



PREMIER MINISTRE

Secretariat General for National Defence

French Network and Information Security Agency

## **Certification Report ANSSI-CC-2009/61**

### **CC Ideal Pass Passport (on SB23YR80A), version 1.3.3**

*Paris, 21<sup>st</sup> December 2009*

**Courtesy Translation**



## Warning

This report is designed to provide sponsors with a document enabling them to assess the security level of a product under the conditions of use and operation defined in this report for the evaluated version. It is also designed to provide the potential purchaser of the product with the conditions under which he may operate or use the product so as to meet the conditions of use for which the product has been evaluated and certified; that is why this certification report must be read alongside the evaluated user and administration guidance, as well as with the product security target, which presents threats, environmental assumptions and the supposed conditions of use so that the user can judge for himself whether the product meets his needs in terms of security objectives.

Certification does not, however, constitute a recommendation product from ANSSI (French Network and Information Security Agency), and does not guarantee that the certified product is totally free of all exploitable vulnerabilities.



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<i>Certification report reference</i>	<b>ANSSI-CC-2009/61</b>	
<i>Product name</i>	<b>CC IDEal Pass Passport (on SB23YR80A)</b>	
<i>Product reference</i>	<b>Version 1.3.3</b>	
<i>Protection profile conformity</i>	<p><b>[PP EAC]</b></p> <p><b>Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control, version 1.10</b></p>	
<i>Evaluation criteria and version</i>	<b>Common Criteria version 3.1</b>	
<i>Evaluation level</i>	<p><b>EAL 4 augmented</b></p> <p><b>ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5</b></p>	
<i>Developers</i>	<p><b>SAGEM Sécurité</b></p> <p>Etablissement d’Osny, 18 Chaussée Jules César, 95520 Osny, France</p>	<p><b>ST Microelectronics</b></p> <p>29 Boulevard Romain Rolland, 75669 Paris cedex 14, France</p>
<i>Sponsor</i>	<p><b>SAGEM Sécurité</b></p> <p>Etablissement d’Osny, 18 Chaussée Jules César, 95520 Osny, France</p>	
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<i>Recognition arrangements</i>	<p><b>CCRA</b></p> 	<p><b>SOG-IS</b></p> 
<b>The product is recognised at EAL4 level.</b>		

## Introduction

### The Certification

Security certification for information technology products and systems is governed by decree number 2002-535 dated April, 18th 2002, and published in the "Journal Officiel de la République Française". This decree stipulates that:

- The French Network and Information Security Agency draws up **certification reports**. These reports indicate the features of the proposed security targets. They may include any warnings that the authors feel the need to mention for security reasons. They may or may not be transmitted to third parties or made public, as the sponsors desire (article 7).
- The **certificates** issued by the Prime Minister certify that the copies of the products or systems submitted for evaluation fulfil the specified security features. They also certify that the evaluations have been carried out in compliance with applicable rules and standards, with the required degrees of skill and impartiality (article 8).

The procedures are available on the Internet site [www.ssi.gouv.fr](http://www.ssi.gouv.fr).



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# 1. The product

## 1.1. Presentation of the product

The evaluated product is the « CC IDEal Pass Passport (on SB23YR80A), Version 1.3.3 » developed by SAGEM Sécurité and ST Microelectronics.

The evaluated product is a contactless smartcard with its antenna. It implements the travel document features according to the specifications from the International Civil Aviation Organization (cf. [ICAO]). This product is designed to check the authenticity of the travel document, and to identify its holder during a border control, with the support of an inspection system.

It is intended to be inserted into the cover page of traditional passport booklets. They can be integrated into modules or inlays. The final product can be a passport, a plastic card, etc

## 1.2. Evaluated product description

The security target [ST] defines the evaluated product, its evaluated security functionalities and its operational environment.

The security target is strictly conformant to the [PP EAC] protection profile

### 1.2.1. *Product identification*

The configuration list [CONF] identifies the product's constituent elements.

The certified version of the product can be identified by the following elements:

- product's name and version : CC IDEal Pass, version 1.3.3;
- microcontroller's name and version: SB23YR80A;
- commercial reference (SAGEM) : IDEAL/ST23YR80/1.3.3;
- whole embedded software reference (SAGEM ORGA) OFFICIEL\_IDEAL\_ST23YR80\_1\_3\_3;
- ST Microelectronics reference: ST23YR80 QPV (masked chip).

Every version of the software components of the certified version of the product can be checked according to the command and responses identified in the installation guidance of the product (see [GUIDES]).

### 1.2.2. *Security services*

The product provides mainly the following security services:

- protection of integrity of the holder's stored data: issuing state or organization, travel document number, expiration date, holder's name, nationality, birth date, sex, holder's face portrait, other optional data, additional biometric data and several other pieces of data for managing the security of the document;




- authentication between the travel document holder and the inspection system prior to any border control by the Basic Access Control mechanism<sup>1</sup>;
- protection of integrity and confidentiality of data read by secure messaging;
- authentication of the genuine chip by the Active Authentication mechanism (optional);
- strong authentication of the chip and the inspection system prior to any biometric data retrieval by the Extended Access Control mechanism.

### 1.2.3. Architecture

The product consists of

- the SB23YR80A microcontroller, developed and produced by ST Microelectronics ;
- software parts, developed by SAGEM Sécurité, which CVS reference is OFFICIEL\_IDEAL\_ST23YR80\_1\_3\_0, masked in the microcontroller's ROM, composed of:
  - o the OPUCE operating system;
  - o the HAL hardware abstract layer;
  - o the AIP card initialization and personalization application;
  - o and the IDEAL Pass ICAO application, version 1.3.0 ;
- the ICAO application patch, developed by SAGEM Sécurité, loaded into the microcontroller's EEPROM, which CVS reference is OFFICIEL\_IDEAL\_ST23YR80\_1\_3\_3, that forms with the masked part the IDEAL Pass ICAO application, version 1.3.3.




Deactivated in user phase

<sup>1</sup> This BAC functionality has been studied in the evaluation project that have lead to the ANSSI-CC-2009/6 certificate.

### 1.2.4. Life cycle

The product's life cycle is organised as follow:



Patch loading is protected by the AIP application.

The embedded software has been developed on the following site:

#### SAGEM Sécurité - Etablissement d'Osny

18 Chaussée Jules César  
 95520 Osny  
 France





The microcontroller development sites are identified in the [2009/28] certification report.

#### **1.2.5. *Evaluated configuration***

The certificate applies to the closed configuration of this product (locking of the applet loading feature after ICAO's loading).

The product tested by the evaluation facility is typical to the final product (phase 7).

## 2. The evaluation

### 2.1. Evaluation referential

The evaluation has been performed in compliance with **Common Criteria version 3.1** [CC], with the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM], and with the following interpretation:

- strict conformance to a PP allow the adding of assumption in the security target (normalisation of this interpretation is on-going at the time of the writing of this certification report);
- the ATE\_DPT.2 assurance component has been replaced by the ATE\_DPT.1 assurance component at the EAL4 level in the third revision of the Common Criteria version 3.1 (published after the beginning of this evaluation).

In order to meet the specificities of smart cards, the [CC AP] and [COMP] guides have been applied.

### 2.2. Evaluation work

The evaluation has been performed according to the composition scheme as defined in the guide [COMP] in order to assess that no weakness comes from the integration of the software in the microcontroller already certified.

Therefore, the results of the evaluation of the microcontroller SB23YR80A at EAL5 level augmented with ALC\_DVS.2 and AVA\_VAN.5, compliant with the [PP0035] protection profile, have been used. This microcontroller has been certified the 1<sup>st</sup> December 2009 under the reference ANSSI-CC-2009/28.

The evaluation technical report [ETR], delivered to ANSSI the 11<sup>th</sup> December 2009, provides details on the work performed by the evaluation facility and assesses that all evaluation tasks are “pass”.

### 2.3. Cryptographic mechanisms robustness analysis

The robustness of cryptographic mechanisms has been analysed by ANSSI according to [REF-CRY]. The results are stated in the cryptographic analysis report [ANA-CRY]

This analysis report established that the analysed mechanisms are compliant to the requirements defined in ANSSI cryptographic referential [REF-CRY].

Those results have been taken into account in the evaluator independent vulnerability analysis and had not led to the identification of exploitable vulnerability for the aimed AVA\_VAN level.

### 2.4. Random number generator analysis

The random number generator used by this product is the one provided by the microcontroller (see [2009/28] certification report).



## 3. Certification

### 3.1. Conclusion

The evaluation was carried out according to the current rules and standards, with the required competency and impartiality of a licensed evaluation facility. All the work performed permits the release of a certificate in conformance with the decree 2002-535.

This certificate testifies that the product “CC Ideal Pass Passport (on SB23YR80A), Version 1.3.3” submitted for evaluation fulfils the security features specified in its security target [ST] for the evaluation level EAL 4 augmented.

### 3.2. Restrictions

This certificate only applies on the product specified in chapter 1.2 of this certification report.

The user of the certified product shall respect the security objectives for the operational environment specified in the security target [ST] at the 4.2 and 4.3 chapters, and shall respect the recommendations in the guidance [GUIDES].

### 3.3. Recognition of the certificate

#### 3.3.1. *European recognition (SOG-IS)*

This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the SOG-IS agreement [SOG-IS].

The European Recognition Agreement made by SOG-IS in 1999 allows recognition from Signatory States of the agreement<sup>1</sup>, of ITSEC and Common Criteria certificates. The European recognition is applicable up to ITSEC E6 and CC EAL7 levels. The certificates that are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:



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<sup>1</sup> The signatory countries of the SOG-IS agreement are: Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.

### **3.3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)**

This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA [CC RA].

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement allows the recognition, by signatory countries<sup>1</sup>, of the Common Criteria certificates. The mutual recognition is applicable up to the assurance components of CC EAL4 level and also to ALC\_FLR family. The certificates that are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:



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<sup>1</sup> The signatory countries of the CCRA arrangement are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, New-Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.



## Annex 1. Evaluation level of the product

Class	Family	Components by assurance level							Assurance level of the product	
		EAL 1	EAL 2	EAL 3	EAL 4	EAL 5	EAL 6	EAL 7	EAL 4+	Name of the component
ADV Developmentt	ADV_ARC		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP	1	2	3	4	5	5	6	4	Complete functional specification
	ADV_IMP				1	1	2	2	1	Implementation representation of the TSF
	ADV_INT					2	3	3		
	ADV_SPM						1	1		
	ADV_TDS		1	2	3	4	5	6	3	Basic modular design
AGD Guidance	AGD_OPE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Preparative procedures
ALC Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC	1	2	3	4	4	5	5	4	Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
	ALC_CMS	1	2	3	4	5	5	5	4	Problem tracking CM coverage
	ALC_DEL		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2	2	Sufficiency of security measures
	ALC_FLR									
	ALC_LCD			1	1	1	1	2	1	Developer defined life-cycle model
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3	1	Well-defined development tools
ASE Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Extended components definition
	ASE_INT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	Security objectives
	ASE_REQ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Security problem definition
	ASE_TSS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	TOE summary specification
ATE Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3	2	Analysis of coverage
	ATE_DPT			1	1	3	3	4	1	Testing: security enforcing modules
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2	1	Functional testing
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	Independent testing: sample
AVA Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN	1	2	2	3	4	5	5	5	Focused vulnerability analysis

## Annex 2. Evaluated product references

[ST]	<p>Reference security target for the evaluation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- « Common Criteria security target - Machine Readable Travel Document – Extended Access Control – CC Ideal Pass », référence SSE-0000072979, révision 06,</li> </ul> <p>For the needs of publication, the following security target has been provided and validated in the evaluation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- « Common Criteria security target - Machine Readable Travel Document – Extended Access Control – CC Ideal Pass », référence SSE-0000076321-01.</li> </ul>
[ETR]	<p>Evaluation technical report :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- « SELENE - Rapport Technique d’Evaluation », référence LETI.CESTI.SEL.RTE.001, édition 2.0.</li> </ul>
[ANA-CRY]	<p>« Cotation de mécanismes cryptographiques- Qualification SELENE », n°2785/SGDN/ANSSI, 5 November 2009.</p>
[CONF]	<p>« CC_IDEAL_PASS – Software Release Sheet - v1.3.3 », référence SSE-0000073926, révision 06.</p>
[GUIDES]	<p>Installation guidance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- « Documentation d’installation, de génération et de démarrage », référence 0000075654, version 02,</li> </ul> <p>Administration guidance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- « ICAO Application Pre-personalization manual - Project : CC Ideal Pass », reference SSE-0000074722, version 02,</li> <li>- « ICAO Application Personalization manual - Project : CC Ideal Pass », reference SSE-0000074723, version 04,</li> </ul> <p>User guidance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- « ICAO Application User manual - Project : CC Ideal Pass », reference SSE-0000074862, version 01.</li> </ul>
[PP EAC]	<p>Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control, version 1.10, 25<sup>th</sup> March 2009. <i>Certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009.</i></p>
[PP0035]	<p>Protection Profile, Security IC Platform Protection Profile Version 1.0 June 2007. <i>Certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) under the reference BSI-PP-0035-2007.</i></p>
[2009/28]	<p>Certification report ANSSI-CC-2009/28, issued the 1<sup>st</sup> December 2009 for the “SB23YR80A secured microcontroller including the cryptographic library NesLib v2.0 in SB configuration”.</p>
[ICAO]	<p>ICAO Doc 9303, Sixth Edition, 2007.</p>



### Annex 3. Certification references

Decree number 2002-535 dated 18 <sup>th</sup> April 2002 related to the security evaluations and certifications for information technology products and systems.	
[CER/P/01]	Procedure CER/P/01 - Certification of the security provided by IT products and systems, DCSSI.
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation : Part 1: Introduction and general model, September 2006, version 3.1, revision 1, ref CCMB-2006-09-001, Part 2: Security functional components, September 2007, version 3.1, revision 2, ref CCMB-2007-09-002, Part 3: Security assurance components, September 2007, version 3.1, revision 2, ref CCMB-2007-09-003.
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation : Evaluation Methodology, September 2007, version 3.1, revision 2, ref CCMB-2007-09-004.
[CC AP]	Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical Document - Application of attack potential to smart-cards, reference CCDB-2009-03-001 version 2.7 revision 1, March 2009.
[COMP]	Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical Document - Composite product evaluation for smart cards and similar devices, reference CCDB-2007-09-001 version 1.0, revision 1, September 2007.
[CC RA]	Arrangement on the Recognition of Common criteria certificates in the field of information Technology Security, May 2000.
[SOG-IS]	«Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security Evaluation Certificates», version 2.0, April 1999, Management Committee of Agreement Group.
[REF-CRY]	Cryptographic mechanisms - Rules and recommendations about the choice and parameters sizes of cryptographic mechanisms with standard robustness level version 1.11, 24 <sup>th</sup> of October 2008, see <a href="http://www.ssi.gouv.fr">www.ssi.gouv.fr</a>