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Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale
Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information

Certification Report ANSSI-CC-2016/20

ID-One eIDAS v1.0 in SSCD-5 configuration on P60x080PVC/PVG components

Paris, 12 may 2016

Courtesy Translation



Warning

This report is designed to provide sponsors with a document enabling them to assess the security level of a product under the conditions of use and operation defined in this report for the evaluated version. It is also designed to provide the potential purchaser of the product with the conditions under which he may operate or use the product so as to meet the conditions of use for which the product has been evaluated and certified; that is why this certification report must be read alongside the evaluated user and administration guidance, as well as with the product security target, which presents threats, environmental assumptions and the supposed conditions of use so that the user can judge for himself whether the product meets his needs in terms of security objectives.

Certification does not, however, constitute a recommendation product from ANSSI (French Network and Information Security Agency), and does not guarantee that the certified product is totally free of all exploitable vulnerabilities.

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Certification report reference

ANSSI-CC-2016/20

Product name

**ID-One eIDAS v1.0 in SSCD-5 configuration on
P60x080PVC/PVG components**

Product reference

**SAAAAR 080031 : ID-One ePass V3 Full EACv2 on NXP
SAAAAR 082456 : Code r6.0 Generic
SAAAAR 082844 : Optional Code r4.0 Digitaly Blurred Image**

Protection profile conformity

**Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 5 : Extension for
device with key generation and trusted communication with signature creation
application, version 1.0.1,
certifié sous la référence [PP-SSCD-Part5].**

Evaluation criteria and version

Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4

Evaluation level

**EAL 5 augmented
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5**

Developers

Oberthur Technologies
420 rue d'Estienne d'Orves
CS 40008
92705 Colombes, France

NXP Semiconductors
Box 54 02 40,
D-22502 Hamburg, Allemagne

Sponsor

Oberthur Technologies
420 rue d'Estienne d'Orves
CS 40008
92705 Colombes, France

Evaluation facility

CEA - LETI
17 rue des martyrs, 38054 Grenoble Cedex 9, France

Recognition arrangements



SOG-IS



The product is recognised at EAL2 level.

Introduction

The Certification

Security certification for information technology products and systems is governed by decree number 2002-535 dated April, 18th 2002, modified. This decree stipulates that:

- The French Network and Information Security Agency draws up **certification reports**. These reports indicate the features of the proposed security targets. They may include any warnings that the authors feel the need to mention for security reasons. They may or may not be transmitted to third parties or made public, as the sponsors desire (article 7).
- The **certificates** issued by the Prime Minister certify that the copies of the products or systems submitted for evaluation fulfil the specified security features. They also certify that the evaluations have been carried out in compliance with applicable rules and standards, with the required degrees of skill and impartiality (article 8).

The procedures are available on the Internet site www.ssi.gouv.fr.

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1. The product

1.1. Presentation of the product

The evaluated product is the smart card « ID-One eIDAS v1.0 in SSCD-5 configuration on P60x080PVC/PVG components », which can be in contact or contactless mode. This product is developed by *OBERTHUR TECHNOLOGIES* on a component manufactured by *NXP SEMICONDUCTORS*.

This product is used to create digital signature.

1.2. Evaluated product description

The security target [ST] defines the evaluated product, its evaluated security functionalities and its operational environment.

This security target is fully compliant with the protection profile [PP-SSCD-Part5].

1.2.1. Product identification

The configuration list [CONF] identifies the product's constituent elements.

The certified version of this product is identified by the elements present in the answer following a GET DATA command (refer to [GUIDES]).

The certified version of the product can be identified by the following elements:

- Commercial name: ID-One ePass Full EAC V2;
- SAAAAR¹ code of ROM code : 080031;
- Mandatory patch code : 412E4D1EC087005B56A9A2CAC0B6558F4CAA E041D8B5A69345559B562A6F4C8E;
- Optional patch code : E339C30BC6A81162413612FE2698284FA6CD28AA5 CF5257A20B83611E58E9BEE;
- Component code (on 42 bytes): XXXXvvvvXX..XX where vvvv can take the following values:
 - '6C14' for P60D080PVC component;
 - '6014' for P60D080PVG component;
 - '6019' for P60C080PVG component.

It can be decided whether or not to load the optional patch and whether or not to the *Digital Blurred Image* function.

The "SAAAAR and patch" codes can be verified using a GetData command with the DF66 tag. The component code can be verified using a GetData command with the 9F7F tag described in the [GUIDES].

¹ S: site code (0 for France), AAAA: article based on 4 numbers, R: software *release* or version.

1.2.2. Security services

The main security services provided by the product are:

- Generation of the signature creation data (*Signature Creation Data* or SCD) and of the corresponding signature verification data (*Signature-Verification Data* or SVD);
- SVD export for an digital certificate creation;
- The reception and storage of the digital certificate information (only if created by the personalization agent);
- The transition from non operational to operational state;
- The creation of the digital signature;
- Administrator authentication;
- Signatory authentication through a PIN code or biometric data.

There is an optional non evaluated function of *Digital Blurred Image* which makes the photo illegible in case of a fraudulent use.

1.2.3. Architecture

The product is a closed smart card which contained the following components:

- a micro-controller P60x080PVC/PVG manufactured by *NXP Semiconductors*, in P60D080PVC, P60D080PVG or P60C080PVG configuration;
- digital a dedicated cryptographic library;
- the *Perso* personalization application;
- The *eSign* application;
- The *MRTD - IDL* application outside of the evaluation scope;
- The *eSign* application outside of the evaluation scope;
- The *Dauth* application outside of the evaluation scope.

1.2.4. Life cycle

The product's life cycle is organised as follow:

| | Phase | Actor | Covered by |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Step 1 | Development | <i>OBERTHUR TECHNOLOGIES</i> | ALC |
| Step 2 | Development | <i>NXP SEMICONDUCTORS</i> | Component Certification |
| Step 3 | Manufacturing | <i>NXP SEMICONDUCTORS</i> | Component Certification |
| TOE delivery point | | | |
| Step 4 | SSCD manufacturer (Pre-perso) | SSCD manufacturer | AGD_PRE |
| Step 5 | SSCD manufacturer (Pre-perso) | SSCD manufacturer | AGD_PRE |
| Step 6 | Personalization | Personalization agent | AGD_PRE |
| Step 7 | Operational use | End user | AGD_OPE |

The product has been developed on the following site:

OBERTHUR TECHNOLOGIES –Colombes site

420 rue d’Estienne d’Orves
92700 Colombes
France

OBERTHUR TECHNOLOGIES –Pessac site

Parc Scientifique UNITEC 1
4 allée du Doyen Georges Brus – Porte 2
33600 Pessac
France

The micro-controller is developed and manufactured by *NXP SEMICONDUCTORS*. The development and manufacturing sites for the micro-controller are detailed in the certification report with the reference [BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-V2-2014].

The "product administrators" are the nations or authorities issuing the ID-One eIDAS v1.0 card.

The "product users" are the users who use eSign’s applications to realize a signature operation.

1.2.5. Evaluated configuration

The product is a closed card that can be personalized into different configurations.

This certification report applies to the configuration including the *Secure Signature Creation Device* mechanism according to the protection profile [PP-SSCD-Part5].

2. The evaluation

2.1. Evaluation referential

The evaluation has been performed in compliance with the **Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4** [CC], in accordance with the Common Evaluation Methodology defined in [CEM].

For assurance components which are not covered by the [CEM] manual, methods specific to the evaluation facility were used.

In order to meet specific features of smart cards, the [JIWG IC] and [JIWG AP] guides were applied. Thus, the AVA_VAN level was determined using the rating scale of the [JIWG AP] guide. For the record, this rating scale is more demanding than that defined by default in the standard method [CC], used for other categories of products (software products for example).

2.2. Evaluation work

The evaluation has been performed according to the composition scheme defined in the guide [COMP], in order to assess that no weakness arises from the integration of the software in the certified microcontroller.

Therefore, the results of the evaluation of the microcontroller « P60x080PVC/PVG » at EAL6 level augmented with ALC_FLR.1 and ASE_TSS.2 components, compliant with the [BSI-PP-0035-2007] protection profile, have been used. This microcontroller has been certified the 24th October 2014 under the reference [BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-V2-2014].

The evaluation technical report [ETR], delivered to ANSSI on the 14th April 2016, provides details on the work performed by the evaluation facility and assesses that all evaluation tasks are “**pass**”.

2.3. Cryptographic mechanisms robustness analysis according to the ANSSI’s technical standards

The rating of the cryptographic mechanisms robustness has been carried out according to the ANSSI [REF] technical standards.

The results obtained have been the subject of an analysis report [ANA-CRY] which leads to the following conclusions:

- The analyzed mechanisms are compliant to the ANSSI ([REF]) technical standard requirements, provided the recommendations mentioned in the guides (refer to [GUIDES]) are followed;
- The Hash function SHA-1 must not be used for signature applications.

As part of the reinforced qualification process, an expertise of cryptography’s implementation was realized by the ITSEF. These results were taken into account in the independent vulnerability analysis realized by the evaluator and have not allowed to highlight exploitable vulnerabilities for the intended target namely AVA_VAN.5 level.

2.4. Random number generator analysis

The physical random number generator used by the final product was evaluated within the scope of the micro-controller evaluation (Refer to [BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-V2-2014]).

In addition, as required in the ANSSI cryptographic standard ([REF]), the output of the physical random number generator is reprocessed using a cryptographic function.

The results were taken into account in the independent vulnerability analysis carried out by the evaluator and found no evidence of exploitable vulnerability for the AVA_VAN.5 level targeted.

3. Certification

3.1. Conclusion

The evaluation was carried out according to the current rules and standards, with the required competency and impartiality of a licensed evaluation facility. All the work performed permits the release of a certificate in conformance with the decree 2002-535.

This certificate testifies that the product « ID-One eIDAS v1.0 in SSCD-5 configuration on P60x080PVC/PVG components » submitted for evaluation fulfils the security features specified in its security target [ST] for the evaluation level EAL5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 components.

3.2. Restrictions

This certificate only applies on the product specified in chapter 1 of this certification report.

The user of the certified product shall respect the security objectives for the operational environment, as specified in the security target [ST], and shall respect the recommendations in the guidance [GUIDES].

3.3. Recognition of the certificate

3.3.1. *European recognition (SOG-IS)*

This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the SOG-IS agreement [SOG-IS].

The European Recognition Agreement made by SOG-IS in 2010 allows recognition from Signatory States of the agreement¹, of ITSEC and Common Criteria certificates. The European recognition is applicable, for smart cards and similar devices, up to ITSEC E6 High and CC EAL7 levels. The certificates that are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:



3.3.2. *International common criteria recognition (CCRA)*

This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA [CC RA].

¹ The signatory countries of the SOG-IS agreements are: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement allows the recognition, by signatory countries¹, of the Common Criteria certificates. The recognition is applicable up to the assurance components of CC EAL2 level and also to ALC_FLR family. The certificates that are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:



¹ The signatory countries of the CCRA arrangement are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, New-Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

Annex 1. Evaluation level of the product

| Class | Family | Component by assurance level | | | | | | | Assurance level assigned to the product | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | | EAL 1 | EAL 2 | EAL 3 | EAL 4 | EAL 5 | EAL 6 | EAL 7 | EAL 5+ | Name of the component | |
| ADV Development | ADV_ARC | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Security architecture description |
| | ADV_FSP | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information |
| | ADV_IMP | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | Implementation representation of the TSF |
| | ADV_INT | | | | | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | Well-structured internals |
| | ADV_SPM | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | |
| | ADV_TDS | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 4 | Semiformal modular design |
| AGD User guides | AGD_OPE | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Operational user guidance |
| | AGD_PRE | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Preparative procedures |
| ALC Life cycle support | ALC_CMC | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | Production support, acceptance procedures and automation |
| | ALC_CMS | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | Development tools CM coverage |
| | ALC_DEL | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Delivery procedures |
| | ALC_DVS | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | Sufficiency of security measures |
| | ALC_FLR | | | | | | | | | | |
| | ALC_LCD | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | Developer defined life-cycle model |
| | ALC_TAT | | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | Compliance with implementation standards |
| ASE Evaluation of the security target | ASE_CCL | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Conformance claims |
| | ASE_ECD | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Extended components definition |
| | ASE_INT | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ST introduction |
| | ASE_OBJ | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | Security objectives |
| | ASE_REQ | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | Derived security requirements |
| | ASE_SPD | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Security problem definition |
| | ASE_TSS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | TOE summary specification |
| ATE Tests | ATE_COV | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | Analysis of coverage |
| | ATE_DPT | | | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | Testing: modular design |
| | ATE_FUN | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | Functional testing |
| | ATE_IND | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | Independent testing: sample |
| AVA Vulnerability assessment | AVA_VAN | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis |

Annex 2. References

| | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [ST] | <p>Reference Security target for the evaluation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MINOS – ID-One eIDAS v1.0 in SSCD-5 configuration Security Target, version 4, reference: 110 7734, 2nd March 2015, Oberthur Technologies. <p>For publication needs, the following security target has been provided and validated for the present evaluation :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ID-One eIDAS v1.0 in SSCD-5 configuration Public Security Target, version 2, reference: 110 7795, Oberthur Technologies. |
| [ETR] | <p>Evaluation Technical Report :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evaluation Technical Report – MINOS-eSign, version: 2.2, reference: LETI.CESTI.MIN.RTE.002 v2.2, on the 14th April 2016, LETI. |
| [ANA-CRY] | <p>MINOS – Cryptographic sizing mechanism MRTD, version 2.0, reference: LETI.CESTI.MIN.RT.004, on the 1st April 2016, LETI.</p> |
| [CONF] | <p>Product configuration list:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MINOS ID-One eIDAS v1.0 Configuration List, version 6, on the 4th March 2016, reference 110 7817, Oberthur Technologies. |
| [GUIDES] | <p>Product installation guide :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MINOS – MRTD FULL EAC V2 – Guidance Document – PREparative procedures, version 11, 2nd March 2016, reference : 110 7111, Oberthur Technologies ; - MINOS – ID-One EIDAS v1.0 in SSCD-5 – Guidance Document – PREparative procedures, version 5, 2nd March 2016, reference : 110 7776, Oberthur Technologies. <p>Product user Guide :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MINOS – ID-One eIDAS v1.0 – Guidance Document – OPERational user guidance, version 1, on the 2nd December 2015, reference 110 7822, Oberthur Technologies. |
| [PP-SSCD-Part5] | <p>Protection Profile for secure signature creation device – Part 5: Extension for device with key generation and trusted communication with signature creation application, référence : prEN 14169-5:2012, version 1.0.1 dated on the 14th November 2012.</p> <p><i>Maintained by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) on the 12th December 2012 under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012.</i></p> |
| [BSI-PP-0035-2007] | <p>Security IC Platform Protection Profile, version 1.0, august 2007.</p> <p><i>Certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) under the reference BSI-PP-0035-2007.</i></p> |

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [BSI-DSZ- CC-0837- V2-2014] | NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)PVG with IC Dedicated Software. <i>Certified by BSI on the 24th October 2014 under the reference BSI- DSZ-CC-0837-V2-2014.</i> |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Annex 3. Certification references

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Decree number 2002-535, 18th April 2002, modified related to the security evaluations and certifications for information technology products and systems. | |
| [CER/P/01] | Procedure CER/P/01 - Certification of the security provided by Information Technology products and systems, ANSSI. |
| [CC] | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation : Part 1: Introduction and general model, September 2012, version 3.1, revision 4, reference CCMB-2012-09-001; Part 2: Security functional components, September 2012, version 3.1, revision 4, reference CCMB-2012-09-002; Part 3: Security assurance components, September 2012, version 3.1, revision 4, reference CCMB-2012-09-003. |
| [CEM] | Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation : Evaluation Methodology, September 2012, version 3.1, revision 4, reference CCMB-2012-09-004. |
| [JIWG AP] * | Mandatory Technical Document - Application of attack potential to smartcards, version 2.9, January 2013. |
| [COMP] * | Mandatory Technical Document – Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, version 1.2, January 2012. |
| [CC RA] | Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security, 2 nd July 2014. |
| [SOG-IS] | « Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security Evaluation Certificates », version 3.0, 8 th January 2010, Management Committee. |
| [REF] | Cryptographic mechanisms – Rules and recommendations regarding the choice and sizing of cryptographic mechanisms, version 2.03 dated 21st February 2014 appended to the General Security Standard (RGS_B1), refer to: www.ssi.gouv.fr . Cryptographic keys management – Rules and recommendations concerning the management of keys used in cryptographic mechanisms, version 2.00 dated 8th June 2012, appended to the General Security Standard (RGS_B2), refer to www.ssi.gouv.fr . |



Authentication – Rules and recommendations concerning the standard robustness level authentication mechanisms, version 1.0 dated 13th January 2010, appended to the General Security Standard (RGS_B3), refer to www.ssi.gouv.fr.

*SOG-IS document; in the scope of the CCRA recognition agreement, the equivalent CCRA supporting document applies.