MRD_Delivery	OE.MRD_ Delivery	Section 6.1.3
A.Pers_Agent	OE.Personalization	Section 6.1.3
A.Insp_Sys	OE.Exam_MRD, OE.Prot_Logical_MRD	Section 6.1.3
A.BAP-Keys	OE.BAP-Keys	Section 6.1.3

Tableau 5 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage

Security objectives for the Operational Environment	Assumptions
OE.MRD_Manufact	A.MRD Manufa <u>ct</u>
OE.MRD_Delivery	A.MRD_Delivery
OE.Personalization	A.Pers Agent
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign	
OE.BAP-Keys	A.BAP-Keys
OE.Exam_MRD	A.Insp_Sys
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif	
OE.Prot_Logical_MRD	A.Insp_Sys

Tableau 6 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage

9.2 Security requirements and security objectives

9.2.1 Objectives

9.2.1.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

OT.AC_Pers The security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRD" addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRD. The write access to the logical MRD data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 as follows: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRD only once.

The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be authenticated either by using the BAP mechanism (FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC) with the personalization key or for reasons of interoperability with the [R11] by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/AUTH).



Note that only symmetric authentication mechanisms is actualy used for interoperability with the [R11].

In case of using the BAP mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6 describes the re-authentication and FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.1/BAP, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/BAP as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC and FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM for the ENC_MAC_Mode.

The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.

OT.Data_Int The security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the logical MRD stored on the MRD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRD data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization). The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6 using either FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC or FCS_COP.1/AUTH.

Note that for interoperability reasons with the [R11] Personalization Agent authentication is performed through FCS_COP.1/AUTH.

The security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" requires the TOE to ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRD data by means of the BAP mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 requires the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.1/BAP, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/BAP and FCS_COP.1/MAC and FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM for the ENC_MAC_Mode.

The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the Personalization Agent to establish the Document Basic Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read by anyone in accordance to FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.

OT.Data_Conf The security objective OT.Data_Conf "Confidentiality of personal data" requires the TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The read access to the logical MRD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: the successful authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to read the data of the logical MRD. The successful authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data of the



logical MRD f specified in EF.COM. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys).

The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Protection Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Protection Authentication Mechanism which includes the protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic functions according to FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/BAP, FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM and FCS_COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1). (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/BAP, FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM and FCS_COP.1/SHA and FCS_RND.1 establish the key management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.

Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Protection Authentication Mechanism or secure messaging.

OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification "Identification and Authentication of the TOE" address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRD's chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.

Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System in Phase 4 "Operational Use". The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 "Operational Use" violates the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRD's chip before successful authentication of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful authentication attempt. In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack.

- **OT.Prot_Abuse-Func** The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func "Protection against Abuse of Functionality" is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
- **OT.Prot_Inf_Leak** The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information Leakage" requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRD's chip against disclosure
 - o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,



- o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1, and/or
- o by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.



- **OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper** The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering" is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
- **OT.Prot_Malfunction** The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against Malfunctions" is covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure Organisation in case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
- **OT.Chip_Authenticity** The security objective OT.Chip_Authenticity "Protection against forgery" is ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE. The Active Authentication relies on FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRD, FCS_COP.1/SHA and FCS_RND.1. It is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, this key being loaded during personalization phase as required by FDP_ITC.1/AA or generated on-card by FCS_CKM.1/ASYM.

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements	Rationale
OT.AC_Pers	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA,FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/AUTH,FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.4,FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1,FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_PHP.3,FPT_FLS.1, FCS_COP.1/BAP, FCS_CKM.1/BAP,FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM	Section 6.2.1
<u>OT.Data_Int</u>	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_COP.1/BAP, FCS_CKM.1/BAP, FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM	Section 6.2.1
OT.Data_Conf	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_COP.1/BAP, FCS_CKM.1/BAP, FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM	Section 6.2.1
OT.Identification	FAU_SAS.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	Section 6.2.1

9.2.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs



Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements	Rationale
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func	FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2	Section 6.2.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak	FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3	Section 6.2.1
<u>OT.Prot_Phys-</u> <u>Tamper</u>	FPT_PHP.3	Section 6.2.1
OT.Prot_Malfunction	FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1	Section 6.2.1
OT.Chip Authenticity	FCS_CKM.1/ASYM, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1, FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ITC.1/AA, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRD, FMT_MOF.1/AA	Section 6.2.1

Tableau 7 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage



Security Functional Requirements	Security Objectives	
FAU_SAS.1	OT.Identification	
FCS_CKM.1	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf	
FCS_CKM.4	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Conf	
FCS_COP.1/SHA	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Authenticity	
FCS_COP.1/ENC	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf	
FCS_COP.1/AUTH	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int	
FCS_COP.1/MAC	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf	
FCS_RND.1	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Authenticity	
FIA_AFL.1	OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification	
FIA_UID.1	OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification	
FIA_UAU.1	OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification	
FIA_UAU.4	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf	
FIA_UAU.5	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf	
FIA_UAU.6	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf	
FDP_ACC.1	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Authenticity	
FDP_ACF.1	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Authenticity	
FDP_UCT.1	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf	
FDP_UIT.1	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf	
FMT_SMF.1	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf	
FMT_SMR.1	OT.AC Pers, OT.Data Int, OT.Data Conf	
FMT_LIM.1	OT.Prot_Abuse-Func	
FMT_LIM.2	OT.Prot_Abuse-Func	
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA	OT.Identification	
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	OT.Identification	
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Authenticity	
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	OT.AC Pers, OT.Data Int, OT.Data Conf, OT.Chip_Authenticity	
FPT_EMS.1	OT.AC Pers, OT.Prot Inf Leak	



Security Functional Requirements	Security Objectives	
FPT_FLS.1	OT.AC Pers, OT.Prot Inf Leak, OT.Prot Malfunction	
FPT_TST.1	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction	
FPT_PHP.3	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper	
FDP_DAU.1/AA	OT.Chip_Authenticity	
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRD	OT.Chip_Authenticity	
FDP_ITC.1/AA	OT.Chip_Authenticity	
FMT_MOF.1/AA	OT.Chip_Authenticity	
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM	OT.Chip_Authenticity	
FCS_COP.1/BAP	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf	
FCS_CKM.1/BAP	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf	
FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf	

Tableau 8 SFRs and Security Objectives



9.3 Dependencies

9.3.1 SFRs dependencies

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1	No dependencies	
FCS_CKM.1	(FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_CKM.4	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)	FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ENC	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	
FCS_COP.1/MAC	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1	No dependencies	
FIA_AFL.1	(FIA_UAU.1)	FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.1	(FIA_UID.1)	FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.5	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.6	No dependencies	
FDP_ACC.1	(FDP_ACF.1)	FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1	(FDP_ACC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3)	FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UCT.1	(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1)	FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1	(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1)	FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1	No dependencies	
FMT_SMR.1	(FIA_UID.1)	FIA_UID.1



Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
FMT_LIM.1	(FMT_LIM.2)	FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2	(FMT_LIM.1)	FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMS.1	No dependencies	
FPT_FLS.1	No dependencies	
FPT_TST.1	No dependencies	
FPT_PHP.3	No dependencies	
FDP_DAU.1/AA	No dependencies	
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRD	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1/AA, FCS_CKM.1/ASYM
FDP_ITC.1/AA	(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3)	FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MOF.1/AA	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM	(FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRD
FCS_COP.1/BAP	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/BAP
FCS_CKM.1/BAP	(FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1) and (FCS_CKM.4)	<u>FCS_CKM.4,</u> FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM
FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/BAP

Tableau 9 SFRs dependencies

9.3.1.1 Rationale for the exclusion of dependencies

The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/SHA is unsupported. The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need



any key material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.

- The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/AUTH is unsupported. The SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key permanently stored during the Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the manufacturer. Thus there is neither the necessity to generate or import a key during the addressed TOE lifecycle by the means of FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.
- The dependency FCS_CKM.4 of FCS_COP.1/AUTH is unsupported. Since the key is permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for FCS_CKM.4, too.
- The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1 is unsupported. The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
- The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1 is unsupported. The SFR FDP_UCT.1 requires the use of secure messaging between the MRD and the BIS. There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
- The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1 is unsupported. The SFR FDP_UIT.1 required the use of secure messaging between the MRD and the BIS. There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
- The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ITC.1/AA is unsupported. FMT_MSA.3 dependency is not required since this import does not involve any specific security attribute.

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1	(ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1)	ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5	(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1)	ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1	(ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1)	ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2	(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1)	ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4	(ADV_FSP.5)	ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1	(ADV_FSP.1)	ADV_FSP.5

9.3.2 SARs dependencies



Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
AGD_PRE.1	No dependencies	
ALC_CMC.4	(ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and (ALC_LCD.1)	ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5	No dependencies	
ALC_DEL.1	No dependencies	
ALC DVS.2	No dependencies	
ALC_LCD.1	No dependencies	
ALC TAT.2	(ADV_IMP.1)	ADV IMP.1
ASE CCL.1	(ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1)	ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1	No dependencies	
ASE INT.1	No dependencies	
ASE_OBJ.2	(ASE_SPD.1)	ASE_SPD.1
ASE REQ.2	(ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2)	ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1	No dependencies	
ASE_TSS.1	(ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1)	ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ATE COV.2	(ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1)	ADV FSP.5, ATE FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3	(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and (ATE_FUN.1)	ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4, ATE_FUN.1
ATE FUN.1	(ATE_COV.1)	ATE COV.2
ATE IND.2	(ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and (ATE_FUN.1)	ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2, ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.3	(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_DPT.1)	ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_DPT.3

Tableau 10 SARs dependencies



9.4 SFRs and TSS

9.4.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale

9.4.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS

Security Functional Requirements	TOE Summary Specification
FAU SAS.1	Access Control in reading, Access Control in writing
FCS_CKM.1	BAC mechanism, BAP mechanism
FCS_CKM.4	BAC mechanism, Secure Messaging, BAP mechanism
FCS_COP.1/SHA	BAC mechanism, BAP mechanism
FCS_COP.1/ENC	BAC mechanism, Secure Messaging, BAP mechanism
FCS_COP.1/AUTH	Personalisation Agent Authentication
FCS_COP.1/MAC	Secure Messaging
FCS_RND.1	Access Control in reading, BAC mechanism, Active Authentication, BAP mechanism
FIA_AFL.1	BAC mechanism, BAP mechanism
FIA_UID.1	BAC mechanism, Personalisation Agent Authentication, BAP mechanism
FIA_UAU.1	BAC mechanism, Active Authentication, BAP mechanism
FIA_UAU.4	BAC mechanism, Personalisation Agent Authentication, BAP mechanism
FIA_UAU.5	BAC mechanism, Secure Messaging, Personalisation Agent Authentication, BAP mechanism
FIA_UAU.6	Secure Messaging
FDP_ACC.1	Access Control in reading, Access Control in writing
FDP_ACF.1	Access Control in reading, Access Control in writing
FDP_UCT.1	Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1	Secure Messaging
FMT_SMF.1	Access Control in writing
FMT_SMR.1	Access Control in writing, Personalisation Agent Authentication
FMT_LIM.1	Access Control in reading, Self tests, Physical protection
FMT_LIM.2	Access Control in reading, Self tests, Physical protection
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA	Access Control in writing
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	Access Control in writing
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE	Access Control in writing



Security Functional Requirements	TOE Summary Specification
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	Access Control in reading
FPT_EMS.1	Access Control in reading, Access Control in writing, BAC mechanism, Secure Messaging, Personalisation Agent Authentication, Active Authentication, Physical protection, BAP mechanism
FPT_FLS.1	Safe Organisation management
FPT_TST.1	Self tests
FPT_PHP.3	Physical protection
FDP DAU.1/AA	Active Authentication
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRD	Active Authentication
FDP_ITC.1/AA	Access Control in writing, Active Authentication
FMT_MOF.1/AA	Active Authentication
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM	Active Authentication
FCS_COP.1/BAP	BAP mechanism, Secure Messaging
FCS_CKM.1/BAP	BAP mechanism
FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM	Secure Messaging

Tableau 11 SFRs and TSS - Coverage



TOE Summary Specification	Security Functional Requirements
Access Control in reading	FAU_SAS.1, FCS_RND.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FPT_EMS.1
Access Control in writing	FAU_SAS.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FPT_EMS.1, FDP_ITC.1/AA
BAC mechanism	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FPT_EMS.1
BAP mechanism	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FPT_EMS.1, FCS_COP.1/BAP, FCS_CKM.1/BAP
Secure Messaging	FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FPT_EMS.1, FCS_COP.1/BAP, FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM
Personalisation Agent Authentication	FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FMT_SMR.1, FPT_EMS.1
Active Authentication	FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.1, FPT_EMS.1, FDP_DAU.1/AA, FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRD, FDP_ITC.1/AA, FMT_MOF.1/AA, FCS_CKM.1/ASYM
Self tests	FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_TST.1
Safe Organisation management	FPT_FLS.1
Physical protection	FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_PHP.3

Tableau 12 TSS and SFRs - Coverage

9.5 EAL rationale

The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.

9.6 EAL augmentations rationale

9.6.1 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures

The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRD's development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRD's material.



The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL4 has no dependencies to other security requirements.

9.6.2 ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information

The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+ due to the restriction of BAP PP on AVA_VAN level.

EAC and EAP STs, targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach an higher level of assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.

9.6.3 ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals

The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+ due to the restriction of BAP PP on AVA_VAN level.

EAC and EAP STs, targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach an higher level of assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.

9.6.4 ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design

The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+ due to the restriction of BAP PP on AVA_VAN level.

EAC and EAP STs, targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach an higher level of assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.

9.6.5 ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage

The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+ due to the restriction of BAP PP on AVA_VAN level.

EAC and EAP STs, targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach an higher level of assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.

9.6.6 ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards

The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+ due to the restriction of BAP PP on AVA_VAN level.

EAC and EAP STs, targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach an higher level of assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.



9.6.7 ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design

The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+ due to the restriction of BAP PP on AVA_VAN level.

EAC and EAP STs, targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach an higher level of assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.



10 PP

10.1 PP reference

The ST is based on PP BAC in CC3.1 [R10].

For consistency reasons, editorial modifications have been performed:

- BAC replaced by BAP,
- MRTD replaced by MRD,
- "DG1 to DG16" replacted by "DG1 to DG24",
- State replaced by organization,
- MRZ replaced by keydoc,
- CVCA replaced by True Root Certificate,
- Reference to EF.COM for access control rules (which specifies which DG is protected by BAP or EAP).

10.2 PP additions

The additional functionalities are the Active Authentication (AA) based on the ICAO PKI V1.1, the related on-card generation of RSA and ECC keys and the AES support following BAP specification. It implies some additions to the standard PP.

The following SFRs are added to the standard PP for the TOE:

- FCS_COP.1 / SIG_MRTD,
- FIA_API.1 / AA,
- FDP_ITC / AA,
- FMT_MOF.1 / AA,
- FCS_CKM.1 / ASYM.

The following SFRs are added to the standard PP for the BAP feature:

- FCS_COP.1 / BAP,
- FCS_CKM.1 / BAP,
- FCS_COP.1 / BAP_SM.

The following Objective for the TOE is added to the standard PP:

- OT.Chip_authenticity "Protection against forgery".
- The following Threat is added to the standard PP:
 - T.counterfeit.

Moreover, the composition with the IC mandates to introduce complementary OSPs:

- P.Plat_Appl "Development according to the IC recommendations",
- P.Sensitive_Data_Protection "Protection of sensitive data",
- P.Key_Function "Design of the cryptographic routines in order to protect the keys".



11 Composition with IC Security Target

IC Elements	Relevant	Consistent in ST with	Justification	
A.Process-Sec-IC	Yes	P.Manufact	Security procedures are used during TOE packaging, finishing and pre-personalisation (During Phase 2)	
A.Plat-Appl	No	n/a	This assumption deals with the development process and is therefore covered by the evaluation	
A.Resp-Appl	Yes	P.Sensitive_Data_Protectio n	The Composite TOE ensure the confidentiality of the cryptographic keys it stores	
A.Check-Init	Yes	P.Manufact	ICs are actually identified uniquely	
A.Key-Function	Yes	P.Key_Function	The Cryptographic routines are designed in such a way that they do not compromise key by any leak of information	
P.Add-Components	Yes	P.Sensitive_Data_Protectio	The TOE ensure protection of data using especially the 3DES and AES algorithms	
T.Leak-Inherent	Yes	(1)	(1)	
T.Phys-Probing	Yes	(1)	(1)	
T.Malfunction	Yes	(1)	(1)	
T.Phys-Manipulation	Yes	(1)	(1)	
T.Leak-Forced	Yes	(1)	(1)	
T.Abuse-Func	Yes	(1)	(1)	
T.RND	Yes	(1)	(1)	
OE.Plat-Appl	No	n/a	This assumption deals with the development process and is therefore covered by the evaluation	
OE.Resp-Appl	Yes	P.Sensitive_Data_Protectio n	The Composite TOE ensure the confidentiality of the cryptographic keys it stores as well as the integrity of all the sensitive data.	



IC Elements	Relevant	Consistent in ST with	Justification	
OE.Process-Sec-IC	Yes	P.Manufact	This objective is ensured by the security procedures and manufacturing guidelines of NXP manufacturing site	
OE.Check-Init	Yes	P.Manufact	ICs are actually identified uniquely	
O.Leak-Inherent	Yes	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper	Software is designed to be protected against leakage with the hardware support	
O.Phys-Probing	Yes	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper	Objective require that memory and execution cannot be probed	
O.Malfunction	Yes	OT.Prot_Malfunction	Correct operation of the TOE is controlled and malfunctions are detected	
O.Phys-Manipulation	Yes	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper	Manipulation of the memory and the execution is controlled by the software. This is achieved with the hardware support	
O.Leak-Forced	Yes	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper	Software is designed to be protected against leakage with the hardware support	
O.Abuse-Func	Yes	OT.Prot_Abuse-Func	Improper usage of the TOE is controlled	
O.Identification	Yes	OT.Identification	Identification is fully handled during whole lifecycle of the TOE from IC manufacturing to use phase.	
O.RND	Yes	OT.AC_Pers OT.Data_Int OT_Data_Conf	The Cryptographic routines are designed in such a way that they do not compromise random values in order to ensure confidentially, integrity and proof of origin.	
O.HW_DES3	Yes	OT.AC_Pers OT.Data_Int OT_Data_Conf	3DES algorithm is used to enforce data integrity, data confidentiality and authentications.	
O.HW_AES	Yes	OT.AC_Pers OT.Data_Int	AES algorithm is used to enforce data integrity, data confidentiality and authentications.	
O.MF_HW	No	n/a	Mifare is not supported	



IC Elements	Relevant	Consistent in ST with	Justification
O.MEM_ACCESS	No	n/a	Not used.
O.SFR_ACCESS	No	n/a	Not used.
FRU_FLT.2	Yes	(2)	(2)
FPT_FLS.1	Yes	(2)	(2)
FMT_LIM.1	Yes	(2)	(2)
FMT_LIM.2	Yes	(2)	(2)
FAU_SAS.1	Yes	(2)	(2)
FPT_PHP.3	Yes	(2)	(2)
FDP_ITT.1	Yes	(2)	(2)
FPT_ITT.1	Yes	(2)	(2)
FDP_IFC.1	Yes	(2)	(2)
FCS_RNG.1	Yes	(2)	(2)
FCS_COP.1[DES]	Yes	(2)	(2)
FCS_COP.1[AES]	Yes	(2)	(2)
FDP_ACC.1[MEM]	Yes	(2)	(2)
FDP_ACC.1[SFR]	Yes	(2)	(2)
FDP_ACF.1[MEM]	Yes	(2)	(2)
FDP_ACF.1[SFR]	Yes	(2)	(2)
FMT_MSA.3[MEM]	Yes	(2)	(2)
FMT_MSA.3[SFR]	Yes	(2)	(2)
FMT_MSA.1[MEM]	Yes	(2)	(2)
FMT_MSA.1[SFR]	Yes	(2)	(2)
FMT_SMF.1	Yes	(2)	(2)

(1) Since IC objectives are consistent with TOE objectives, IC Threats are also consistent with TOE SPD

(2) Since IC SFRs are translations of IC objectives, IC SFRs are consistent with TOE SFRs



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13 ACRONYMS

AA BAC CC CPLC DF DFA DG	Active Authentication Basic Access Control Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 3 Card personalisation life cycle Dedicated File Differential Fault Analysis Data Group
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EF EFID	Elementary File File Identifier
DES	Digital encryption standard
DH	Diffie Hellmann
I/O	Input/Output
IC	Integrated Circuit
ICAO	International Civil Aviation organization
ICC	Integrated Circuit Card
IFD	Interface device
LDS	Logical Data structure
MF	Master File
MRTD	Machine readable Travel Document
MRD	Machine readable Document
MRZ	Machine readable Zone
MSK	Manufacturer Secret Key
OS	Operating System
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PP	Protection Profile
SFI	Short File identifier
SHA	Secure hashing Algorithm
SOD	Security object Data
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security function



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