

**Site Security Target Lite NXP San Jose**Security Management  
BU Security & Connectivity

# NXPOMS-1719007347-2659a

## Site Security Target Lite NXP San Jose

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## 1. Document Introduction

### 1.1 Reference

Title: Site Security Target Lite NXP San Jose

Version: 1.1

Date: 11<sup>th</sup> December 2018

Company: NXP Semiconductors

Name of site: NXP San Jose

EAL: SARs taken from EAL6

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## 2. SST Introduction

1 This document is based upon the Eurosmart Site Security Target Template [1] with adaptations such that it fits the site (i.e. development site, no production, no direct delivery to customers of the user of the site).

### 2.1 SST Reference

2 Title Site Security Target Lite NXP San Jose

3 Version 1.1

### 2.2 Site Reference

4 The site belongs to NXP and is located at:

5 411 East Plumeria Drive

6 San Jose, CA 95134

7 United States

### 2.3 Site Description

8 The site is a single building location with two (2) floors occupied by NXP Semiconductors. The entire site is in-scope for this SST.

9 This development areas are a Yellow RS (Restricted Security) and Red HS (High Security). These are exclusively occupied by NXP with restricted need to know access controlled by NXP for authorize personnel only. These areas are compliant with;

[10] 'Minimum Site Requirements v2.1'

[11] Eurosmart Protection Profile.

10

11 Within the development area, only members of the development team are entitled to access sensitive information i.e. source code, confidential documentation, etc.



The activities are: Security IC Embedded Software Development (Phase 1), IC Embedded Software and Testing (Phase 1), IC Design (Phase 2), IC Dedicated Software and Testing (Phase 1) as defined in 'Security IC Platform Protection Profile' (PP-0035) and 'Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages' (PP-0084)

Activity	Area
Development and testing* of software for secure integrated circuits.	F8-x/F9-x/F17-x/G7-x/G8-x/G9-x/G14-x/G16-x/G17-x/G18-x/H14-x/H18-x
Secure integrated circuits hardware development and testing* .	F9-x/F16-x/F17-x/G8-x/G14-x/G15-x/G16-x/H14-x/H15-x  "x" refers to a specific cube number. The listed cubes are surrounded by a common wall, but this room has no separate ID.

\* Through simulation or remotely on physical objects at another site.

- 12 The site is used by NXP Business Unit Security & Connectivity (BU S&C) to participate in the development and testing of secure IC hardware products and their software<sup>1</sup>. To perform its activities the site uses the NXP provided remote IT-infrastructure and local IT equipment (workstations, router) and works according to BU S&C processes.

<sup>1</sup> 'Software' means in this case: IC Embedded Software Development (Phase 1) and/or IC Dedicated Software Development (Phase 2) as defined in 'Security IC Platform Protection Profile' (PP-0035) and 'Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages' (PP-0084).

### 3. Conformance Claim

13 This SST is conformant with Common Criteria Version 3.1:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, [2]
- Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1, 4, September 2012, [3]

14 For the evaluation, the following methodology will be used:

- Common Methodology for Information Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology; Version 3.1, 4, September 2012, [4]

15 This SST is CC Part 3 conformant.

16 The evaluation of the site comprises the following assurance components<sup>2</sup>:

17 ALC\_CMC.5, ALC\_CMS.5, ALC\_DVS.2, ALC\_LCD.1, and ALC\_TAT.3.

18 The assurance level chosen for the SST is compliant to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [5] and is therefore suitable for the evaluation of (software for) Security ICs.

19 The chosen assurance components are derived from the assurance level EAL6 of the assurance class "Life-cycle Support". For the assessment of the security measures attackers with a high attack potential are assumed. Therefore this site supports potentially augmented product evaluations up to EAL6.

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<sup>2</sup> The activities of the site are not directly related to production and shipping of secure products. Therefore this site does not claim conformance to ALC\_DEL.

## 4. Security Problem Definition

20 The Security Problem Definition comprises security problems derived from threats against the assets handled by the site.

21 Where necessary the items in this section have been re-worked to fit the site

### 4.1 Assets

22 The following section describes the assets handled at the site.

Development data: The site has access to (and optionally copies thereof) electronic development data (specifications, guidance documentation, source code, etc) in relation to developed TOEs. Both the integrity and the confidentiality of these electronic documents must be protected.

Development computers: To perform its development activities the site uses tools (e.g. compiler) to transform source code (and potentially the libraries that come with these tools) into binaries. The integrity of these tools (running on local or remote development computers) must be protected.

Physical security objects: The site has physical security objects (samples, printed documents, etc) in relation to developed TOEs. Both the integrity and the confidentiality of these must be protected.

### 4.2 Threats

T.Smart-Theft: An attacker tries to access sensitive areas of the site for manipulation or theft of assets

(1) In this case development data with the intention to violate confidentiality and possibly integrity

(2) Physical security objects in the form of printed documentation

(3) Development Tools in the form of IT infrastructure hardware.

The attacker has sufficient time to investigate the site outside the controlled boundary. For the attack the use of standard equipment for burglary is considered.

- T.Rugged-Theft:** An attacker with specialized equipment for burglary, who may be paid to perform the attack, tries to access sensitive areas and manipulate or steal assets (1) In this case development data with the intention to violate confidentiality and possibly integrity (2) Physical security objects in the form of printed documentation or engineering samples (3) Development Tools in the form of IT infrastructure hardware.
- T.Computer-Net:** A possibly paid hacker with substantial expertise using standard equipment attempts to remotely access sensitive network segments to get access to (1) development data with the intention to violate confidentiality and possibly integrity or (2) development computers with the intention to modify the development process.
- T.Unauthorised-Staff:** Employees or subcontractors not authorized to get access to assets by violating (1) In this case development data with the intention to violate confidentiality and possibly integrity (2) Physical security objects in the form of printed documentation or engineering samples (3) Development Tools in the form of IT infrastructure hardware.
- T.Staff-Collusion:** An attacker tries to get access to assets by getting support from one employee through extortion or bribery. (1) In this case development data with the intention to violate confidentiality and possibly integrity (2) Physical security objects in the form of printed documentation or engineering samples (3) Development Tools in the form of IT infrastructure hardware.
- T.Attack-Transport:** An attacker tries to get access to shipped physical security objects when shipped in or out of the site with the intention to compromise confidentiality and/or integrity of the product design data, customer and/or consumer data like code and data (including personalization data and/or keys) stored in the ROM and/or EEPROM or classified product documentation.

### 4.3 Organizational Security Policies

- P.Config\_IT-env: The site uses software on development workstations and servers in addition to configuration management systems for file versioning and problem tracking. For file versioning unique repositories shall be used to support proper management of multiple products and the site internal procedures.
- P.LifeCycle-Doc: The site uses life cycle documentation that describes: (1) Description of configuration management systems and their usage; (2) A configuration items list; (3) Site security; (4) The development process; (5) The development tools.
- P.Config\_Activities: The activities of the site shall be performed in accordance with the life cycle documentation (P.Config\_IT-env) using the IT-environment (P.LifeCycle-Doc).

### 4.4 Assumptions

- A.Inherit-secure-IT: The local IT equipment (e.g. workstations) is connected to a secure remote IT-Infrastructure through a secure (encrypted) network connection. The local workstations, the remote secure IT-infrastructure and the secure connection to it satisfy all relevant ALC requirements and are provided and managed by NXP. The workstations are configured such that any assets are contained within encrypted containers.
- A.Shared-Docs: In case of necessary updates to the life cycle documentation<sup>3</sup> the site and NXP cooperate.
- A.Setup-Projects: To enable that the site participates in the development of products NXP provides services to setup the necessary development computers (tools, user accounts, etc.) and configuration management systems (user accounts, repositories etc.).
- A.Shipment: To enable the site to realize shipment such that assurance of integrity is assured throughout transport of physical security

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<sup>3</sup> Part of the life cycle documentation is written in corporation with NXP where other parts are provided by NXP.

objects NXP will adhere to the shipment method as described in the life cycle documentation.

A.Product-Setup: The site participates in the development of products. To define the participation of the site in the development while maintaining quality, for each product the site and NXP agree on the activities to be performed by the site, the specifications of the input for the site and the acceptance of the results by NXP.

## 5. Security Objectives

23 The Security Objectives are related to physical, technical, and organizational security measures, the configuration management as well as the internal shipment and/or the external delivery.

O.Config\_IT-env: The site uses software on development workstations and servers in addition to configuration management systems for file versioning and problem tracking. For file versioning unique repositories are used to support proper management of multiple products and the site internal procedures.

O.LifeCycle-Doc: The site uses life cycle documentation that describes:

(1) Description of configuration management systems and their usage;

(2) A configuration items list;

(3) Site security;

(4) The development process;

(5) The development tools.

(6) CM\_Plan

O.Config\_Activities: The activities of the site are performed in accordance with the life cycle documentation (O.Config\_IT-env) using the IT-environment (O.LifeCycle-Doc).

O.Physical-Access: The combination of physical partitioning between the different access control levels together with technical and organisational security measures allows a sufficient separation of employees to enforce the “need to know” principle. The access control shall support the limitation for the access to these areas including the identification and rejection of unauthorised people. The access control measures ensure that only registered employees can access restricted areas. Assets are handled in restricted areas only.

- O.Security-Control: Assigned personnel of the site or guards operate the systems for access control and surveillance and respond to alarms. Technical security measures like motion sensors and similar kind of sensors support the enforcement of the access control. These personnel are also responsible for registering and ensuring escort of visitors, contractors and suppliers.
- O.Alarm-Response: The technical and organisational security measures ensure that an alarm is generated before an unauthorised person gets access to any asset. After the alarm is triggered the unauthorised person still has to overcome further security measures. The reaction time of the employees and/or guards is short enough to prevent a successful attack.
- O.Internal-Monitor: The site performs security management meetings at least every six months. The security management meetings are used to review security incidences, to verify that maintenance measures are applied and to reconsider the assessment of risks and security measures. Furthermore, an internal audit is performed every year to control the application of the security measures.
- O.Maintain-Security: Technical security measures are maintained regularly to ensure correct operation. The logging of sensitive systems is checked regularly. This comprises the access control system to ensure that only authorised employees have access to sensitive areas as well as computer/network systems to ensure that they are configured as required to ensure the protection of the networks and computer systems.
- O.Network-separation: The (plain-text) development network of the site exists within the secured areas of the site only. It is connected only to: (1) The encryption equipment employs encrypted VPNs to the secure network provided by NXP; (2) the development workstations provided by NXP; (3) Additional equipment (e.g. a printer) approved by NXP.
- O.Logical-Operation: Development computers enforce that every user authenticates using a password and has a unique user ID.
- O.Control-Shipment: The site has measures in place to provide assurance of integrity throughout transport of physical security objects.



O.Control-Scrap: The site has measures in place to either securely destruct assets (e.g. paper shredder) or return them to NXP.

O.Staff-Engagement: All employees who have access to assets are checked regarding security concerns and have to sign a non-disclosure agreement. Furthermore, all employees are trained and qualified for their job.

## 5.1 Security Objectives Rationale

Threat	Security Objective(s)	Rationale
T.Smart-Theft	O.Lifecycle-Doc O.Physical-Access O.Control-Scrap O.Security-Control O.Alarm-Response O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.Config_Activities	<p>O.Lifecycle-Doc ensure that procedures are documented which assist in preventing Theft.</p> <p>O.Physical-Access ensures that the Secure Room is physically partitioned off, so that a burglar cannot just walk in.</p> <p>O.Control-Scrap ensures that scrap material cannot be accessed by an authorized party</p> <p>O.Security-Control ensures that an attacker will be detected when trying to reach the assets through the Secure Room</p> <p>O.Alarm-Response supports O.Physical_Access and O.Security_Control by ensuring that a response will be given to the alarm systems and that this response is quick enough to prevent access to the assets.</p> <p>O.Internal-Monitor and O.Maintain-Security ensure that the above is managed and maintained.</p> <p>O.Config_Activities activities of the site are performed in accordance with the life cycle documentation.</p> <p>Together, these objectives will therefore counter T.Smart_Theft.</p>

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<p>T.Rugged-Theft</p>	<p>O.Lifecycle-Doc O.Physical-Access O.Control-Scrap O.Security-Control O.Alarm-Response O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.Config_Activities</p>	<p>O.Lifecycle-Doc ensure that procedures are documented which assist in preventing Theft. O.Physical-Access ensures that the Secure Room is physically partitioned off, so that a burglar cannot just walk in. O.Control-Scrap ensures that scrap material cannot be accessed by an authorized party O.Security-Control ensures that an attacker will be detected when trying to reach the assets through the Secure Room O.Alarm-Response supports O.Physical_Access and O.Security_Control by ensuring that a response will be given to the alarm systems and that this response is quick enough to prevent access to the assets. O.Internal-Monitor and O.Maintain-Security ensure that the above is managed and maintained. O.Config_Activities activities of the site are performed in accordance with the life cycle documentation.</p> <p>Together, these objectives will therefore counter T.Rugged_Theft</p>
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<p>T.Computer-Net</p>	<p>O.Config_IT-env O.Lifecycle-Doc O.Network-separation O.Physical-Access O.Logical-Operation O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.Control-Scrap O.Staff-Engagement O.Config_Activities</p>	<p>O.Config_IT-env assigns unique numbers to the internal procedures and guidance. This helps enforce segregation of duties and the need to know principals.</p> <p>O.Lifecycle-Doc ensure that procedures are documented which assist in preventing Unauthorised Staff access.</p> <p>O.Network-separation ensures that the development network is not connected to anything that an attacker could use to set up a remote connection</p> <p>O.Physical-Access ensures that all communication between the Secure Room and the Business Unit is done through encryption equipment (provided by the Business Unit). The attacker can therefore neither:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Listen in on or manipulate the network connection between the Secure Room and the Business Unit</li> <li>• Penetrate the Secure Room management stations through this connection</li> </ul> <p>The attacker also cannot use other networks that lead into the Secure Room as O.Physical-Access also ensures that all such connections are not connected to the encryption equipment.</p> <p>In addition, O.Logical-Operation ensures that all computer systems used to manage the Business Unit network are kept up to date (software updates, security patches, virus and spyware protection)</p> <p>O.Internal-Monitor and O.Maintain-Security ensure that the above is managed and maintained.</p> <p>O.Control-Scrap ensures that scrap material cannot be accessed by an authorized party</p> <p>O.Config_Activities activities of the site are performed in accordance with the life cycle documentation.</p> <p>O.Staff-Engagement ensures that all staff is aware of its responsibilities (signing NDAs, and being trained).</p> <p>Together, these objectives will therefore counter T.Computer-Net.</p>
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<p>T.Unauthorised-Staff</p>	<p>O.Physical-Access O.Security-Control O.Alarm-Response O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.Config_IT-env O.Logical-Operation O.Control-Scrap O.Config_Activities O.Network-separation O.Lifecycle-Doc O.Staff-Engagement</p>	<p>O.Security_Control ensures that all unauthorised people who have a legitimate need to visit the Secure Room are always accompanied. O.Physical-Access, O.Security-Control and O.Alarm-Response ensures that the unauthorised people cannot circumvent this (see the rationale for T.Smart-Theft for more details on this) O.Internal-Monitor and O.Maintain-Security ensure that the above is managed and maintained. O.Config_IT-env assigns unique numbers to the internal procedures and guidance. This helps enforce segregation of duties and the need to know principals. O.Control-Scrap ensures that scrap material cannot be accessed by an authorized party O.Config_Activities activities of the site are performed in accordance with the life cycle documentation. O.Network-separation ensures that that access can only be gained to networks on a need to know basis In addition, O.Logical-Operation ensures that all computer systems used to manage the Business Unit network are kept up to date (software updates, security patches, virus and spyware protection) O.Lifecycle-Doc ensure that procedures are documented which assist in preventing Unauthorised Staff access. O.Staff-Engagement ensures that all staff is aware of its responsibilities (signing NDAs, and being trained).</p> <p>Together, these objectives will therefore counter T.Unauthorised-Staff.</p>
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<p>T.Staff-Collusion</p>	<p>O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.Staff-Engagement O.Config_IT-env O.Control-Scrap O.Config_Activities O.Lifecycle-Doc O.Physical-Access</p>	<p>O.Staff-Engagement ensures that all staff is aware of its responsibilities (signing NDAs, and being trained). O.Internal-Monitor and O.Maintain-Security ensure that the above is managed and maintained. O.Config_IT-env assigns unique numbers to the internal procedures and guidance. This helps enforce segregation of duties and the need to know principals. O.Control-Scrap ensures that scrap material cannot be accessed by an authorized party O.Config_Activities activities of the site are performed in accordance with the life cycle documentation. O.Lifecycle-Doc ensure that procedures are documented which assist in preventing Unauthorised Staff access. O.Physical-Access ensures that all communication between the Secure Room and the Business Unit is done through encryption equipment (provided by the Business Unit). The attacker can therefore neither:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Listen in on or manipulate the network connection between the Secure Room and the Business Unit</li> <li>• Penetrate the Secure Room management stations through this connection</li> </ul> <p>The attacker also cannot use other networks that lead into the Secure Room as O.Physical-Access also ensures that all such connections are not connected to the encryption equipment. Together, these objectives will therefore counter T.Staff-Collusion.</p>
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T.Attack-Transport	O.Control-Shipment O.Lifecycle-Doc O.Staff-Engagement	O.Control-Shipment activities have measures in place to provide assurance of integrity throughout transport of physical security objects O.Lifecycle-Doc ensure that procedures are documented which assist in preventing Unauthorised Staff access. Together, these objectives will therefore counter T.Attach-Transport. O.Staff-Engagement ensures that all staff is aware of its responsibilities (signing NDAs, and being trained).
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**Table 1 Threats - Security Objectives Rationale**

OSP	Security Objective(s)	Rationale
P.Config_IT-env	O.Config_IT-env	The Security Objective directly enforces the OSP. O.Config_IT-env assigns unique numbers to the internal procedures and guidance. As the site processes no other configuration items, this is sufficient to meet P.Config_IT-env.
P.LifeCycle-Doc	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The Security Objective directly enforces the OSP. This ensures life cycle documentation that describes configuration management systems, Site security, development process and tools providing a CM_Plan is sufficient to meet P.LifeCycle-doc.
P.Config_Activities	O.Config_Activities O.Network-	The Security Objective directly enforces the OSP.

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	separation	<p>O.Config_Activities activities of the site are performed in accordance with the life cycle documentation.</p> <p>O.Network-separation ensures that that access can only be gained to networks on a need to know basis</p> <p>The services and processes provided by the site are described in the internal procedures and guidance. As these are kept under CM (see the rationale above), this is sufficient to meet</p> <p>P.Config_Activities.</p>
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**Table 2 OSP - Security Objectives Rationale**



## **6. Extended Assurance Components Definition**

24 No extended components are defined in this Site Security Target.

## 7. Security Assurance Requirements

- 25 Clients using this Site Security Target require a TOE evaluation up to evaluation assurance level EAL6+, potentially claiming conformance with the Eurosmart Protection Profile [5].
- 26 The Security Assurance Requirements are chosen from the class ALC (Life-cycle support) as defined in [3]:
- CM capabilities (ALC\_CMC.5)
  - CM scope (ALC\_CMS.5)
  - Development Security (ALC\_DVS.2)
  - Life-cycle definition (ALC\_LCD.1)
  - Tools and techniques (ALC\_TAT.3)
- 27 Because hierarchically higher components are used in this SST the Security Assurance Requirements listed above fulfil the requirements of:
- [10] 'Minimum Site Requirements'
  - [11] Eurosmart Protection Profile.
- 28 In addition, the minimum set of SAR as defined in [10] 'Minimum Site Requirements v2.1' is augmented by assurance components from 'Life-cycle definition' (ALC\_LCD.1) and 'Tools and techniques' (ALC\_TAT.3).

### 7.1 Application Notes and Refinements

- 29 The description of the site certification process [6] includes specific application notes. The main item is that a product that is considered as intended TOE is not available during the evaluation. Since the term "TOE" is not applicable in the Site Security Target, the associated processes for the handling of products, or "intended TOEs" are in the scope of this Site Security Target and are described in this document. These processes are subject of the evaluation of the site.

**7.1.1 CM Capabilities (ALC\_CMC.5)**

30 Refer to subsection 'Application Notes for Site Certification' in [6] 5.1 'Application Notes for ALC\_CMC'.

**7.1.2 CM Scope (ALC\_CMS.5)**

31 Refer to subsection 'Application Notes for Site Certification' in [6] 5.2 'Application Notes for ALC\_CMS'.

**7.1.3 Development Security (ALC\_DVS.2)**

32 Refer to subsection 'Application Notes for Site Certification' in [6] 5.4 'Application Notes for ALC\_DVS'.

**7.1.4 Life-cycle Definition (ALC\_LCD.1)**

33 Refer to subsection 'Application Notes for Site Certification' in [6] 5.6 'Application Notes for ALC\_LCD'.

34 Refer to 'Application Note 26' in 6.2.1.2 'Refinements regarding Development Security (ALC\_DVS)' in the Eurosmart PP [5].

35 Refer to subsection 'Refinement' in 6.2.1.2 'Refinements regarding Development Security (ALC\_DVS)' in the Eurosmart PP [5].

**7.1.5 Tools and Techniques (ALC\_TAT.3)**

36 Refer to subsection 'Application Notes for Site Certification' in [6] 5.7 'Application Notes for ALC\_TAT'.

**7.2 Security Requirements Rationale****7.2.1 Security Requirements Rationale - Dependencies**

37 The dependencies for the assurance requirements are as follows:

- ALC\_CMC.5: ALC\_CMS.1, ALC\_DVS.2, ALC\_LCD.1
- ALC\_CMS.5: None
- ALC\_DVS.2: None
- ALC\_LCD.1: None
- ALC\_TAT.3: ADV\_IMP.1

38 Some of the dependencies are not (completely) fulfilled:

- ALC\_LCD.1 is only partially fulfilled as the site does not represent the entire development environment. This is in-line with and further explained in [6] 5.1 'Application Notes for ALC\_CMC'.
- ADV\_IMP.1 is not fulfilled as there is no specific TOE. This is in-line with and further explained in [6] 5.7 'Application Notes for ALC\_TAT'.

### 7.2.2 Security Requirements Rationale – Mapping

SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_CMC.5.1C: The CM documentation shall show that a process is in place to ensure an appropriate and consistent labeling.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Config_Activities	Appropriate and consistent labelling is ensured through the application (O.Config_Activities) of the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) and the use of the configuration management systems (O.Config_IT-env).
ALC_CMC.5.2C: The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The method used to uniquely identify the configuration items is described in the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc).
ALC_CMC.5.3C: The CM documentation shall justify that the acceptance procedures provide for an adequate and appropriate review of changes	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The adequate and appropriate acceptance procedures for configuration items are described in the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc).

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SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
to all configuration items.		
ALC_CMC.5.4C: The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Config_Activities	Unique identification of all CIs is realized by performing the CM activities (O.Config_Activities) in accordance with the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) using the Configuration management systems (C.Config_IT-env)
ALC_CMC.5.5C: The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only authorized changes are made to the configuration items.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Config_Activities	The configuration management systems (O.Config_IT-Env) used (O.Config_Activities) according to the CM-Plan (C.Config_CM-Plan) enforces automated measures such that only authorized changes are made to the configuration items
ALC_CMC.5.6C: The CM system shall support the production of the product by automated means.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Config_Activities	The software on the development computers (O.Config_IT-env) supports automated production of products when used (O.Config_Activities) in accordance with the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc)
ALC_CMC.5.7C: The CM system shall ensure that the person responsible for accepting a	O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Config_Activities	As described in the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) the activities performed (O.Config_Activities) are such that the person responsible for accepting a configuration

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SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
configuration item into CM is not the person who developed it.		item into CM is not the person who developed it.
ALC_CMC.5.8C: The CM system shall clearly identify the configuration items that comprise the TSF.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc	The CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) identifies the configuration items that comprise the TSF possibly supported by the configuration management system (O.Config_IT-env)
ALC_CMC.5.9C: The CM system shall support the audit of all changes to the TOE by automated means, including the originator, date, and time in the audit trail.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc	As described in the CM_Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) the configuration management systems (O.Config_IT-env) are configured such that an audit trail (showing originator, date and time) is automatically generated.
ALC_CMC.5.10C: The CM system shall provide an automated means to identify all other configuration items that are affected by the change of a given configuration item.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc	As described in the CM_Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) the configurations management system and software installed on the development workstations and servers (O.Config_IT-env) provide automated means to identify all other configuration items that are affected by the change of a given configuration item.
ALC_CMC.5.11C: The CM system	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc	As described in the CM_Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc) the

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SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
shall be able to identify the version of the implementation representation from which the TOE is generated.		configurations management system (O.Config_IT-env) identifies the version of the implementation representation from which the TOE is generated through baselines.
ALC_CMC.5.12C: The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) includes a CM-Plan.
ALC_CMC.5.13C: The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development of the TOE.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) describes how the CM system is used for the development of the product.
ALC_CMC.5.14C: The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the TOE	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The acceptance procedures for modified or newly created configuration items are described in the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc).
ALC_CMC.5.15C: The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	All configuration items are listed in the CI-list (O.LifeCycle-Doc)

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SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_CMC.5.16C: The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items have been and are being maintained under the CM system.	O.Config_IT-env O.LifeCycle-Doc	The CI-list (O.LifeCycle-Doc) is generated from the configuration management systems (O.Config_IT-env)

Table 3 Rationale for ALC\_CMC.5

SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_CMS.5.1C: The configuration list includes the following: the TOE itself; the evaluation evidence required by the SARs in the ST; the parts that comprise the TOE; the implementation representation; security flaws; and development tools and related information. The CM documentationshall include a CM plan.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) includes a CM-Plan and a CI-List with the items required by ALC_CMS.5.1C
ALC_CMS.5.2C: The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The CI-List (O.LifeCycle-Doc) uniquely identifies the configurations items as described in the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc).
ALC_CMS.5.3C: For each configuration item, the configuration list shall	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The CI-List (O.LifeCycle-Doc) indicates the developer/subcontractor



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SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
indicate the developer/subcontractor of the item.		for each configuration items as described in the CM-Plan (O.LifeCycle-Doc).

**Table 4 Rationale for ALC\_CMS.5**

SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_DVS.2.1C: The development security documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development environment.	O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Physical-Access O.Security-Control O.Alarm-Response O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.Network-separation O.Logical-Operation O.Control-Ship O.Control-Scrap O.Staff-Engagement	The development security documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) describes the physical (O.Physical-Access, O.Security-Control, O.Alarm-Response), procedural (O.Internal-Monitor, O.Maintain-Security, O.Control-Ship, O.Control-Scrap), personnel (O.Staff-Engagement), and other(O.Network-separation, O.Logical-Operation, ) security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its

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SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
		development environment.
ALC_DVS.2.2C: The development security documentation shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The development security documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) justifies the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.
ALC_DVS.2.3C: The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.	O.LifeCycle-Doc O.Physical-Access O.Security-Control O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.Network-separation O.Logical-Operation O.Control-Scrap O.Staff-Engagement	The development security documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) describes the physical (O.Physical-Access, O.Security-Control), procedural (O.Internal-Monitor, O.Maintain-Security, O.Control-Scrap), personnel (O.Staff-Engagement), and other (O.Network-separation, O.Logical-Operation) security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development

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SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
		environment.

Table 5 Rationale for ALC\_DVS.2

SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_LCD.1.1C: The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop and maintain the TOE.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The model used to develop the TOE is described in the life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc)
ALC_LCD.1.2C: The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the TOE.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle model as described in the life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) provides for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the TOE.

Table 6 Rationale for ALC\_LCD.1

SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_TAT.3.1C: Each development tool used for implementation shall be well-defined.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) shows that the development tools used for implementation are well-defined.
ALC_TAT.3.2.C: The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define the meaning of all	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) together with the documentation of the development tools

SAR	Security Objective	Rationale
statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the implementation.		unambiguously defines the meaning of all statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the implementation.
ALC_TAT.3.3C: The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.	O.LifeCycle-Doc	The life cycle documentation (O.LifeCycle-Doc) together with the documentation of the development tools unambiguously defines the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.

Table 7 Rationale for ALC\_TAT.3

**Site Security Target Lite NXP San Jose****8. Site Summary Specification****8.1 Preconditions required by the Site**

- 39 The site activities are performed using an IT infrastructure consisting of development workstations, servers and configuration management systems. All of these are provided, configured and maintained by NXP.
- 40 The IT infrastructure consists of local and remote equipment connected using an encrypted connection. NXP provides, configures and maintains the local workstations and router (used for the encrypted connection) and all remote equipment such that they are secure. The workstations are configured such that any assets are contained within encrypted containers.
- 41 In case of necessary updates to the life cycle documentation<sup>4</sup> the site and NXP will cooperate.
- 42 To enable that the site participates in the development of products NXP provides services to setup the necessary development computers (tools, user accounts, etc.) and configuration management systems (user accounts, repositories etc.).
- 43 To enable the site to realize shipment such that assurance of integrity is assured throughout transport of physical security objects NXP will adhere to the shipment method.
- 44 In case the site is unable to securely destruct certain physical assets the assets will be securely shipped to the NXP Hamburg head office for destruction.
- 45 To define the participation of the site in the development while maintaining quality, for each product the site and NXP agree on the activities to be performed by the site, the specifications of the input for the site and the acceptance of the results by NXP.
- 46 The site follows the development processes of NXP. Applicable policies and processes are documented and available from NXP to the site.

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<sup>4</sup> Part of the life cycle documentation is written in corporation with NXP where other parts are provided by NXP.

## 8.2 Services of the Site

- 47 The site participates in the development and testing of software<sup>5</sup> for secure integrated circuits.
- 48 The site participates in the hardware development and testing of secure integrated circuits.
- 49 The site uses a shipment method such that assurance of integrity is assured throughout transport of physical security objects.

## 8.3 Aspects of the SARs

### 8.3.1 CM capabilities (ALC\_CMC.5)

- 50 Configuration Management is described.

### 8.3.2 CM capabilities (ALC\_CMC.5)

- 51 Configuration Management is described.
- 52 For full detail and evidences please view Section 7.2.2

### 8.3.3 CM scope (ALC\_CMS.5)

- 53 Configuration Management is described.
- 54 For full detail and evidences please view Section 7.2.2

### 8.3.4 Development Security (ALC\_DVS.2)

- 55 Development Security is described.
- 56 For full detail and evidences please view Section 7.2.2

### 8.3.5 Life-cycle definition (ALC\_LCD.1)

- 57 Life-cycle definition is described.
- 58 For full detail and evidences please view Section 7.2.2

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<sup>5</sup> 'Software' means in this case: IC Embedded Software Development (Phase 1) and/or IC Dedicated Software Development (Phase 2) as defined in 'Security IC Platform Protection Profile' (PP-0035) and 'Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages' (PP-0084).

### 8.3.6 Tools and techniques (ALC\_TAT.3)

Tools and techniques is described.

59 For full detail and evidences please view Section 7.2.2

## 8.4 Objectives Rationale

60 The following rationale provides a justification that shows that all threats and OSP are effectively addressed by the Security Objectives.

### 8.4.1 O.Config\_IT-env

61 The configuration of the IT environment is designed in such way to ensure segregation of duties and the need to know principals. These measures address T.Computer-Net, T.Staff-Collusion and T.Unauthorized-Staff. Also addresses the OSP P.Config-IT-env.

### 8.4.2 O.Physical-Access

The physical access is supported by O.Security-Control that includes the maintenance of the access control and the control of visitors. The physical security measures are supported by O.Alarm-Response providing an alarm system.

Thereby the threats T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft can be prevented. The physical security measures together with the security measure provided by O.Security-Control enforce the recording of all actions. Thereby also T.Computer-Net, T.Staff-Collusion and T.Unauthorized-Staff is addressed. Also addresses the OSP P.Config-Activities.

### 8.4.3 O.Security-Control

62 During off hours the guard patrol the internal of the building and the alarm system is used to monitor the site with a dedicated off site monitoring station. The CCTV system supports these measures because it is always enabled and monitored 24/7. The security control is further supported by O.Physical-Access requiring different level of access control for the access to security product during operation as well as during off-hours.

63 This addresses the threats T.Smart-Theft and T.Rugged-Theft. Supported by O.Maintain- Security and O.Physical-Access also an internal attacker triggers the security measures implemented by O.Security-Control. Therefore also the Threat T.Unauthorized-Staff is addressed.

**8.4.4 O.Alarm-Response**

64 During working hours the employees monitor the alarm system. The alarm system is connected to a control center that is manned 24 hours. During off-hours additional guard patrol supports the alarm system. O.Physical-Access requires certain time to overcome the different level of access control. The response time of the guard and the physical resistance match to provide an effective alarm response.

65 This addresses the threats T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft and T.Unauthorised-Staff

**8.4.5 O.Internal-Monitor**

66 Regular security management meetings are implemented to monitor security incidences as well as changes or updates of security relevant systems and processes. This comprises of all security events, security relevant systems, CCTV and access control. Major changes of security systems and security procedures are reviewed in general management systems review meetings (2x per year). Upon introduction of a new process a formal review and release for mass production is made before being generally introduced.

67 The security relevant systems enforcing or supporting O.Physical-Access, O.Security-Control and O.Logical-Access are checked and maintained regularly by the suppliers. In addition the configuration is updated as required either by employees (for the access control system) of the supplier. Logging files are checked at least monthly for technical problems and specific maintenance requests.

68 This addresses T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff and T.Staff-Collusion

**8.4.6 O.Logical-Operation**

69 All logical protection measures are maintained and updated as required, at least once a month. Critical items such as virus scanners are updated daily. The backup is sufficiently protected and is only accessible for the administration.

70 This addresses the threats T.Computer-Net and T.Unauthorised-Staff



**8.4.7 O.Staff-Engagement**

- 71 All employees are interviewed before hiring. They must sign an NDA and a code of conduct for the use of NXP equipment before they start working in the company. The formal training and qualification includes security relevant subjects and the principles of handling and storage of security products. The security objectives O.Physical-Access, O.Logical- Access and O.Config-Items support the engagement of the staff.
- 72 This addresses the threats T.Computer-Net, T.Staff-Collusion, T.Attack-Transport and T.Unauthorised-Staff

**8.4.8 O.Control-Scrap**

- 73 Scrap may exist in a number of forms on this site printed secure objects, test samples or redundant hardware/movable media. Hardware and samples scrap is returned to NXP head office for controlled secure destruction. Transport and actual destruction of security products is done under supervision of a qualified employee in collaboration with the destructor. Sensitive information and information storage media are collected internally in a safe location and destroyed in a supervised and documented process. All documentation destroyed on site is by means of a Level 5 security shredder.
- 74 Supported by O.Physical-Access and O.Staff-engagement this addresses the threats T.Unauthorised-Staff, T.Computer-Net, T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft and T.Staff-Collusion

**8.4.9 O.Config\_Activities**

- 75 All product configuration information is stored in the database on the NXP secure network. The information stored is covering process specifications, acceptance test instructions and specifications, and test programs. Products are identified by unique customer part IDs with are linked to the unique ID numbers of the associated configuration items.
- 76 This is addressing the threat T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Staff-Collusion, T.Unauthorised-Staff, T.Smart-Theft and the OSP P.Config-Activities

**8.4.10 O.Network\_Separation**

77 The internal network is separated from the internet with a firewall. The internal network is further separated into subnetworks by internal firewalls. These firewalls allow only authorized information exchange between the internal subnetworks. Each user is logging into the system with his personalised user name and password. The objective is supported by O.Internal-Monitor based on the checks of the logging regarding security relevant events.

78 The individual accounts are addressing T.Computer-Net. All network configuration is stored in the database of the NXP secure network. Supported by O.Config-IT-env this addresses the threats T.Unauthorised-Staff and the OSP P.Config-Activity.

**8.4.11 O.Maintain\_Security**

79 The security measures are maintained regularly to ensure correct operation. The logging of sensitive systems is checked regularly. This comprises the access control system to ensure that only authorised employees have access to sensitive areas as well as computer/network systems to ensure that they are configured as required to ensure the protection of the networks and computer systems

80 These security measures are necessary to prevent the threats T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff and T.Staff-Collusion

**8.4.12 O.Control-Shipment**

81 The site has measures in place to provide assurance of integrity throughout transport of physical security objects. These security measures are maintained regularly checked to ensure correct operation.

82 These security measures are necessary to prevent the threats T.Attack-Transport

**8.4.13 O.LifeCycle\_doc**

83 The security of the site is maintained according to the sites security documentation covering all physical and logical measures to ensure the security of the site.

84 These security measures are necessary to prevent the threats T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff, T.Attack-Transport and T.Staff-Collusion. Also addressing the OSP P.Lifecycle-Doc

## **9. References**

### **9.1 Literature**

- [1] "Site Security Target Template, Version 1.0, published by Eurosmart," Eurosmart, 21.06.2009.
- [2] Common Criteria, "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 4," September 2012.
- [3] Common Criteria, "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part3: Security Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 4," September 2012.
- [4] Common Criteria, "Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology; Version 3.1, Revision 4," September 2012.
- [5] "Security IC Platform Protection Profile Version 1.0," Eurosmart, 15.06.2007.
- [6] Common Criteria, "Supporting Document, Site Certification, Version 1.0, Revision 1, CCDB-2007-11-001," October 2007.
- [10] Minimum Site Security Requirement V2.1
- [11] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmented Packages (BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014), Version 1.0, Eurosmart, 2014.

## 9.2 List of Abbreviations

CC	Common Criteria
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
IC	Integrated Circuit
IP	Intellectual Property
IT	Information Technology
OSP	Organizational Security Policy
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SST	Site Security Target
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation