



## Site Security Target Lite

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# 1 SST Introduction

The Site Security Target refers to Advanced Semiconductor Engineering Inc. ChungLi Factory (hereinafter referred to as "ASECL") that describes the security features of a site and therefore defines the scope of the site.

This chapter is divided into the sections "SST Reference and Site Reference" and "Site description".

## 1.1 SST Reference and Site Reference

### 1.1.1 SST Reference

Title	Site Security Target Lite
Reference document number	92-31-0000-0257-05
Version	1.2
Publication Date	2017-6-22
Company	Advanced Semiconductor Engineering Inc.
Name of the site	Advanced Semiconductor Engineering Inc. ChungLi Factory
Product type	Wafers and dies with Security ICs
EAL-Level	The site supports product evaluations up to EAL6

### 1.1.2 Site Reference

Name of the site: Advanced Semiconductor Engineering ChungLi Factory

Location: 550, Chung-Hwa Road Section 1, Chung-Li District, Taoyuan City, Taiwan, R.O.C.

## 1.2 Site Description

### 1.2.1 Physical Scope of the Site

ASECL consists of 9 buildings, Building A, B, C, D, E, L, M, K and Administration surrounded by a fence that are guarded with surveillance and secured by security guards, restrictions and access controlled from main and back gates.

ASECL provides services that include assembly, wafer and IC test for security products.

The site includes production facilities, warehousing and material dispatch, customer service, equipment maintenance, engineering, configuration control, as well as the IT office for the site.

The relevant physical sections that are targets of the evaluation process are the areas that are directly involved in the services and/or processes of the site used for security products as well as areas that support these areas either from the operations point of view (configuration



control, operation control, location of IT-systems, warehouse, etc.) or from the organisational point of view (site security organisation and control, maintenance of systems and tools, customer service and interfaces to other sites, etc.). These areas are called Security Area and are access-controlled with restrictions as well as guarded with surveillance. The Security Areas are located as bellow floors of buildings:

- Building A
  - 1F : Shipping & Packing Room.
  - 4F & 5F : Final Test Manufacturing
  - 7F : Wafer Receiving Room, Wafer Incoming QA Area, Die Cage and Assembly Manufacturing
- Building B
  - 4F : Assembly Manufacturing
  - 5F : Test Program Server Room
  - 7F : Wafer Receiving Room and Wafer Probe Test Manufacturing
  - 9F : IT Server Room
- Building C
  - 1F : Central Control Room
  - 4F : Assembly Manufacturing
  - 7F : IT Server Room
- Building L
  - 1-2F : Test Program Server Room

### 1.2.2 Logical Scope of the Site

The following services and/or processes provided by ASECL are in the scope of the site evaluation process.

- Wafer Receiving provides wafer receiving services, storage and transferring.
- Wafer IQA provides services that include wafer incoming quality and inspection.
- Die Cage provides wafer storage and transferring services.
- Assembly process provides services for wafer assembly in a package.
- Final Test process provides services for IC test.
- Wafer Probe Test process provides services that include wafer test for security products.
- Shipping & Packing Room provides services that include packing and handover for shipment of the finished goods for security products.

The complete logical flow of the Security IC modules for Smart Card applications at the site is covered by the SST. In addition, the management of the Security IC modules for Smart Card applications related processes and the site security are covered by the SST.



The product flow of Security IC modules for Smart Card applications on the site starts with the receipt of parts of wafers up to the packing and handover for shipment of the finished Security IC modules for Smart Card applications.

The following life-cycle phases of the Security IC packages for Smart Card applications are subject of the SST.

- Life cycle phase 4: IC Packaging (according to the protection profile [6])
  - Security IC packaging (and testing)
  - Pre-personalisation if necessary



## 2 Conformance Claims

The evaluation is based on Common Criteria Version 3.1, release 4

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, [1]
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, [2]

This SST is CC part 3 conformant.

For the evaluation the following methodology will be used:

- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology; Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, [3]
- Supporting Document, Site Certification, October 2007, Version 1.0, Revision 1, CCDB-2007-11-001 [4]
- Guidance for Site Certification, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Version 1.1 , 2013-12-04. [5]

The evaluation of the site comprises the following assurance components :

ALC\_CMC.5, ALC\_CMS.5, ALC\_DEL.1<sup>1</sup>, ALC\_DVS.2, ALC\_TAT.3 and ALC\_LCD.1.

The assurance level chosen for the SST is compliant to the Protection Profile (PP) [6] and therefore suitable for Security ICs.

The chosen assurance components are derived from the assurance level EAL6 of the assurance class "Life-cycle Support". For the assessment of the security measures, attackers with high attack potential are assumed. Therefore this site supports product evaluations of products up to EAL6.

The assurance components chosen for the Site Security Target are compliant to the Protection Profile (PP) [6]. Therefore the scope of the evaluation is suitable to support product evaluations up to assurance level EAL6 conformant to Part 3 [2] of the Common Criteria.

<sup>1</sup> The activities of ASECL are not directly related to shipping of security products. The transport is not under the responsibility of ASECL. The site does not provide contributions to ALC\_DEL.1. However, the component is included here to support the reuse of the evaluation results and to enable the justification of the evaluator regarding ALC\_DEL.1.<sup>2</sup> The site does not directly contribute to the development of the intended TOE in the sense of Common Criteria. The site ensures a reproducible production process within the limits defined for the released production process. Therefore relevant parameters are controlled during the production process. This is subject of the production control and the configuration management on site.

## 3 Security Problem Definition

The Security Problem Definition comprises security problems derived from threats against the assets handled by the site and security problems derived from the configuration management requirements. The configuration management covers the integrity of the TOE and the security management of the site. The goal is to achieve and hold a high security level to counter attacks with high attack potential at the site.

### 3.1 Asset

The following assets are handled at the site:

The site has internal documentation and data that is relevant to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of an intended TOE. This comprises site security concepts and the associated security measures as well as key and cryptographic tools for the encrypted exchange of data. These items are not explicitly listed in the list of assets below.

The integrity of any machine or tool used for development, production and testing is not considered an asset. However, appropriate measures are defined for the site to ensure this important condition.

#### 3.1.1 IC Assembly & Testing

The following items listed are assets related to the intended TOE for ASECL IC assembly and testing process.

- Wafers and dice
- Rejected dice and modules
- Test programs and associated documentation for functional testing of the finished or Wafer form products
- Probe Card and Load Board
- Development and implementation data (intended TOE)
- Scripts, data and keys needed for the pre-personalisation process

There can be further client specific assets like seals, special transport protection or similar items that support the security of the internal shipment to the client. They are handled in the same way as other assets to prevent misuse, disclosure or loss of these sensitive items or information.

### 3.2 Threats

All threats endanger the integrity and confidentiality of the intended TOE and the representation of parts of the TOE. However, during the development, production, test and assembly the TOE and the representation of parts of the TOE are vulnerable to such attacks.

The following threats are considered:



**T.Smart-Theft:** An attacker tries to access sensitive areas of the site for manipulation or theft of sensitive configuration items. The attacker has sufficient time to investigate the site outside the controlled boundary. For the attack, the use of standard equipment for burglary is considered. In addition the attacker may be able to use specific working clothes of the site to camouflage the intention.

This attack already includes a variety of targets and aspects with respect to the various assets listed in the section above. It shall cover the range of individuals that try to get unregistered or defect devices that can be used to further investigate the functionality of the device and search for possible exploits. Such an attacker will have limited resources and a low financial budget to prepare the attack. However the time that can be spent by such an attacker to prepare the attack and the flexibility of such an attacker will provide notable risk.

It is expected that such an attacker can be defeated by state-of-the-art physical, technical and procedural security measures like access control and surveillance. In general, an access control concept with two or three levels shall be implemented. If two levels are implemented, the more restrictive level of the access control shall prevent the simple access using a lost or stolen access token. Other restrictions may be the need for parallel access by two employees. The technical measures shall include automated measures to support the surveillance.

**T.Rugged-Theft :** An experienced thief with specialized equipment for burglary, who may be paid to perform the attack, tries to access sensitive areas and manipulate or steal sensitive configuration items.

Although this attack is applicable for each site the risk may be different regarding the assets. These attackers may be prepared to take high risks for payment. They are considered to be sufficiently resourced to circumvent security measures and do not consider any damage done to the affected company. The target of the attack may be products that can be sold or misused in an application context. This can comprise devices at a specific testing or personalisation state for cloning or introduction of forged devices. Those attackers are considered to have the highest attack potential.

Such attackers may not be completely defeated by the physical, technical and procedural security measures. Special measures like storage of items in safes or strong rooms or the splitting of sensitive data like keys provide additional protect against such attacks. Also the unique registration of the products can support the protection if they can be disabled or blocked.

**T.Computer-Net:** A hacker with substantial expertise, standard equipment, who may be paid to attempt to remotely access sensitive network segments to get data such as test data or other sensitive production data or modify the testing or production process at the site.

A logical attack against the network of the site provides the lowest risk for an attacker.



The target of such an attack is to access the company network to get information that may allow to attack a product or manipulate a product or retrieve information to allow or change the configuration or the personalisation. In addition, a successful access to a company network leads to loss of reputation of the company processing the product or the company that produces the product.

Such attackers are considered to have high attack potential because the attacker may have appropriate technical equipment to perform such an attack. Furthermore, the attacker may have the resource to develop or buy software or hardware which can exploit known vulnerabilities within the tools and software used by the company.

Therefore, also for the company network a protective concept with more than one level is expected. This shall comprise a firewall to the external network, and further limitations of the network users and the network services for internal sub-networks. In addition, computer users shall have individual accounts which require authentication using e.g. a password. For specific tasks or processes standalone networks may be required. The protection must be supported by appropriate measures to update and maintain the computer and network systems and analyze logs that may provide indications for attack attempts.

**T.Accident-Change:** Employees, contractors that are not trained may take products or influence production systems without considering possible impacts or problems. This threat includes accidental changes e.g. due to working tasks of student trainees or maintenance tasks of contractors within the development, production or test area.

Such accidental changes can include the modification of configurations for tools that may have an impact on the TOE, the wrong assignment of tools for a dedicated process step. Further examples may be machine failure or misalignment between operators that are responsible for products of different clients or different products of the same client are mixed during production. This also includes the disposal of security products using the standard flow and not the controlled destruction.

**T.Unauthorised-Staff:** Employees or subcontractors not authorised to get access to products or systems used for production get access to products or affect production systems or configuration systems, so that the confidentiality and/or the integrity of the product is violated. This can apply to any production step and any configuration item of the final product as well as to the final product or its configuration.

Especially maintenance tasks of subcontractors may require the access to computer systems storing sensitive data. The implemented security measures may not work because a special dedicated access may be used to the network or specific tools may be used for this dedicated task.



Also other subcontractors like cleaning staff or maintenance staff for the building get limited access that may allow them to start an attack. The disposal of defect equipment and/or sensitive configuration items must be considered.

The attack potential depends on the trustworthiness of the subcontracted company and the access required within the company. Related to these different measures are required.

**T.Staff-Collusion:** An attacker tries to get access to material processed at the site. The attacker tries to get support from one employee through an attempted extortion or an attempt at bribery.

Personal accountability shall be traceable as far as possible. Handover procedures with dual control, enforcement of parallel access by two authorised employees and the split of sensitive knowledge like personalisation keys can be implemented to prevent such an attack. The measures depend on the assets that must be protected at the site.

**T.Attack-Transport:** An attacker might try to get data, specifications or products during the internal shipment. The target is to compromise confidential information or violate the integrity of the products during the stated internal shipment process to allow a modification, cloning or the retrieval of confidential information at later life cycle states. Confidential information comprises design information, test documentation and test data as far as classified as sensitive.

ASECL will be provided with the configuration of the product that will be the basis of the protection of the internal shipment. This is based on assumption A.Product-Integrity.

### 3.3 Organisational Security Policies

The following policies are introduced by the requirements of the assurance components of ALC for the assurance level EAL6. The chosen policies support the understanding of the production flow and the security measures of the site. In addition, they allow an appropriate mapping to the Security Assurance Requirements (SAR).

The documentation of the site under evaluation is under configuration management.

This comprises all procedures regarding the evaluated test and assembly flows and the security measures that are in the scope of the evaluation.

Table 3.1 – OSP Addressed by the Site

Policy	Description
<b>P.Config-Items</b>	<p>The configuration management system shall be able to uniquely identify configuration items. This includes the unique identification of items that are created, generated, developed or used at a site as well as the received and transferred and/or provided items.</p> <p>The configuration management relies completely on the naming and identification of the received configuration items. The consistency with the expected identification is verified after receipt and the item each item is assigned to an internal unique identification. This holds also for test programs and other items that are provided to the site for local use. For configuration items that are created, generated or developed at the site the naming and identification must be specified.</p>
<b>P.Config-Control</b>	<p>The procedures for setting up the production process for a new product as well as the procedure that allows changes of the initial setup for a product shall only be applied by authorised personnel. Automated systems shall support the configuration management and ensure access control or interactive acceptance measures for set up and changes. The procedure for the initial set up of a production process ensures that sufficient information is provided by the client.</p> <p>The product setup includes the following information (i) identification of the product, (ii) properties of the product when received at the site (iii) properties of the product when internally shipped, (iv) classification of the items (which are security relevant), (v) who (either ASECL or the client) is responsible for destruction of defect devices, (vi) how the product is tested after assembly, (vii) any configuration of the processed item as part of the services provided by the site, (viii) which address is used for the internal shipment.</p>
<b>P.Config-Process</b>	<p>The services and/or processes provided by a site are controlled in the configuration management plan. This comprises tools used for the assembly and testing of the product, the management of flaws and optimizations of the process flow as well as the documentation that describes the services and/or processes provided by a site.</p>



Policy	Description
	<p>The documentation with the process descriptions and the security measures of the site are under version control. Measures are in place to ensure that the evaluated status is ensured. In most cases tools are used to support the processes at the site. This comprises e.g. scripts or batch routines developed by the site and a commercial data base system. This comprises also service levels and quality parameters.</p>
<p><b>P.Reception-Control</b></p>	<p>The inspection of incoming items done at the site ensures that the received configuration items comply with the properties stated by the client. Furthermore, it is verified that the product can be identified and a released production process is defined for the product. If applicable this aspect includes the check that all required information and data is available to process the items.</p>
<p><b>P.Accept-Product</b></p>	<p>The testing and quality control of the site ensures that the released products comply with the specification agreed with the client. The acceptance process is supported by automated measures. Records are generated for the acceptance process of the configuration items. Thereby, it is ensured that the properties of the product are ensured when internally shipped.</p>
<p><b>P.Zero-Balance</b></p>	<p>The site ensures that all sensitive items (security relevant parts of the intended TOEs of different clients) are separated and traced on a device basis. For each hand over, either an automated or an organisational “two-employees-acknowledgement” (four-eyes principle) is applied for functional and defect assets.</p> <p>According to the released production process the defect assets are either destroyed at the site or sent back to the client (depending on the production-setup).</p>
<p><b>P.Transport-Prep</b></p>	<p>Technical and organisational measures ensure the correct labeling of the product. The products are packed as required by the client. A forwarder selected by the client is verified before the handover of security products. Measures to support traceability during the transport are supported by ASECL.</p>
<p><b>P.Data-Transfer</b></p>	<p>Any data in electronic form (e.g test programs) that is classified as sensitive or higher security level by the client is encrypted to ensure confidentiality of the data.</p>



Policy	Description
<b>P.Secure-Scrap</b>	The process is following the normal procedure for producing but labeling and collecting the good and reject products segregation. All operation is completed in security area and monotered by CCTV. The reject product is acted according to customer request (destroyed in the site or return to customer).

### 3.4 Assumptions

ASECL site is operating in a production flow and therefore must rely on preconditions provided by the previous site. This means, each site relies on the materials and information received by the previous site/client. This is reflected by the assumptions which are to be fulfilled by the client.

Table 3.2 – Assumption for the Client

Assumption	Description
<b>A.Item-Identification</b>	Each configuration item received by the site is appropriately labeled to ensure the identification of the configuration item.
<b>A.Product-Specification</b>	The client must provide appropriate specifications and guidance for the assembly and testing of the product. This comprises bond plans for an appropriate assembly process as well as test requirements and test parameters for the development of the functional tests or a finished test program appropriate for the final testing. The provided information includes the classification of the delivered items, documents and data.
<b>A.Internal-Shipment</b>	The client defines the requirements for packing of the security products. The recipient of the product is defined by the client. The client provides the address and shipping information (selected forwarder) via secure channel to ASECL.
<b>A.Product-Integrity</b>	The self-protecting features of the devices are fully operational and it is not possible to influence the configuration and behavior of the devices based on insufficient operational conditions or any command sequence generated by an attacker or by accident.
<b>A.Testdata-Support</b>	The client must provide test data and optional pre-personalisation data via a secure connection to the site in





Assumption	Description
	correct data format. The client is responsible for the secure transfer of data into the ASE security network. The data must be prepared in a way, so that ASE is able to directly get the data from the client in order to process it using their Testers.

The assumptions are outside the sphere of influence of ASECL. They are needed to provide the basis for an appropriate production process, to assign the product to the released production process and to ensure the proper handling, storage and destruction of all configuration items related to the intended TOE.

## 4 Security Objectives

### 4.1 Security Objectives

The Security Objectives are related to physical, technical and organisational security measures, the configuration management as well as the internal shipment and/or the external delivery.

Table 4.1 – Security Objectives for the Site

Objective	Description
<b>O.Physical-Access</b>	The combination of physical partitioning between the different access control levels together with technical and organisational security measures enforce the access of authorised staff only and allow a sufficient separation of employees to enforce the “need to know” principle. The access control supports the limitation for the access to sensitive areas including the identification and rejection of unauthorised people. The site enforces up to three levels (level 0 to level 2) of access control depending on the area. The access control measures ensure that only registered employees and vendors can access restricted areas. Security products are handled in restricted areas only. ASE provides a secured space within a level 2 area where a client may place any network connection equipment to support A.Testdata-Support.
<b>O.Security-Control</b>	Assigned personnel of the site or guards operate the systems for access control and surveillance. Responsibilities and measures for responding to alarms are defined. Technical security measures like video control, motion sensors and similar kind of sensors support the enforcement of the access control. These personnel are also responsible for registering and ensuring escort of visitors, contractors and suppliers.
<b>O.Alarm-Response</b>	The technical and organisational security measures ensure that an alarm is generated before an unauthorised person gets access to any sensitive configuration item (asset). After the alarm is triggered the unauthorised person still has to overcome further security measures. The reaction time of the employees or guards is short enough to prevent a successful attack.



Objective	Description
<b>O.Internal-Monitor</b>	The site performs security management meetings at least every year. The security management meetings are used to review security incidences, to verify that maintenance measures are applied and to reconsider the assessment of risks and security measures. Furthermore, an internal audit is performed every year to control the application of the security measures. Sensitive processes are controlled within a shorter time frame to ensure a sufficient protection.
<b>O.Maintain-Security</b>	Technical security measures are maintained regularly to ensure correct operation. The logging of sensitive systems is checked regularly. This comprises the access control system to ensure that only authorised employees have access to sensitive areas as well as computer/network systems to ensure the protection of the networks and computer systems based on the appropriate configuration.
<b>O.Logical-Access</b>	The site enforces a logical separation between the internal network and the internet by a firewall. The firewall ensures that only defined services and defined connections are accepted. Furthermore, the internal network is separated into a production network and an office network. Additional specific networks for production and configuration are physically separated from any internal network to enforce access control. Access to the production network and related systems is restricted to authorised employees that work in the related area or that are involved in the configuration tasks or the production systems. Every user of an IT system has its own user account and password. An authentication using user account and password is enforced by all computer systems.
<b>O.Logical-Operation</b>	All network segments and the computer systems are kept up-to-date (software updates, security patches, virus protection, spyware protection). The backup of sensitive data and security relevant logs is applied according to the classification of the stored data.
<b>O.Config-Items</b>	The site has a configuration management system that assigns a unique internal identification to each product to uniquely identify configuration items and allow an assignment to the client. Also the internal procedures and guidance are covered by the configuration management.
<b>O.Config-Control</b>	The site applies a release procedure for the setup of the production process for each new product. In addition, the site has

Objective	Description
	<p>a process to classify and introduce changes for services and/or processes of released products. Minor changes are handled by the site, major changes must be acknowledged by the client. A designated team is responsible for the release of new products and for the classification and release of changes. This team comprises specialists for all aspects of the services and/or processes. The services and/or processes can be changed by authorised personnel only. Automated systems support configuration management and production control.</p>
<b>O.Config-Process</b>	<p>The site controls its services and/or processes using a configuration management plan. The configuration management is controlled by tools and procedures for the development of test programs and the assembly of the products, for the management of flaws and optimizations of the process flow as well as for the documentation that describes the services and/or processes provided by a site.</p>
<b>O.Acceptance-Test</b>	<p>The site delivers configuration items that fulfil the specified properties. Parameter checks, functional and visual checks and tests are performed to ensure the compliance with the specification. The test results are logged to support tracing and the identification of systematic failures.</p>
<b>O.Staff-Engagement</b>	<p>All employees who have access to sensitive configuration items and who can move parts of the product out of the defined production flow are checked regarding security concerns and have to sign a non- disclosure agreement. Furthermore, all employees are trained and qualified for their job.</p>
<b>O.Zero-Balance</b>	<p>The site ensures that all security products (intended TOE of different clients) are separated and traced on a device basis. Automated control and/or two employees acknowledgement during hand over is applied for functional and defective devices. All devices are tracked until they are either shipped or destroyed locally.</p>
<b>O.Reception-Control</b>	<p>Upon reception of products an immediate incoming inspection is performed. The inspection comprises the received amount of products and the identification and assignment of the product to a related internal production process.</p>

Objective	Description
<b>O.Internal-Transport</b>	The recipient of a physical configuration item is identified by the assigned client address. The internal shipment procedure is applied to the configuration item. The address for shipment can only be changed by a controlled process. The packaging is part of the defined process and applied as agreed with the client. The forwarder supports the tracing of configuration items during internal shipment. For every sensitive configuration item, the protection measures against manipulation are defined.
<b>O.Data-Transfer</b>	Sensitive electronic configuration items (data or documents in electronic form) are protected with cryptographic algorithms to ensure confidentiality and integrity. The associated keys must be assigned to individuals to ensure that only authorised employees are able to extract the sensitive electronic configuration item. The keys are exchanged based on secure measures and they are sufficiently protected.
<b>O.Control-Scrap</b>	The site has measures in place to destruct sensitive documentation, erase electronic media and destroy sensitive configuration items so that they do not support an attacker. Rejected or defect devices are either destructed locally or they are returned to the client.

## 4.2 Relation between Security Objectives and the Security Problem Definition

This SST includes a Security Objectives Rationale with two parts. The first part includes a tracing which shows how the threats and OSPs are covered by the Security Objectives. The second part described in chapter 7.3 includes a justification that shows that all threats and OSPs are effectively addressed by the Security Objectives.

Note that the assumptions defined in this Site Security Target cannot be used to cover any threat or OSP of the site. They are seen as pre-conditions fulfilled either by the site providing the sensitive configuration items or by the site receiving the sensitive configuration items. Therefore, they do not contribute to the security of the site under evaluation.



Table 4.2 – Security Objectives Rationale

Threat and OSP	Security Objective	Note
<b>T.Smart-Theft</b>	O.Physical-Access O.Security-Control O.Alarm-Response O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security	N/A
<b>T.Rugged-Theft</b>	O.Physical-Access O.Security-Control O.Alarm-Response O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security	N/A
<b>T.Computer-Net</b>	O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.Logical-Access O.Logical-Operation O.Staff-Engagement	N/A
<b>T.Accident-Change</b>	O.Logical-Access O.Logical-Operation O.Config-Items O.Config-Control O.Config-Process O.Acceptance-Test O.Staff-Engagement O.Zero-Balance	N/A



Threat and OSP	Security Objective	Note
<b>T.Unauthorised-Staff</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.Physical-Access</li> <li>O.Security-Control</li> <li>O.Alarm-Response</li> <li>O.Internal-Monitor</li> <li>O.Maintain-Security</li> <li>O.Logical-Access</li> <li>O.Logical-Operation</li> <li>O.Staff-Engagement</li> <li>O.Config-Control</li> <li>O.Zero-Balance</li> <li>O.Control-Scrap</li> </ul>	N/A
<b>T.Staff-Collusion</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.Internal-Monitor</li> <li>O.Maintain-Security</li> <li>O.Staff-Engagement</li> <li>O.Zero-Balance</li> <li>O.Data-Transfer</li> <li>O.Control-Scrap</li> </ul>	Encrypted data transfer
<b>T.Attack-Transport</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.Internal-Transport</li> <li>O.Data-Transfer</li> </ul>	Pre-announcement shipment
<b>P.Config-Items</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.Reception-Control</li> <li>O.Config-Items</li> </ul>	N/A
<b>P.Config-Control</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.Config-Items</li> <li>O.Config-Control</li> <li>O.Logical-Access</li> </ul>	N/A
<b>P.Config-Process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.Config-Process</li> </ul>	N/A
<b>P.Reception-Control</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.Reception-Control</li> </ul>	N/A
<b>P.Accept-Product</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.Config-Control</li> <li>O.Config-Process</li> <li>O.Acceptance-Test</li> </ul>	N/A
<b>P.Zero-Balance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.Internal-Monitor</li> <li>O.Staff-Engagement</li> <li>O.Zero-Balance</li> <li>O.Control-Scrap</li> </ul>	N/A



Threat and OSP	Security Objective	Note
<b>P.Transport-Prep</b>	O.Config-Process O.Internal-Transport O.Data-Transfer	N/A
<b>P.Data-Transfer</b>	O.Data-Transfer	N/A
<b>P.Secure Scrap</b>	O.Security-Control O.Zero-Balance O.Control-Scrap	





## 5 Extended Components Definition

No extended components are currently defined in this SST.

## 6 Security Requirements

Product evaluations using this SST may require an evaluation against evaluation assurance level EAL6. Therefore, the Security Assurance Requirements are a superset of the SARs included in the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [6].

The Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) is chosen from the class ALC (Lifecycle support) as defined in [2]:

- CM capabilities (ALC\_CMC.5)
- CM scope (ALC\_CMS.5)
- Delivery (ALC\_DEL.1)
- Development security (ALC\_DVS.2)
- Life-cycle definition (ALC\_LCD.1)
- Tools and techniques (ALC\_TAT.3)

The Security Assurance Requirements listed above fulfil the requirements of [4] because hierarchically higher components are used in this SST. In addition, the minimum set of SAR is extended by SAR of the assurance components for "Delivery" (ALC\_DEL.1), "Life-cycle definition" (ALC\_LCD.1) and "Tools and techniques" (ALC\_TAT.3).

ALC\_DEL.1 covers the packing and shipment. The site is only responsible for the packing. The shipment itself is outside the responsibility of the site. The component is included to support the reuse of the evaluation results and to enable the justification of a TOE evaluation regarding ALC\_DEL.1.

### 6.1 Application Notes and Refinements

The description of the site certification process [4] includes specific application notes. The main item is that a product that is considered as intended TOE (i.e. any TOE type) is not available during the evaluation. Since the term "TOE" is not applicable in the SST the associated processes for the handling of products are in the focus and described in this SST. These processes are subject of the evaluation of the site.

#### 6.1.1 Overview and Refinements regarding CM Capabilities (ALC\_CMC)

A production control system is employed to guarantee the traceability and completeness of different production charges or lots. The number of wafers, dice and/or packaged products (e.g. modules/inlays) is tracked by this system. Appropriate administration procedures are implemented for managing wafers, dice and/or packaged products, which are being removed from the production-process in order to verify and to control predefined quality standards and production parameters. It is ensured, that wafers, dice or assembled devices removed from the production stage (i) are returned to the production stage from where they were removed or (ii) are securely stored and destroyed.

According to [4] the processes rather than a TOE are in the focus of the CMC examination. The changed content elements are presented below. The application notes in [4] are defined

for ALC\_CMC.5. The configuration control and a defined change process for the procedures and descriptions of the site under evaluation are mandatory. The control process must include all procedures that have an impact on the evaluated production processes as well as on the site security measures.

The configuration control and a defined change process for the procedures and descriptions of the site under evaluation are mandatory. The control process must include all procedures that have an impact on the evaluated production processes as well as on the site security measures.

The life-cycle described in [6] is a complex production process. Only parts of this production process are normally provided at a specific site. In such a case the control of the product during such a production process must include sufficient verification steps to ensure the specified and expected result. Test procedures, verification procedures and the associated expected results must be under configuration management for these cases. The configuration items for the considered product type are listed in section 3.1. The CM documentation of the site is able to maintain the items listed for the relevant life-cycle step and the CM system is able to track the configuration items.

A CM system is employed to guarantee the traceability and completeness of different production charges or lots. Appropriate administration procedures are in place to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the configuration items.

### **6.1.2 Overview and Refinements regarding CM Scope (ALC\_CMS)**

The scope of the configuration management for a site certification process is limited to the documentation relevant for the SAR for the claimed life-cycle SAR and the configuration items handled at the site.

In the particular case of a Security IC the scope of the configuration management can include a number of configuration items. The configuration items already defined in section 3.1 that are considered as “TOE implementation representation” include:

- logical design data
- physical design data
- IC dedicated software
- Final physical design data

In addition, process control data, test data and related procedures and programs can be in the scope of the configuration management

### **6.1.3 Overview and Refinements regarding Delivery Procedure (ALC\_DEL)**

The CC assurance components of the family ALC\_DEL (Delivery) refer to the external delivery of (i) the TOE or parts of it (ii) to the consumer or consumer’s site (Composite TOE Manufacturer). The CC assurance component ALC\_DEL.1 requires procedures and technical measures to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the product. The means to detect

modifications and prevent any compromise of the Initialisation Data and/or Configuration Data may include supplements of the Security IC Embedded Software.

In the particular case of a Security IC more “material and information” than the TOE itself (which by definition includes the necessary guidance) is exchanged with clients or consumers. Since the TOE can be externally delivered after different life-cycle phases (phases 4 or 5) the Site Security Target must consider the data that is exchanged by the sites either as part of the product or separate as input for further production steps.

Since the assurance component ALC\_DEL.1 is only applicable to the external delivery to the consumer, the component cannot be used for internal shipment. Internal shipment is covered by ALC\_DVS.2 refer to the CEM [3], paragraph 1087, subparagraph b. However, the component ALC\_DEL.1 is included here to support the reuse of the evaluation results and to enable the justification of the evaluator on the classification of the delivery.

#### **6.1.4 Overview and Refinements regarding Development Security (ALC\_DVS)**

The CC assurance components of family ALC\_DVS refer to (i) the “development environment”, (ii) to the “TOE” or “TOE design and implementation”. The component ALC\_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures” requires additional evidence for the suitability of the security measures.

The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that the development and production of the TOE is secure so that no information is unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The confidentiality and integrity of design information, test data, configuration data and pre-personalisation data must be guaranteed, access to any kind of samples (customer specific samples or open samples) development tools and other material must be restricted to authorised persons only.

Based on these requirements the physical securities as well as the logical security of the site are in the focus of the evaluation. Beside the pure implementation of the security measures also the control and the maintenance of the security measures must be considered.

If the transfer of configuration items between two sites involved in the production flow is included in the scope of the evaluation (life-cycle covered by the product evaluation) this is considered as internal shipment. In general, the security requirements for confidentiality and integrity are the same but it must be clearly distinguished to ensure the correct subject of the evaluation.

#### **6.1.5 Overview and Refinements regarding Life-Cycle Definition (ALC\_LCD)**

The site is not equal to the entire development environment. Therefore, the ALC\_LCD criteria are interpreted in a way that only those life-cycle phases have to be evaluated which are in the scope of the site. The PP [6] provides a life-cycle description there specific life-cycles steps can be assigned to the tasks at site. This may comprise a change of the life-cycle state if e.g. testing or initialisation is performed at the site or not.



The PP [6] does not include any refinements for ALC\_LCD. The site under evaluation does not initiate a life cycle change of the intended TOE. The products are assembled and the functional devices are delivered to the client. The defective devices are returned to the client.

### 6.1.6 Overview and Refinements regarding Tools and Techniques (ALC\_TAT)

The CC assurance components of family ALC\_TAT refer to the tools that are used to develop, analyse and implement the TOE. The assurance family "Tools and Techniques" is not applicable because there is no development (in the sense of CC) performed by ASECL. The customers provide test programs, there is no software compilation performed by ASECL.

## 6.2 Security Assurance Rationale

The Security Assurance Rationale maps the content elements of the selected assurance components of [2] to the Security Objectives defined in this SST. The refinements described above are considered.

The site has a process in place to ensure an appropriate and consistent identification of the products. If the site already receives configuration items, this process is based on the assumption that the received configuration items are appropriately labeled and identified, refer to A.Item-Identification.

Note: The content elements that are changed from the original CEM [3] according to the application notes in the process description [4] are written in italic. The term TOE can be replaced by configuration items in most cases. In specific cases it is replaced by product (in the sense of "intended TOE").

Table 6.1 - Security Assurance Rationale

SARs	Objectives	Rationale
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.1C</b></p> <p>The CM documentation shall show that a process is in place to ensure an appropriate and consistent labeling.</p>	O.Config-Items	All products assembled at ASECL get a unique client part ID automatically generated by a data base as defined by O.Config-Item.



SARs	Objectives	Rationale
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.2C</b></p> <p>The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items.</p>	<p>O.Reception-Control O.Config-Item O.Config-Control O.Config-Process</p>	<p>Incoming inspection according O.Reception-Control ensures product identification and the associated labeling. This labeling is mapped to the internal identification as defined by O.Config-Item. This ensures the unique identification of security products.</p> <p>O.Config-Control ensures that each client part ID is setup and releases based on a defined process. This comprises also changes related to a client part ID. The configurations can only be done by authorised person.</p> <p>O.Config-Process provides a configured and controlled production process.</p>
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.3C</b></p> <p>The CM documentation shall justify that the acceptance procedures provide for an adequate and appropriate review of changes to all configuration items.</p>	<p>O.Reception-Control O.Config-Items O.Config-Control</p>	<p>O.Reception-Control comprises the incoming labeling and the mapping to internal identifications. O.Config-Items comprise the internal unique identification of all items that belong to a client part ID. Each product is setup according to O.Config-Control comprising all necessary items.</p>
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.4C</b></p> <p>The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.</p>	<p>O.Reception-Control O.Config-Items O.Config-Control</p>	<p>O.Reception-Control comprises the incoming labeling and the mapping to internal identifications.O.Config-Item comprises the internal unique identification of all items that belong to a client part ID. Each product is setup according to O.Config-Control comprising all necessary items.</p>



SARs	Objectives	Rationale
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.5C</b></p> <p>The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only authorised changes are made to the configuration items.</p>	<p>O.Config-Control O.Config-Process O.Logical-Access O.Logical-Operation</p>	<p>O.Config-Control assigns the setup including processes and items for the production of each client part ID. O.Config-Process comprises the control of the production processes. O.Logical-Access and O.Logical-Operation support the control by limiting the access and ensuring the correct operation for all tasks to authorised staff.</p>
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.6C</b></p> <p>The CM system shall support the production of the <i>product</i> by automated means.</p>	<p>O.Config-Process O.Zero-Balance O.Acceptance-Test</p>	<p>O.Config-Process comprises the automated management of the production processes O.Zero-Balance ensures the control of all security products during production. O.Acceptance-Test provides an automated testing of the functionality and supports the tracing.</p>
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.7C</b></p> <p>The CM system shall ensure that the person responsible for accepting a configuration item into CM is not the person who developed it.</p>	<p>O.Reception-Control O.Logical-Access</p>	<p>O.Reception-Control comprises the incoming labeling and the mapping to internal identifications for all security products. O.Logical-Access supports the control by limiting the access and ensuring the correct operation for all tasks to authorised staff.</p>
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.8C</b></p> <p>The CM system shall clearly identify the configuration items that comprise the TSF.</p>	<p>O.Config-Items O.Config-Control O.Config-Process</p>	<p>O.Config-Items comprises the internal unique identification of all items that belong to a client part ID. O.Config-Control describes the management of the client part IDs at the site. According to O.Config-Process the CM plans describe the services provided by the site.</p>



SARs	Objectives	Rationale
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.9C</b></p> <p>The CM system shall support the audit of all changes to the <i>CM items</i> by automated means, including the originator, date, and time in the audit trail.</p>	<p>O.Config-Items O.Acceptance-Test O.Config-Control O.Config-Process</p>	<p>O.Config-Items comprises the internal unique identification of all items that belong to a client part ID. O.Config-Control describes the management of the client part IDs at the site. According to O.Config-Process the CM plans describe the services provided by the site. O.Acceptance-Test provides an automated testing of the functionality and supports the tracing.</p>
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.10C</b></p> <p>The CM system shall provide an automated means to identify all other configuration items that are affected by the change of a given configuration item.</p>	<p>O.Config-Control O.Config-Process</p>	<p>O.Config-Control describes the management of the client part IDs at the site. According to O.Config-Process the CM plans describe the services provided by the site.</p>
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.11C</b></p> <p>The CM system shall be able to identify the version of the implementation representation from which the <i>wafer and dice data</i> are generated.</p>	<p>O.Reception-Control O.Logical-Access O.Config-Control O.Config-Process</p>	<p>O.Reception-Control comprises the incoming labeling and the mapping to internal identifications. O.Logical-Access supports the control by limiting the access and ensuring the correct operation for all tasks to authorised staff. O.Config-Control describes the management of the client part IDs at the site. According to O.Config- Process the CM plans describe the services provided by the site.</p>
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.12C</b></p> <p>The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.</p>	<p>O.Config-Control O.Config-Process</p>	<p>O.Config-Control describes the management of the client part IDs at the site. According to O.Config- Process the CM plans describe the services provided by the site.</p>





SARs	Objectives	Rationale
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.13C</b></p> <p>The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development of the <i>product</i>.</p>	<p>O.Config-Control O.Config-Process</p>	<p>O.Config-Control describes the management of the client part IDs at the site. According to O.Config-Process the CM plans describe the services provided by the site.</p>
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.14C</b></p> <p>The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the <i>product</i>.</p>	<p>O.Reception-Control O.Config-Items O.Config-Control O.Config-Process</p>	<p>O.Reception-Control supports the identification of configuration items at ASECL. O.Config-Items ensures the unique identification of each product produces at ASECL by the client part ID. O.Config-Control ensures a release for each new or changed client part ID. O.Config-Process ensures the automated control of released products</p>
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.15C</b></p> <p>The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system.</p>	<p>O.Reception-Control O.Config-Control O.Config-Process O.Zero-Balance O.Internal-Transport</p>	<p>The objectives O.Reception-Control, O.Config-Control, O.Config-Process ensure that only released client part IDs are produced. This is supported by O.Zero-Balance ensuring the tracing of all security products. O.Internal-Transport includes the packing requirements, the reports, logs and notifications including the required evidence.</p>
<p><b>ALC_CMC.5.16C</b></p> <p>The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items have been and are being maintained under the CM system.</p>	<p>O.Config-Control O.Config-Process</p>	<p>O.Config-Control comprises a release procedure as evidence. O.Config-Process ensures the compliance of the process.</p>



SARs	Objectives	Rationale
<p><b>ALC_CMS.5.1C</b></p> <p>The configuration list includes the following: <i>clear instructions how to consider these items in the list</i>; the evaluation evidence required by the SARs of <i>the life-cycle; development and production tools</i>; security flaw; and development tools and related information.</p>	<p>O.Config-Items O.Config-Control O.Config-Process</p>	<p>Since the process is subject of the evaluation no products are part of the configuration list. O.Config-Items ensure unique part IDs including a list of all items and processes for this part. O.Config-Control describes the release process for each client part ID. O.Config-Process defined the configuration control including part IDs, procedures and processes.</p>
<p><b>ALC_CMS.5.2C</b></p> <p>The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.</p>	<p>O.Config-Items O.Config-Control O.Config-Process O.Reception-Control O.Internal-Transport</p>	<p>Items, products and processes are uniquely identified by the data base system according to O.Config-Items. Within the production process the unique identification is supported by automated tools according to O.Config-Control and O.Config- Process. The identification of received products is defined by O.Reception-Control. The labeling and preparation for the transport is defined by O.Internal-Transport.</p>
<p><b>ALC_CMS.5.3C</b></p> <p>For each <i>//</i> configuration item, the configuration list shall indicate the developer/<i>subcontractor</i> of the item.</p> <p><i>//</i> is indicated that “TSF relevant” has been deleted.</p>	<p>O.Config-Items</p>	<p>ASECL does not involve subcontractors for the assembly of security products. According to O.Config-Item all configuration items for secure products are identified.</p>



SARs	Objectives	Rationale
<p><b>ALC_DVS.2.1C</b></p> <p>The development security documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development environment.</p>	<p>O.Physical-Access  O.Security-Control  O.Alarm-Response  O.Logical-Access  O.Logical-Operation  O.Staff-Engagement  O.Maintain-Security  O.Control-Scrap</p>	<p>The physical protection is provided by O.Physical-Access, supported by O.Security-Control, O.Alarm-Response, and O.Maintain-Security. The logical protection of data and the configuration management is provided by O.Logical-Access and O.Logical-Operation. The personnel security measures are provided by O.Staff-Engagement. Any scrap that may support an attacker is controlled according to O.Control-Scrap.</p>



SARs	Objectives	Rationale
<p><b>ALC_DVS.2.2C</b></p> <p>The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the <i>product</i>.</p>	<p>O.Internal-Monitor  O.Logical-Operation  O.Maintain-Security  O.Zero-Balance  O.Acceptance-Test  O.Reception-Control  O.Internal-Transport  O.Data-Transfer</p>	<p>The security measures described above under ALC_DVS.2.1C are commonly regarded as effective protection if they are correctly implemented and enforced. The associated control and continuous justification is subject of the objectives O.Internal-Monitor, O.Logical-Operation and O.Maintain-Security. All devices including functional and non-functional are traced according to O.Zero-Balance. O.Acceptance-Test supports the integrity control by testing of the finished products. The reception and incoming inspection supports the detection of attacks during the transport of the security products to ASECL according to O.Reception-Control. The delivery to the client is protected by similar measures according to the requirements of the client based on O.Internal-Transport. Sensitive data received by ASECL as well as sensitive data sent by ASECL is encrypted according O.Data-Transfer to ensure access by authorised recipients only.</p>
<p><b>ALC_DVS.2.3C</b></p>	<p>./.</p>	<p>Not applicable due to [5], chapter 3.</p>
<p><b>ALC_LCD.1.1C:</b></p> <p>The lifecycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop and maintain the TOE.</p>	<p>O.Config-Control  O.Config-Process</p>	<p>The processes used for identification and manufacturing are covered by O.Config-Control and O.Config-Process.</p>



SARs	Objectives	Rationale
<b>ALC_LCD.1.2C:</b> The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the TOE.	O.Acceptance-Test O.Config-Process O.Zero-Balance	The site does not perform development tasks. The applied production process is controlled according to O.Config-Process, the finished client parts are tested according O.Acceptance-Test and all security products are traced according O.Zero-Balance.

Since this SST references the PP [6], the life-cycle module used in this PP includes also the processes provided by this site. Therefore the life-cycle module described in the PP [6] is considered to be applicable for this site. The ALC\_TAT.3 security assurance requirement is related to the usage of well-defined development tools that yield consistent and predictable results and whether implementation standards have been applied. The performed production steps do not involve source code, design tools, compilers or other tools used to build the security product (intended TOE). However the ALC\_TAT.3 is included here to support the reuse of the evaluation results and to enable the justification of the evaluators regarding ALC\_TAT.3

The site always returns the security products back to the client that provided the security products for the assembly. ASECL is always involved as subcontractor. There is no delivery of security products directly to the customer regarding the next life cycle step. Therefore the transport of security products is always considered as internal transport.

## 7 Site Summary Specification

The Site summary specification describes aspects of how the Site meets the SARs.

### 7.1 Preconditions Required by the Site

This section provides background information on the assumptions defined in section 3.4. These assumptions can be seen as guidance for the client regarding the information and deliverables which are needed to allow the production under conditions described in this Site Security Target.

The following deliverables are required to provide the services as described above according to the evaluated processes:

- wafers or sawn wafers(dice)
- product description required for the assembly process
- identification for the tracking of the tracing of the products
- guidance, scripts, data and related keys for the pre-personalisation process if the optional pre-personalisation is requested by the client
- address of the recipient and verification procedure of the forwarder
- if requested, specific tapes or labels used for the shipment of the finished products
- processing of rejected, defect and obsolete security products.

For the setup of the production process, the relevant specifications and product information is required by ASECL. In general, the release process can only be finished, if the required information is provided by the client and the samples are approved by the client. Based on the provided specifications also the tests are configured. The test environment allows functional tests to verify the operation after completion of the assembly. The production at ASECL is released after the client accepted the initial sample lot produced by ASECL. Therefore each client is in charge for the verification of his products based on the sample lot provided by ASECL.

The release process for the optional pre-personalisation process comprises a verification of the initialised products by the client. During the product set up at ASECL samples initialized based on the delivered pre-personalisation guidance, scripts, data and related keys are returned to the client for verification purpose. Only if the client confirms the correct pre-personalisation the product is released at ASECL.

It is assumed, that the self-protection features of the wafers and dice are fully operational during production.

ASECL has procedures in place to protect and maintain classified products and properties of the clients. The protection is based on the classification agreed with the client or printed on the received item or document. This comprises also the pre-personalisation data that is maintained as configuration item related to a product. For all classified items appropriate destruction procedures are in place. The rejected, defect or obsolete security products are returned to the client.



ASECL is not responsible for any transport outside their premises. The client is responsible for delivery and transfer of the products. This comprises the selection of the forwarder and the provision of data for the verification of the transport order. Any transport from or to the site is under the control of the clients. The shipping after the production is supported by labeling and packaging the finished products. The products are labeled and packed as specified by the client. This includes the address of the receiver. There can be further client specific assets like seals, special transport protection or similar items that support the security of the internal shipment to the client. They are handled in the same way as the other assets to prevent misuse, disclosure or loss of these sensitive items or information. The forwarder is selected by the client. ASECL verifies the identity of the car and the driver based on the provided pre-announcement by the client before any charge is handed over. The pre-announcement is performed for each transport. The tracing and further control is under the responsibility of the client.

The secure process data transfer for all kind of data are summarised in the document named "NPI Checklist" [7]. This document shall be handed to the client for following.

## 7.2 Services of the Site

Each product set up at ASECL gets a unique customer part ID (client parts). This part ID is linked with the security device that is assembled in the product.

The processes for assembly, testing and acceptance are set up at ASECL according to the specifications provided by the client (e.g. bond plan, module specification, test specification and packing requirements if applicable). For the release a sample lot is produced at the site.

The complete product specific flow includes a functional test of each product as part of the acceptance process that include e.g. digital testing, mixed-signal testing (digital and analog), RF testing. The functional tests are either developed by ASECL based on the test specification and electrical parameters/limits provided by the client or the test program provided by the client is integrated in the test environment of ASECL. Test programs provided by the client must be dedicated for the test tools used at ASECL.

The pre-personalisation of the products assembled at the premises is an optional service of ASECL. The pre-personalisation is done using scripts, data and keys provided by the client. The items used for the pre-personalisation are treated as assets. ASECL provides a standardised environment for the processing of the scripts. The implemented setup ensures the correct assignment between products and associated scripts, data and keys during the pre-personalisation process. Pre-personalisation data supplied by the client is injected into the non-volatile memory. These data are for instance used for traceability and/or to secure shipment between phases of production.

ASECL has a standard procedure for packing of finished products and preparation of shipment. If special packing requirements are provided by the client they are included in the process setup. The client is alerted if products are ready for transport because the transport must be organised by the client. Based on the alert the client provides information on the forwarder that is used for the verification of the forwarder before the handover of the products.

Defective or rejected products will be returned to the client.

### 7.3 Objectives Rationale

Table 7.1 provides an overview for the correspondence between Security objectives of the TOE / environment listed in chapter 4.1 / 4.2 to the threats and policies identified in chapter 3.2 and 3.3, and demonstrating that all threats and OSP are mapped to at least one security objective. The following chapters provide a more detailed explanation of this mapping.

Table 7.1 – Mappings between the Security Objectives, and Threats / OSP

Threats / OSPs \ Security Objectives	O.Physical-Access	O.Security-Control	O.Alarm-Response	O.Internal-Monitor	O.Maintain-Security	O.Logical-Access	O.Logical-Operation	O.Config-Items	O.Config-Control	O.Config-Process	O.Acceptance-Test	O.Staff-Engagement	O.Zero-Balance	O.Reception-Control	O.Internal-Transport	O.Data-Transfer	O.Control-Scrap
T.Smart-Theft	X	X	X	X	X												
T.Rugged-Theft	X	X	X	X	X												
T.Computer-Net				X	X	X	X					X					
T.Accident-Change						X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
T.Unauthorised-Staff	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X			X	X				X
T.Staff-Collusion				X	X							X	X			X	X
T.Attack-Transport															X	X	
P.Config-Items								X						X			
P.Config-Control						X		X	X								
P.Config-Process										X							
P.Reception-Control														X			
P.Accept-Product									X	X	X						
P.Zero-Balance				X								X	X				X
P.Transport-Prep								X		X					X		
P.Data-Transfer																X	
P.Secure-Scrap		X											X				X

The following rationale provides a justification that shows that all threats and OSP are effectively addressed by the Security Objectives of ASECL site.





### **O.Physical-Access**

The plant is surrounded by a fence and controlled by CCTV. The access to the building is only possible via access controlled doors. The locking of the gate, the enabling of the alarm system and the additional external control are graduated according to the running operation at the site. This considers the manpower per shift as well as the operational needs regarding receipt and delivery of goods. The physical, technical and organisational security measures ensure a separation of the site into three security levels. The access control ensures that only registered persons can access sensitive areas. This is supported by O.Security-Control that includes the maintenance of the access control and the control of visitors. The physical security measures are supported by O.Alarm-Response providing an alarm system.

Thereby the threats T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft can be prevented. The physical security measures together with the security measure provided by O.Security-Control enforce the recording of all actions. Thereby also T.Unauthorised-Staff is addressed.

### **O.Security-Control**

During working hours the employees monitor the site and surveillance system. During off-hours the guard and the alarm system are used to monitor the site. The CCTV system supports these measures because it is always enabled. Further on the security control is supported by O.Physical-Access requiring different level of access control for the access to security product during operation as well as during off-hours.

This addresses the threats T.Smart-Theft and T.Rugged-Theft. Supported by O.Maintain-Security and O.Physical-Access also an internal attacker triggers the security measures implemented by O.Security-Control. Therefore also the Threat T.Unauthorised-Staff is addressed.

### **O.Alarm-Response**

During working hours the employees monitor the alarm system. During off-hours additional guard patrol supports the alarm system. O.Physical-Access requires certain time to overcome the different level of access control. The response time of the guard and the physical resistance match to provide an effective alarm response.

This addresses the threats T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft and T.Unauthorised-Staff

### **O.Internal-Monitor**

Regular security management meetings are implemented to monitor security incidences as well as changes or updates of security relevant systems and processes. This comprises also logs and security events of security relevant systems like Firewall, Virus protection and access control. Major changes of security systems and security procedures are reviewed in general management systems review meetings. Upon introduction of a new process a formal review and release for mass production is made before being generally introduced.



This addresses T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorisd-Staff, T.Staff-Collusion and the OSP P.Zero-Balance

### **O.Maintain-Security**

The security relevant systems enforcing or supporting O.Physical-Access, O.Security- control and O.Logical-Access are checked and maintained regularly by the suppliers. In addition the configuration is updated as required either by employees (for the access control system) of the supplier. Logging files are checked for technical problems and specific maintenance requests.

This addresses T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff and T.Staff-Collusion

### **O.Logical-Access**

The internal network is separated from the internet with a firewall. The internal network is further separated into sub-networks by internal firewalls. These firewalls allow only authorised information exchange between the internal sub-networks. Each user is logging into the system with his personalised user name and password. The objective is supported by O.Internal-Monitor based on the checks of the logging regarding security relevant events.

The individual accounts are addressing T.Computer-Net. All configurations are stored in the database of the internal system. Supported by O.Config-Items this addresses the threats T.Accident-Change and T.Unauthorised-Staff and the OSP P.Config-Control.

### **O.Logical-Operation**

All logical protection measures are maintained and updated Critical items such as virus scanners are updated daily. The backup is sufficiently protected and is only accessible for the administration.

This addresses the threats T.Computer-Net and T.Unauthorised-Staff

### **O.Config-Items**

All product configuration information is stored in the database of the internal system. The information stored is covering used materials, process specifications, acceptance test instructions and specifications, test programs and packing instructions. Products are identified by unique customer part IDs which are linked to the unique ID numbers of the associated configuration items.

This is addressing the threat T.Accident-Change and the OSP P.Config-Items, P.Config-Control



### **O.Config-Control**

Procedures arrange for a formal release of specifications and test programs based on an engineering run. The information is also stored in the configuration database. Engineering Change Procedures are in place to classify and introduce changes. ASECL's internal system requires personalised access controlled by passwords. Each user has access rights limited to the needs of his function. Thereby only authorised changes are possible.

Supported by O.Config-Items this addresses the threat T.Unauthorised-Staff and the OSP P.Config-Control, P.Accept-Product

### **O.Config-Process**

The released configuration information including production and acceptance specifications is automatically copied to every work order. The test program is automatically loaded to the test machine according to the configuration information of the work order.

This addresses the threat T.Accident-Change and the OSP P.Config-Process, P.Accept-Product and P.Transport-Prep.

### **O.Acceptance-Test**

Acceptance tests are introduced and released based on the customer approval. The tools, specifications and procedures for these tests are controlled by the means of O.config- Items and O.Config-Control. Acceptance test results are logged and linked to a work order in ASECL's internal system.

This addresses the threat T.Accident-Change and the OSP P.Accept-Product.

### **O.Staff-Engagement**

All employees are interviewed before hiring. They must sign an NDA and a code of conduct for the use of computers before they start working in the company. The formal training and qualification includes security relevant subjects and the principles of handling and storage of security products. The security objectives O.Physical-Access, O.Logical- Access and O.Config-Items support the engagement of the staff.

This addresses the threats T.Computer-Net, T.Accident-Change, T.Unauthorised-Staff, T.Staff-Collusion and the OSP P.Zero-Balance

### **O.Zero-Balance**

Products are uniquely identified throughout the whole process. Further on the amount of functional and non-functional dice on a wafer and for a production order is known. Handover and storage of security products is controlled by the 4-eyes principle and documented. Re-jects are following the good products thru the whole production process. At every process step the registration of good and rejected products is updated. Before a production order is closed a zero balance calculation is documenting the history of good and bad parts of this



order. This security objective is supported by O.Physical-Access, O.Config-Items and O.Staff-Engagement.

This addresses the threats T.Accident-Change, T.Unauthorised-Staff, T.Staff-Collusion and the OSP P.Zero-Balance.

### **O.Reception-Control**

At reception each configuration item including security products are identified by the shipping documents, packaging labels and information in ASECL internal system based on shipment alerts from the customers and supported by O.Config-Items. If a product cannot be identified it is put on hold in a secure storage. Inspection at reception is counting the amount of boxes and checking the integrity of security seals of these boxes if applicable. Thereby only correctly identified products are released for production.

The OSPs P.Config-Items and P.Reception-Control are addressed by the reception control.

### **O.Internal-Transport**

The recipient of a production lot is linked to the work order in the ASECL internal system and can only be modified by authorised users. Packing procedures are documented in the product configuration. This includes specific requirement of the client. This security objective is supported by O.Staff-Engagement and O.Config-Items.

The threat T.Attack-Transport and the OSP P.Transport-Prep are addressed by the internal transport.

### **O.Data-Transfer**

The confidentiality and integrity of the data transfer from/to the site, specifically test program, test procedure data and within the site is ensured by appropriate secure measures. The secure measures include using secure transfer protocol during transfer and encryption on sensitive information within the site.

Supported by O.Logical-Access and O.Staff-engagement this addresses the threats T.Staff-Collusion and T.Attack-Transport as well as the OSP P.Transport-Prep and P.Data-Transfer.

### **O. Control-Scrap**

Scrap is identified and handled in the same way as functional devices.

For all classified items appropriate destruction procedures are in place. The rejected, defect or obsolete security products are returned to the client. Sensitive information and information storage media are managed in a secure way and destructed with a documented process.

Supported by O. Physical-Access and O. Staff-Engagement, this addresses the threats T. Unauthorized-Staff and T. Staff-Collusion and the OSP P. Zero-Balancing.

## 7.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The Security Assurance Rationale is given in section 6.2. This rationale addresses all content elements and thereby also implicitly all the developer action elements defined in [2]. Therefore the following Security Assurance Requirements rationale provides the justification for the selected Security Assurance Requirements. In general the selected Security Assurance Requirements fulfil the needs derived from the Protection Profile [6]. Because they are compliant with the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL6 all derived dependencies are fulfilled.

The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) are:

Class ALC: Life-cycle support

CM capabilities (ALC\_CMC.5)

CM scope (ALC\_CMS.5)

Delivery (ALC\_DEL.1)

Development security (ALC\_DVS.2)

Life-cycle definition (ALC\_LCD.1)

Tools and techniques (ALC\_TAT.3)

### 7.4.1 ALC\_CMC.5

**Content and presentation elements:**

**ALC\_CMC.5.1C** The CM documentation shall show that a process is in place to ensure an appropriate and consistent labeling.

**ALC\_CMC.5.2C** The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items.

**ALC\_CMC.5.3C** The CM documentation shall justify that the acceptance procedures provide for an adequate and appropriate review of changes to all configuration items.

**ALC\_CMC.5.4C** The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.

**ALC\_CMC.5.5C** The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only authorised changes are made to the configuration items.

**ALC\_CMC.5.6C** The CM system shall support the production of the *product* by automated means.

**ALC\_CMC.5.7C** The CM system shall ensure that the person responsible for accepting a configuration item into CM is not the person who developed it.

**ALC\_CMC.5.8C** The CM system shall clearly identify the configuration items that comprise the TSF.

**ALC\_CMC.5.9C** The CM system shall support the audit of all changes to the *CM items* by automated means, including the originator, date, and time in the audit trail.

**ALC\_CMC.5.10C** The CM system shall provide an automated means to identify all other configuration items that are affected by the change of a given configuration item.



**ALC\_CMC.5.11C** The CM system shall be able to identify the version of the implementation representation from which the *wafer, dice and mask data* are generated.

**ALC\_CMC.5.12C** The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.

**ALC\_CMC.5.13C** The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development of the *product*

**ALC\_CMC.5.14C** The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the *product*.

**ALC\_CMC.5.15C** The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system.

**ALC\_CMC.5.16C** The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items have been and are being maintained under the CM system.

The chosen assurance level ALC\_CMC.5 of the assurance family "CM capabilities" is suitable to support the production of high volumes due to the formalized acceptance process and the automated support. The identification of all configuration items supports an automated and industrialised production process. The requirement for authorised changes support the integrity and confidentiality required for the products. Therefore these security assurance requirements meet the requirements for the configuration management.

## 7.4.2 ALC\_CMS.5

### Content and presentation elements:

**ALC\_CMS.5.1C** The configuration list includes the following: *clear instructions how to consider these items in the list*; the evaluation evidence required by the SARs of the *life-cycle; development and production tools*; security flaw; and development tools and related information. The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.

**ALC\_CMS.5.2C** The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

**ALC\_CMS.5.3C** For each *//* configuration item, the configuration list shall indicate the developer/*subcontractor* of the item.

*//* is indicated that "TSF relevant" has been deleted.

The chosen assurance level ALC\_CMS.5 of the assurance family "CM scope" supports the control of the production and test environment. This includes product related documentation and data as well as the documentation for the configuration management and the site security measures. Since the site certification process focuses on the processes based on the absence of a concrete TOE these security assurance requirements are considered to be suitable.



### 7.4.3 ALC\_DVS.2

#### Content and presentation elements:

**ALC\_DVS.2.1C** The development security documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development environment.

**ALC\_DVS.2.2C** The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the *product*.

The chosen assurance level ALC\_DVS.2 of the assurance family "Development security" is required since a high attack potential is assumed for potential attackers. The configuration items and information handled at the site during production, assembly and testing of the product can be used by potential attackers for the development of attacks. Therefore the handling and storage of these items must be sufficiently protected. Further on the Protection Profile [6] requires this protection for sites involved in the life-cycle of Security ICs development and production.

### 7.4.4 ALC\_LCD.1

#### Content and presentation elements:

**ALC\_LCD.1.1C** The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop and maintain the TOE.

**ALC\_LCD.1.2C** The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the TOE.

The chosen assurance level ALC\_LCD.1 of the assurance family "Life-cycle definition" is suitable to support the controlled development and production process. This includes the documentation of these processes and the procedures for the configuration management. Because the site provides only a limited support of the described life-cycle for the development and production of Security ICs the focus is limited to this site. However the assurance requirements are considered to be suitable to support the application of the site evaluation results for the evaluation of an intended TOE.

### 7.4.5 ALC\_DEL.1

#### Content and presentation elements:

**ALC\_DEL.1.1C** The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to the consumer.



The assurance family "Delivery" is not applicable because the products are returned to the client and this is considered as internal delivery.

### 7.4.6 ALC\_TAT.3

#### Content and presentation elements:

**ALC\_TAT.3.1C** Each development tool used for implementation shall be well-defined.

**ALC\_TAT.3.2C** The documentation of the development tool shall unambiguously define the meaning of all statements used in the implementation.

**ALC\_TAT.3.3C** The documentation of the development tool shall unambiguously define the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.

The security assurance requirements of the assurance class "Tools and Techniques" listed above shall support the secure development and optimization of the test programs. But all of test programs will be provided by customer. ASECL will not develop, analysis or debug any test program. The assurance family "Tools and Techniques" is not applicable.

## 7.5 Assurance Measure Rationale

### O.Physical-Access

ALC\_DVS.2.1C requires that the developer shall describe all physical security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development environment. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

### O.Security-Control

ALC\_DVS.2.1C requires that the developer shall describe all personnel, procedural and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development and production environment. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

### O.Alarm-Response

ALC\_DVS.2.1C requires that the developer shall describe all personnel, procedural and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation including the initialization in its development and production environment. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

### O.Internal-Monitor

ALC\_DVS.2.2C: The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary





level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the product. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

### **O.Maintain-Security**

ALC\_DVS.2.1C: requires that the developer shall describe all personnel, procedural and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design, implementation and in its development and production environment. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective

ALC\_DVS.2.2C: The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the product. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

### **O.Logical-Access**

ALC\_DVS.2.1C requires that the developer shall describe all personnel, procedural and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design, implementation and in its development and production environment. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

ALC\_CMC.5.5C requires that the CM system provides automated measures so that only authorised changes are made to the configuration items. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

ALC\_CMC.5.7C requires the CM system shall ensure that the person responsible for accepting a configuration item into CM is not the person who developed it. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

ALC\_CMC.5.11C requires the CM system shall be able to identify the version of the implementation representation from which the TOE is generated. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

### **O.Logical-Operation**

ALC\_DVS.2.1C: requires that the developer shall describe all personnel, procedural and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design, implementation and in its development and production environment. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

ALC\_DVS.2.2C: The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the product. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

ALC\_CMC.5.5C requires that the CM system provides automated measures so that only authorised changes are made to the configuration items. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.



## O.Config-Items

ALC\_CMC.5.1C requires a documented process ensuring an appropriate and consistent labeling of the products. A method used to uniquely identify the configuration items is required by ALC\_CMC.5.2C.

ALC\_CMC.5.3C requires an adequate and appropriate review of changes to all configuration items. In addition ALC\_CMC.5.4C requires that the CM system uniquely identifies all configuration items.

ALC\_CMC.5.8C requires the CM system shall identify the configuration items that comprise the TSF.

ALC\_CMC.5.9C requires the CM system shall support the audit of all changes to the TOE by automated means, including the originator, date, and time in the audit trail.

ALC\_CMC.5.14C requires that the CM plan describes the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the TOE. The configuration list required by ALC\_CMS.5.1C shall include the evaluation evidence for the fulfilment of the SARs, development tools and related information.

ALC\_CMS.5.2C addresses the same requirement as ALC\_CMC.5.4C.

ALC\_CMS.5.3C requires that the developer of each TSF relevant configuration item is indicated in the configuration list. Thereby these SARs are suitable to meet the security objective.

## O.Config-Control

ALC\_CMC.5.2C requires a CM documentation that describes the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items.

ALC\_CMC.5.3C requires an adequate and appropriate review of changes to all configuration items.

ALC\_CMC.5.4C requires a unique identification of all configuration items by the CM system.

ALC\_CMC.5.5C requires that the CM system provides automated measures so that only authorised changes are made to the configuration items.

ALC\_CMC.5.8C requires the CM system shall identify the configuration items that comprise the TSF.

ALC\_CMC.5.9C requires the CM system shall support the audit of all changes to the TOE by automated means, including the originator, date, and time in the audit trail.

ALC\_CMC.5.10C requires the CM system shall provide an automated means to identify all other configuration items that are affected by the change of a given configuration item.

ALC\_CMC.5.11C requires the CM system shall be able to identify the version of the implementation representation from which the TOE is generated.

ALC\_CMC.5.12C requires a CM documentation that includes a CM plan.

ALC\_CMC.5.13C requires that the CM plan describes how the CM system is used for the development of the TOE.

ALC\_CMC.5.14C requires the description of the procedures used to accept modified or new-



ly created configuration items as part of the TOE.

ALC\_CMC.5.15C requests evidence demonstrating that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system.

ALC\_CMC.5.16C requires that the evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items have been and are being maintained under the CM system. The configuration list required by ALC\_CMS.5.1C shall include the evaluation evidence for the fulfilment of the SARs, development tools and related information.

ALC\_CMS.5.2C addresses the same requirement as ALC\_CMC.5.4C. In addition ALC\_LCD.1.1C requires that the life-cycle definition documentation describes the model used to develop and maintain the products.

### **O.Config-Process**

ALC\_CMC.5.2C requires a CM documentation that describes the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items. The provision of automated measures such that only authorised changes is made to the configuration items as required by ALC\_CMC.5.5C. ALC\_CMC.5.6C requires that the CM system supports the production by automated means. ALC\_CMC.5.8C requires the CM system shall identify the configuration items that comprise the TSF.

ALC\_CMC.5.9C requires the CM system shall support the audit of all changes to the TOE by automated means, including the originator, date, and time in the audit trail.

ALC\_CMC.5.10C requires the CM system shall provide an automated means to identify all other configuration items that are affected by the change of a given configuration item. ALC\_CMC.5.11C requires the CM system shall be able to identify the version of the implementation representation from which the TOE is generated.

ALC\_CMC.5.12C requires that the CM documentation includes a CM plan.

ALC\_CMC.5.13C requires that the CM plan describe how the CM system is used for the development of the TOE.

ALC\_CMC.5.14C requires the description of the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the TOE.

ALC\_CMC.5.15C requests evidence showing that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system.

ALC\_CMC.5.16C requires that the evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items have been and are being maintained under the CM system. The configuration list required by ALC\_CMS.5.1C shall include the evaluation evidence for the fulfilment of the SARs, development tools and related information.

ALC\_CMS.5.2C addresses the same requirement as ALC\_CMC.5.4C.

ALC\_LCD.1.1C requires that the life-cycle definition documentation describes the model used to develop and maintain the products.

ALC\_LCD.1.2C requires control over the development and maintenance of the TOE. The objective meets the set of Security Assurance Requirements.



### **O.Acceptance-Test**

The testing of the products is considered as automated procedure as required by ALC\_CMC.5.6C. ALC\_CMC.5.9C requires the CM system shall support the audit of all changes to the TOE by automated means, including the originator, date, and time in the audit trail. In addition ALC\_LCD.1.2C requires control over the development and maintenance of the TOE. ALC\_DVS.2.2C requires security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the product during production. Thereby these SARs are suitable to meet the security objective.

### **O.Staff-Engagement**

ALC\_DVS.2.1C requires the description of personnel security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development environment. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

### **O.Zero-Balance**

ALC\_CMC.5.6C requires that the CM system supports the production of the TOE by automated means. ALC\_CMC.5.15C requires evidence demonstrating that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system. ALC\_DVS.2.2C requires security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the product. ALC\_LCD.1.2C requires control over the development and maintenance of the TOE. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

### **O.Reception-Control**

ALC\_CMC.5.2C requires a CM documentation that describes the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items. ALC\_CMC.5.3C requires an adequate and appropriate review of changes to all configuration items. ALC\_CMC.5.4C requires a unique identification of all configuration items by the CM system. ALC\_CMC.5.7C requires the CM system shall ensure that the person responsible for accepting a configuration item into CM is not the person who developed it.

ALC\_CMC.5.11C requires the CM system shall be able to identify the version of the implementation representation from which the TOE is generated. ALC\_CMC.5.14C requires the description of the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the TOE. ALC\_CMC.5.15C requests evidence to demonstrate that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system. ALC\_CMS.5.2C addresses the same requirement as ALC\_CMC.5.4C. ALC\_DVS.2.2C requires security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the product during the transfer between sites.

Thereby these SARs are suitable to meet the security objective.



### **O.Internal-Transport**

ALC\_DVS.2.2C requires that the evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the product. This includes also the protection during the transport between production sides. ALC\_CMC.5.15C requests evidence to demonstrate that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

### **O.Data-Transfer**

ALC\_DVS.2.2C: The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the product. This includes also the protection during the transport between production sides. Thereby this SAR is suitable to meet the security objective.

### **O. Control-Scrap**

ALC\_DVS.2.1C requires physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are implemented to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation. Thereby this objective is suitable to meet the Security Assurance Requirement.



## 7.6 Mapping of the Evaluation Documentation

The scope of the evaluation according to the assurance class ALC comprises the processing and handling of security products and the complete documentation of the site provided for the evaluation. The specifications and descriptions provided by the client are not part of the configuration management at ASECL

The mapping between the internal site documentation and the Security Assurance Requirements is only available within the full version of the Site Security Target.

## 8 Reference

### 8.1 Literature

The following documentation was used to prepare this SST:

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
- [2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
- [3] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology; Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
- [4] Supporting Document, Site Certification, Version 1.0, Revision 1, CCDB-2007-11-001, October 2007,
- [5] Guidance for Site Certification, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Version 1.1 , 2013-12-04
- [6] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmented Packages (BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014), Version 1.0, Eurosmart, 2014
- [7] NPI Checklist, CODE:94-31-0000-0072/10/02, version Q, October 27, 2015.

### 8.2 Definitions

- Client**            The term “client” is used in this SST to denote the IC manufacturer, which is a customer of ASECL (ASECL operates as a wafer assembly and testing for the IC manufacturer).
- Consumer**        The term “consumer” is used in this SST to denote the customer of the IC manufacturer, which the finished and functionally tested ICs are delivered to.

### 8.3 Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this SST:

Table 8.1 – Abbreviations Table

Term	Definition
ASECL	Advanced Semiconductor Engineering Inc. ChungLi Factory
CC	Common Criteria
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
IC	Integrated Circuit



IT	Information Technology
OSP	Organisational Security Policy
PP	Protection Profile
QA	Quality Assurance
RDL	Redistribution Layer
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SST	Site Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
Wafer IQA	Wafer Incoming Quality Assurance